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## **Soviet Union**

***Political Affairs***

19980616 056

# Soviet Union

## Political Affairs

JPRS-UPA-89-050

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7 AUGUST 1989

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**Aid To Chernobyl-Affected Areas Examined**  
*18001274a Minsk SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA*  
*in Russian 19 May 89 p 3*

[BELTA report: "Program of Safe Resettlement"]

[Text] A commission of the Belorussian CP Central Committee Buro and the Belorussian SSR Council of Ministers met in a regular session to discuss the 1990-1995 draft state program of eliminating the consequences of the explosion at the Chernobyl atomic power station in the Belorussian SSR.

The program provides for a number of measures to resettle people from the inhabited localities where no safe living conditions have been ensured. The program highlights scientific problems involved in eliminating the disaster's effects. Comprehensive research is planned to study the water and ground ecological systems in each oblast, look into the physical, biochemical and genetic consequences of radiological contamination, review preventive measures and treatment of diseases, the methods of farming in the affected areas, and to develop radiological measuring instruments and devices.

Steps have been outlined to improve drastically medical services, trade, and the operation of everyday services for the population in the disaster areas. Institutions of higher learning, schools, and kindergartens will have their material and technical supplies increased and modern equipment will be provided for them.

The commission approved the draft state program in general and instructed the Gosplan, the Academy of Sciences, Gosagroprom, the Ministry of Public Health of the republic, the Gomel and Mogilev oblispolkoms and other ministries and agencies to revise it, taking into consideration the discussion that took place and submit it for discussion by the Belorussian CP Central Committee and the Belorussian SSR Council of Ministers.

The Mogilev oblispolkom and the Belkoopsoyuz [Belorussian Cooperative Union] were criticized for shortcomings in providing clean food products, especially baby food, to the people living in the constantly monitored areas. The heads of the Mogilev oblispolkom were instructed to immediately improve the housing and living conditions for medical workers, public educators and other specialists living in the areas in question.

The Belkoopsoyuz, the Belorussian SSR Gosagroprom [State Agroindustrial Committee] and the Belsovrof [Belorussian SSR Trade Union Council] were taken to task for shortcomings in eliminating the disaster's consequences.

The discussion of the draft program was joined by N. I. Dementey, secretary of the Belorussian CP Central Committee; Yu. M. Khusainov, first deputy chairman of the

Belorussian Council of Ministers; V. F. Kebich and N. N. Mazay, deputy chairmen of the Belorussian SSR Council of Ministers, and the heads of ministries and departments.

**BSSR Supreme Soviet Working Group On Stalinist Victims Meets**

*18001274b Minsk SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA*  
*in Russian 21 May 89 p 1*

[BELTA report: "In Memory of Victims of Repressions"]

[Text] A working group in charge of rendering assistance and ensuring the rights and interests of the rehabilitated people and immortalizing the victims of repressions in the 1930s-1940s and early 1950s held a session under the chairmanship of A. A. Zdanovich, deputy to the Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet. The group, working under the Supreme Soviet Presidium, listened to reports made by V. A. Gilep, deputy minister of culture of the republic; G. N. Vecherko, first deputy chairman of the Belorussian SSR Gosplan; A. L. Petrashkevich, deputy editor-in-chief of the Belorussian Soviet Encyclopedia; and T. V. Smirnova, head of the architecture and public buildings department of the Belorussian SSR Gosstroy. The reports described the progress made in implementing the decision of the republic's Council of Ministers on immortalizing the victims of mass repressions in 1937-1941 in the Kuropaty forest.

The republic will hold an open competition to design the best monument to the repression victims, consisting of an open phase and followed by one reviewing the ordered projects. Its program and conditions have been drawn up already. Winners will be awarded prizes. The Minsk gorispolkom has decided to temporarily develop the Kuropaty forest and to have the monument unveiled there. A temporary tombstone with an inscription has been erected at the burial ground.

The working group suggested that all organizations concerned redouble their efforts to hold the competition and build the monument as well as to prepare a special publication devoted to the repression victims. It was suggested that the available information be researched thoroughly so that nobody is left out.

According to the schedule, the working group members see visitors every Wednesday from 10 a.m. until 1 p.m.

**BSSR Supreme Soviet Studies Dissemination of Belorussian Language**

*18001274c Minsk SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA*  
*in Russian 21 May 89 p 1*

[Unattributed report: "Taking Care of the Native Language"]

[Text] What has been done by the Belorussian SSR Ministries of Public Education and Culture to promote and enhance the role played by the Belorussian language



in the republic's public life? This question was on the agenda of the Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet standing commission in charge of the nationalities issues and interethnic relations. The deputies paid visits to these departments, boards of public education at the Minsk oblispolkom and gorispolkom, the department of public education of the Soligorsk rayispolkom, Belorussian SSR Goskomizdat, the Belorussian State University and the Gorky Pedagogical Institute in Minsk. They took interest in the specific question of how the ministries together with the Belorussian Culture Fund and the Belorussian SSR Academy of Sciences are elaborating the republic "Native Language" and "Spring" programs.

The meeting noted that the activities of those organizations are uncoordinated and unmonitored. The problems of promoting Russian and national bilingualism remain as topical as ever and their practical implementation has been slowed down. It was emphasized that while preserving the principle of bilingualism in the republic, the study and use of the Belorussian language should be improved across the board and conditions should be set up to make it a state language.

The Yunatstva, Narodnaya Asveta and Vysheyshaya Shkola publishing houses failed to print the needed number of schoolbooks in the Belorussian language, especially of the popular history of the Belorussian SSR. Television, if it starts showing educational and instructional movies in the near future, can help the Belorussian language teachers a great deal, according to the speakers. To enhance the role of the Belorussian language in public life, it should be used more widely in kindergartens, schools and institutions of higher learning in the republic.

The commission members decided to include the problem on the agenda of the Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium. It was considered expedient to set up a commission or a group in the Supreme Soviet to prepare respective legislative acts. The ministries of public education and culture of the Belorussian SSR have been instructed to coordinate the formulation and implementation of the republic programs on language and the historical and cultural heritage in concert with the Academy of Sciences and the Belorussian Culture Fund. It was suggested that the number of hours allocated to the study of the Belorussian language and literature be increased in schools and that arts institutions of higher learning, technicums and teachers' training colleges gradually switch to instruction in Belorussian. Steps were urged to organize special courses with a view to expanding the training and advanced training of the teachers at the Belorussian language classes and schools as well as teachers in children's institutions.

The commission also looked into the use of the Belorussian language in traffic signs.

Taking part in the work of the commission were V. A. Mikulich, deputy chairman of the Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, and L. N. Syroyegina, secretary of the Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium.

### **Pugo Asks To Relinquish His LaSSR Supreme Soviet Position**

18001174 Riga SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA in Russian  
18 May 89 p 1

[Unattributed report: "In the Latvian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium"]

[Text] The Latvian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium received from Pugo, Boris Karlovich, deputy of the Latvian SSR Supreme Soviet, the following statement:

*"Respected comrades,*

"Perestroyka, democratization, and glasnost multiply many times over the demands on a deputy of the republic's supreme organ of power. One of his most important duties is to be in constant, close contact with the voters of his district and to be aware of their everyday needs and concerns.

"My confirmation as chairman of the Party Control Committee under the CPSU Central Committee and my departure to a permanent place of residence in Moscow deny me that opportunity and make extremely difficult the observance of the functions of deputy.

"As a result, I request that I be released from the duties of a deputy of the Latvian SSR Supreme Soviet.

"I take the opportunity to express once more my deep gratitude to all the voters of the district who granted me the high honor of acting as their deputy.

"I wish to assure you, respected comrades, that as a USSR people's deputy I will uphold the CPSU's Leninist policies, which express the true interests of all the peoples of our great homeland.

*"6 May 1989.  
"B. Pugo."*

Having considered the statement of Deputy Pugo, B.K., the Latvian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium has decided to grant his request.

\* \* \*

### **Ukase of the Latvian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium**

#### **On the Premature Termination of the Powers of Pugo, B.K., Deputy of the Latvian SSR Supreme Soviet**

In connection with the personal statement of Comrade Pugo, B.K. concerning the resignation of his powers as deputy, the Latvian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium resolves:

On the basis of Article 10 of the USSR Law "On the Status of People's Deputies in the USSR," to consider the powers of Pugo, Boris Karlovich, deputy of the Latvian SSR Supreme Soviet from Riga voting district No 85, prematurely terminated.

*A. Gorbunov, chairman of the Latvian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium. V. Klibik, secretary of the Latvian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium.*

*Riga, 17 May 1989*

### **Moldavian 11 May CC Plenum Debate Speeches**

#### **Moldavian SSR KGB Chairman Speaks**

*18001229 Kishinev SOVETSKAYA MOLDAVIYA  
in Russian 14 May 89 p 2*

[Unattributed report: "Discussion Speeches at the 11 May 1989 Moldavian CP Central Committee Plenum"]

[Excerpts]

Statement by **G. I. Lavranchuk** (member of Moldavian CP Central Committee, chairman of MSSR State Security Committee)

Recently the political and operational situation in the republic has become noticeably more complicated and, essentially speaking, has taken on the nature of an explosive crisis. Among a definite part of the intelligentsia and the youth, sharp negative moods have arisen, and they are promoting the development of centers of tension and leading to extremism, nationalism, chauvinism, national enmity, and conflict situations.

It is indisputable that many of these phenomena appeared in our society as a result of the creation and activity of such formations as the democratic movement in support of perestroika, the A. Mateyevich club, the Yedinstvo [Unity] Intermovement, the Moldavian Students League, the Gagauz Khalky Movement, and a number of others. In working with these informal associations, a number of mistakes were made at the very start. Their first steps were not immediately given the proper evaluation on the part of the Buro of the Moldavian CP Central Committee, the republic's government, or the party and soviet agencies in the outlying areas. No active dialogue with their leaders has been established so far, and no party influence is being exerted on the activity of the informal association by way of the CPSU members and labor collective administrators who have joined them. Little use is being made of the propaganda apparatus to explain the problems that are arising. There was a failure to give a prompt, well-principled evaluation of the passivity on the part of individual officials in the emergency situations.

At a time when the party and soviet agencies and their aktiv, having occupied a position of noninterference, remained stubbornly silent and pretended that nothing

was happening, various elements from among the persons with a nationalistic and anti-Soviet frame of mind began penetrating into the ranks of the informal associations and operating actively there. They also include today those who, in the past, had had criminal proceedings instituted against them. It was precisely under their influence at the informal meetings and rallies being conducted by the informal associations that the problems of languages, the alphabet, history, migration, and ecology began to be treated tendentiously, from positions of narrowly national interests. At these meetings and rallies, the speakers displayed an obvious tendency toward "sensationalism" in providing various information to their audience, and the attempt to incite among them unhealthy passions around the activity of the party and soviet agencies.

Against a background of the processes occurring in the republic one can observe the noticeable intensification of the subversive intelligence activities against Moldavia, and the increased interest of the representatives of the Western mass media to the events occurring in our republic. Using democratic institutions, the expansion of glasnost, and the legal changes in the direction of the greater openness of Soviet society, many diplomats, correspondents, and other representatives of a number of capitalist countries, in addition to the traditional interest that they have shown in military and institutional objectives, have recently increased their efforts in gathering intelligence information of a political nature. They are interested first of all in the rate of perestroika, in socioeconomic problems, in the atmosphere in which the election campaign is proceeding, and in the activities of the informal associations.

Special attention is devoted to a series of questions that deal with the interethnic relations and linguistic aspects. It was precisely those questions that were in the center of attention of the American, West German, English, and Norwegian diplomats and journalists who visited our republic in recent months. The perplexing thing is that, in the overwhelming majority of instances, they attempt to get the information that they are interested in not from representatives of the official agencies, labor collectives, and the intellectuals, but instead turn chiefly to dubious sources.

There is just one purpose for many of these visits—the attempts to gather as many "freshly baked" facts, tendentious conjectures, gossip, and rumors. One can understand the payment that De Sessieux, the correspondent from the France-Presse agency, hoped to receive by receiving information from I. Tutunaru, who is well-known in the circles of the informal associations, but who now has been arrested for having committed crude violations of law and order during unsanctioned demonstrations. He reported to the French journalist that the task of those who shared his views was to convince no fewer than 100,000 inhabitants of the republic of the need to renounce Soviet citizenship, in order, by this means, to attract the attention of the world public to their activities.

Since the beginning of 1989 there has been a considerable increase in the number of radio broadcasts and newspaper items in the West that have been devoted to the events in Moldavia. For example, the Romanian desk of the Radio Free Europe currently transmits materials three times a week concerning the situation in the republic. Radio Paris has opened up a second program in Romanian for radio listeners in Moldavia. There has been simultaneously a noticeable increase in the volume of broadcasts to the republic by the Romanian desks of Voice of America, BBC, Deutsche Welle, and also Radio Liberty.

The content of most of the correspondents' reports and especially the radio broadcasts concerning Moldavia is distinguished in a number of instances by the lack of objectivity when evaluating the events taking place in the republic, by bias, and by provocational attacks aimed primarily at instigating anti-Soviet, anti-Russian moods. The very list of questions that are of interest to the foreign correspondents also looks tendentious. They include the details about the breaking up of the unsanctioned demonstrations and rallies; the means that were used at such times by the workers in the law-enforcement agencies; the number of persons wounded and arrested; the participation of troops in breaking up the groups of demonstrators; the content of the slogans and street banners; and details concerning conflicts on an inter-ethnic basis. There have been rather frequent instances when Western radio stations in their broadcasts to Moldavia, playing upon the national emotions of the radio audience, attempt to evoke in them a distrust toward the information being published in certain central newspapers and magazines.

For purposes of further inciting the situation, creating additional centers of tension, intensifying the unhealthy passions and emotions, and disseminating panic rumors, the Western mass media resort to direct falsifications when illuminating the events taking place in the republic. For example, Voice of America, citing the West German newspaper SUEDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG, reported that during an unsanctioned rally that occurred on 2 March in Kishinev, there had been human casualties, and that had led to the arrival of a group of investigators from USSR Procuracy.

To a considerable degree the creation of the mentioned falsifications is promoted by the numerous interviews that are lavishly given to the foreign correspondents by the leaders of the informal organizations, and also by certain journalists and members of MSSR Writers Union. In February-April 1989 alone, the radio waves repeatedly carried interviews given by A. Shalaru, Yu. Roshki, M. Fusu, I. Tsurkanu, A. Tsurkanu, I. Katsaveyke, S. Burke, I. Tutunaru, and others.

In this regard, something that is at least surprising is the stubborn silence and lack of reaction of our republic-level newspapers, radio, and television to the facts cited in these interviews, as well as the detached position

taken by those organizations when those journalists and writers are carried on the rolls. Their administrators are apparently remaining silent because they agree with the people who are slandering the republic and its nation. One needs only to add that the increased activity of the Western mass media is directed and encouraged by the enemy's intelligence services.

It should be noted that, under the action of this situation, one observes the increase also of a tendency toward emigration. Whereas in 1987, 1100 residents of the republic went abroad for permanent residency and in 1988 that number increased to 1700 residents, during the first four months of the current year more than 2000 persons received authorization to leave the republic. The reasons for leaving include the aggravation of the inter-ethnic situation and the instability of the situation within the republic. That hypothesis was actively seized upon by the Western ideological services. For example, in definite circles in the United States, a question that is being puffed up out of all proportion is the question of granting to such emigres the status of political refugees. This idea is being purposefully suggested to our citizens.

One of the reasons for the complicating of the situation in the republic, in our opinion, was the fact that many comrades, including the administrative cadres, felt for a long time—and certain of them continue to feel now—that the only way that it is possible to improve that situation is by using the forces of the law-enforcement agencies and making practically all the informal organizations administratively and criminally answerable. Yes, the violators of the law and criminals must be brought to responsibility, the law-enforcement agencies must actually do this in a time-responsive and sufficiently qualified manner. True, they are not always successful in this, and they must make the necessary conclusions from this. But I feel that the basic way to improve the situation in the republic is the quickest possible resolution of those serious problems that have arisen during the perestroika period; the carrying out of active work in the workers' collectives; a prompt and constructive dialogue; and the convincing explanation to the people who have joined the informal associations that they are using erroneous methods in their attempt to satisfying their just demands and are proceeding after the wrong authorities. Holding people criminally accountable is an extreme measure, and it must be employed only when other measures of exerting an influence on people can no longer achieve the goal.

The course aimed at perestroika, and the current practical and operational situation, determine the strategy and tactics, and the content and nature of the activities of MSSR Committee for State Security. Today in order for us Chekists to be on top of things, it is necessary for us to understand correctly the essence of what is occurring, to evaluate our work objectively, and to take a critical approach to its results and plans. Proceeding from this principle, the committee associates are carrying out active preventive work. A number of persons

have been issued an official warning. At the present time the participation of Chekists in the fight against such a dangerous phenomenon as organized crimes has been deemed to be possible and desirable.

The present situation requires the party organizations to intensify the demands that they place on every Communist for observing the requirements of the CPSU Rules, in accordance with which he is obliged to work consistently to implement the ideas of proletarian socialist internationalism and Soviet patriotism, to wage an aggressive struggle against manifestations of nationalism and chauvinism, and to work actively to promote the reinforcement of the friendship of the nations of the USSR. It is only when every party member follows these holy and immutable principles and the party organizations react sharply to every instance when they are violated, that we can achieve the improvement of the political and operational situation in the republic. [passage omitted]

**Kishinev Gorkom First Secretary's Speech**

18001229 Kishinev SOVETSKAYA MOLDAVIYA  
in Russian 14 May 89 p 2

[Unattributed report: "Discussion Speeches at the 11 May 1989 Moldavian CP Central Committee Plenum"]

[Excerpts]

Statement by N. A. Tsyu (member of the Buro of the Moldavian CP Central Committee, First Secretary of the party's Kishinev Gorkom)

At the current turning point in the development of the processes of perestroyka, life presents us with very serious questions. Without their prompt and thorough analysis, movement ahead is extremely complicated. Today's plenum has been called upon to analyze carefully the phenomena and processes that are occurring in the republic's sociopolitical life and to provide their appropriate evaluation. We must interpret and define precisely the role of the Central Committee, the party committees and organizations, and every Communist in the situation that has been created, and must ascertain the ways for resolving the questions that have been posed by life itself. In a word, the plenum has an importance that is very great for the life of the republic, since the recent events do not provide us with the grounds either for complacency or contemplativeness.

The broad politicizing of the masses and the entry of newer and newer people onto the arena of social activity—all this has fundamentally changed the sociopolitical situation in the republic. An extremely paradoxical situation has developed. We always used to appeal to people to show greater participation, but when a real explosion of civic participation occurred, we proved to be unready for that and we were unable to channel it constructively. So today it is already obvious that we are losing in specifically those places where we have been

slow to interpret the processes that are occurring. The initiative has been seized by other forces, by the independent formations. I do not want to dramatize the state of affairs, but we Communists also do not have the right to close our eyes to what is happening in the republic.

The problems that have risen to full height today include such problems as the harmonizing of the interethnic relations; the throwing of light on the "unexplored areas" in the history of our republic; the status of the Moldavian language; and the writing system for that language. People do not want to reconcile themselves to the slow resolution of the housing question, or to the shortcomings in organizing the work of trade, the personal-services sphere, and public health. People are also dissatisfied with the work of the law-enforcement agencies, the ecological situation, the failures in the economy, and many other things. All this gives rise to people's distrust, to reciprocal suspiciousness, and to irritation that changes over to social tension. Simultaneously, people begin to lose trust in the administrative agencies. These are extremely alarming symptoms. It is already obvious today that we have proven to be incapable of carrying out thoroughly thought-out mass-political work under the conditions, either with regard to form or with regard to content. And we have made so many tactical errors and miscalculations for the simple reason that we have operated in accordance with the old way of doing things.

The leadership of the party's city organization is well aware of its entire responsibility for the undesirable processes that have been occurring in the city. Currently the city's party committees are carrying out a persistent search for work forms and methods that would conform to today's needs. The primary party organizations, the Communists, are our main force and support. Much depends upon their position, role, influence, and authority. There is no doubt that today, as never before, we need the constructivism and consolidation of the forces and actions of all the party links. It is necessary to bring the political essence, the entire complexity and variety of the restructuring processes that have been occurring in the country, the republic, the city, and the work collective to the awareness of every party cell, every Communist.

Today we must admit frankly that in this complicated situation the unity of the party ranks is being shaken. In the city's party organizations one can encounter not only people's confusion, but also their most real panic, and a few people are even turning in their party identification cards. Arguments are occurring everywhere: is it permissible for a party member to participate in the work of the informal organizations? Individual party members occupy a dual—and, I would say, hypocritical—position. The time has come to ascertain who is who. If you have a party card, then you should be courteous, you should carry out the line that has been defined by the party's Program and Rules. If you have a different opinion, then turn in your party card. We must all give a strict evaluation to those Communists who are not fulfilling

the party's Program and Rules, and who are not following Leninist party principles. Our opinion is unambiguous—every Communist must find himself precisely in his own party organization, must stir up people, and lead them after himself.

Party meetings and labor collective meetings have occurred in the city, at which the proper evaluation was given to the events occurring in Kishinev. However, it must be admitted that the results of our efforts have been insignificant and the city's party and soviet agencies continue to be concerned about this. In addition, the resolution of most of the problems around which people's passions have been raging today is beyond their competency.

The city's party aktiv asks us why the Central Committee workers, and primarily the secretaries, have not been taking part in the discussions at rallies, and rarely make statements on the pages of the press, or over the radio or television. Why have the republic's administrators not been given a personal rebuff to our ideological opponents, but instead have been entrusting this job to others? Why is it that, while we quote Lenin frequently, we forget the Leninist principle—do not overlook a single ideological eccentricity, do not consider it to be labor invariably to criticize sharply and in a well-principled manner any harmful declaration? When will we finally learn how to forecast events? These and dozens of similar questions require a persistent answer. No one will deny the fact that one can notice in our work today the lack of cohesion, the wait-and-see tactics, and the lack of a single, integrated platform or program of actions.

Many people do not have a clear idea of the causes of today's problems or the ways to eliminate them. The lack of information concerning the steps being taken to resolve many acute questions creates in certain people the incorrect opinion that nothing is changing, that everything remains the way it used to be. Let us be self-critical: we party workers and ideologists frequently are moving too slowly in this situation. Frequently we are forced not to persuade people, but to make them change their minds, and that is much more difficult.

We say, for example, that it is necessary to help the masses analyze the programs and views of certain formations and leaders who are rushing to seize political power. However, this is understood in such a way that all the help must proceed from the party's gorkoms and raykoms. But what about the Central Committee and its Ideological Department? To this day the local party agencies have not received either the proper guidelines or any practical advice concerning the questions that are disturbing them. And I agree with the evaluation that was given to ideological work in S. K. Grossu's report.

I shall state confidently that a large number of the Communists—not to mention the ordinary inhabitants—of Kishinev do not know today what the Central

Committee's position with regard to the current problems is, or what the specific deadlines for resolving them are. And are we really to believe that it is normal for the people of Kishinev to state frankly that they do not sense how the republic's leadership defends the population's interests at CPSU Central Committee or USSR Council of Ministers? Wouldn't it be a good idea, once a month, to discuss the newly arisen problems, making use of television and taking advantage of the opportunity to direct questions by telephone to the Central Committee secretaries, the Chairmen of the republic's Supreme Soviet and Council of Ministers, and their deputies?

A large number of questions are asked at rallies. I feel that absolutely all of them should be answered. At the same time, the answers must be prompt and competent. The group of experts that has been specially created under Moldavian CP Central Committee should be involved in preparing those answers. The April 1989 Plenum of CPSU Central Committee reminded us once again that the processes that are occurring must not be viewed by yesterday's eyes, and must not be evaluated only from our own parochial point of view. We need political analysis that is well-principled and honest. We need frank dialogue with all strata of society. Social movements are very varied, and much in them is subjective. Nevertheless, it is necessary, with a consideration of the real-life political process, to make all these interests compatible. It is necessary to consolidate all the republic's healthy forces, and to search for and find points of contact. The time when it was possible to conceal, ban, or disband anything that we did not like has passed irreversibly.

And I would like to say one more thing. Wouldn't it be a good idea for us members of the Moldavian CP Central Committee, taking into consideration the tempestuous dynamics of current political life, to meet considerably more frequently? I feel that this would not always necessitate a large report or an extensive decree. What we need is the frank exchange of opinions in order to come up with a joint resolution.

In conclusion I would like to emphasize that we see our party duty in looking for the answers to questions that disturb people, in dispelling the doubts, in putting hope into people, and in channeling people's growing social and political participation into good deeds, into the acceleration of perestroika. It is becoming increasingly obvious that the entire dissent in opinions and judgments, the resistance, and the dissatisfaction are linked with causes that are more deeply rooted: the state of public relations, the economic and social infrastructure, the development of democracy, and political culture. And we must reach that level of understanding, we must reach that depth in our work. [passage omitted]

**Moldavian SSR Komsomol First Secretary Speaks**  
*18001229 Kishinev SOVETSKAYA MOLDAVIYA*  
*in Russian 14 May 89 p 3*

[Unattributed report: "Discussion Speeches at the 11 May 1989 Moldavian CP Central Committee Plenum"]

[Excerpts]

Statement by **D. P. Bragish** (first secretary of the Moldavian Komsomol Central Committee)

The Komsomol Central Committee shares the deep concern that was expressed in the report with regard to the situation that has developed among the republic's youth. It is no secret to anyone that frequently the participation of young men and women is realized outside the Komsomol structures, in new associations that ascribe to themselves the status of social and political ones. At such time a number of the Komsomol committees continue to play the role of passengers who are rushing to catch a train at the last minute or who are running after it. Why does this occur? Today this question is brought up more and more frequently at sessions of the Buro and the Secretariat of the Komsomol Central Committee, and at meetings with the Komsomol aktiv.

There are many reasons, and I would like to mention several of them. The active participation of many Komsomol cadres continues to be shackled by the inveterate habit of acting in accordance with a command issued from the top. A large number of our workers and organizations—and this was mentioned in the report—have not mastered the ideological initiative among the youth. We see a way out of the situation that has been created in the restructuring of the thought processes of the Komsomol cadres and aktiv.

The events of recent months have shown that the political struggle frequently proceeds without the active participation of the Komsomol leaders. But just as it is impossible to learn how to swim unless one goes into the water, it is impossible to carry out any proper political discussion, much less win it, unless one participates in it. But many of our cadres have difficulty differentiating between a genuine attempt to help the perestroika and the desire to speculate on the existing problems. This proceeds as a result of the fact that the Komsomol aktiv, including the Central Committee members, is insufficiently informed and by the poor explanatory work being carried out among the young people.

In the current complicated situation, every young person must be promptly aware of the changes in the ideological situation. It must be stated directly: the Komsomol Central Committee, with regard to political enlightenment, is currently doing an amount of work that is obviously insufficient. In our opinion, the party committees in the outlying areas are also devoting insufficient attention to these questions. But today, as never before, we sense the need for a contact between the party committees and their

administrators, on the one hand, and young people, on the other, a need for a real return to the Leninist principle of working with young people. This will undoubtedly be a mutually advantageous dialogue.

I would like for the members of the party's Central Committee to speak more frequently to audiences of young people and to inquire about their problems. But unfortunately, during the past six months, only every fourth party gorkom or raykom conducted meetings with the Komsomol aktiv at which the political situation was explained. This is also especially important because a number of newly revealed politicians who are attempting to obtain public recognition, having armed themselves with fashionable slogans and phrases, are attempting to extend their influence specifically to young people, to subordinate them to themselves, and to channel them into counteractions against the party, soviet, and Komsomol agencies.

Their statements are also echoed by certain statements made in the mass media, which over-emphasize the negative features of everyday life and deliberately distort history. And the young men and women frequently find the answers to the questions that arise at such time only at rallies. Despite the fact that these answers, in a number of instances, are of a tendentious nature, they are accepted as the truth—because there is no alternative. Thus, there is an active process of the "de-ideologizing" of the young people, and there is created in their minds a confusion that sometimes leads to the making of politically immature decisions.

And if one adds to this the slow resolution of the social problems that are linked with the obtaining of housing and an education, with the way that people spend their free time, and recently with the finding of a job, it becomes understandable why it is precisely among the young people that the outcroppings of destabilization, of nationalistic moods, and various kinds of illegal actions find fertile ground.

It seems to us that something that can become a real way out of this is the acceptance and publicizing of specific programs for resolving young people's problems, the implementation of which would reinforce the young men and women's faith in the correctness of the party's political course. I would also like to see in the press scientific elaborations for developing the economy and history of Moldavia and for its national and cultural construction, which would place their emphasis on these questions. Such statements, if they do exist, have been extremely infrequent and do not always find their way to the young people.

In the situation that has been created, the Komsomol committees, with the support of the party agencies, must considerably reinforce the system of the political education of the Komsomol and the other young people, channeling into that work those propagandists who are capable of answering all the varied questions that young people ask.

It is necessary to organize the work in such a way that history and modern life, by interacting flexibly, became an organic part of the person's inner world. For this purpose it is necessary to use the experience of the veterans and the large charge of civic-mindedness and bravery provided by the young people who are our same age—the internationalist fighting men. The Buro of the Moldavian Komsomol Central Committee sees the outcroppings of the new approaches to the formation in young men and women of precise theoretical positions, the skills needed for participation in political life, and in the subsequent development of the political-club movement.

And there is something else: the people's movement for perestroika exists—otherwise there would be no perestroika itself—but the attempts to introduce extremist measures into this movement will inevitably lead to a demarcation based on political, national, and other motivations, and will deflect considerable forces from resolving its absolutely fundamental tasks. And we must not allow this to happen. The position of the Buro of the Komsomol's Central Committee in this regard is well-principled: we are in favor of those youth associations whose goals correspond to the interests of society and to socialist positions.

That was specifically the approach taken by the Komsomol's Central Committee to the conducting of a forum of representatives of various associations that appeared spontaneously in the republic. The basic task of that forum was the consolidation of the youth forces in supporting perestroika; cooperation in resolving the problems of young people in various areas (the economy, politics, the development of national relations, the spiritual sphere); the protection of the rights and interests of broad segments of the republic's youth by means of a completely equal dialogue and the use of the right of the Moldavian Komsomol's Central Committee to have the legislative initiative. The few meetings and sessions that have been held have demonstrated the viability and necessity of the forum.

However, these approaches have not been to the liking of the leaders of the democratic movement, the A. Mateyevich club, the students' league, or certain others. Having refused at the last moment to participate in the dialogue, they have demonstrated their lack of desire to search for constructive ways to stabilize the positive processes of perestroika. [passage omitted]

**Chief of MVD Political Department**

18001229 Kishinev SOVETSKAYA MOLDAVIYA  
in Russian 14 May 89 p 3

[Unattributed report: "Discussion Speeches at the 11 May 1989 Moldavian CP Central Committee Plenum"]

[Excerpts]

Statement by **M. Kh. Popov** (candidate member of Moldavian CP Central Committee, chief of Political Department, MSSR Ministry of Internal Affairs)

Democracy and glasnost, the political, economic, and legal reforms, and all the processes of perestroika are becoming part of our life for the sake of one thing: so that Soviet people can live better, so that their initiative, creativity, and rich spiritual world can be revealed more completely. There certainly is no one who does not agree with this thesis, which was mentioned in a PRAVDA editorial. Why, then, have the mutually exclusive phenomena of perestroika and the negative phenomena become frequent facts in our life today? There are a rather large number of reasons for this. I assume that one of them lies in the positions that the party organizations occupy.

The situation in the republic during recent months not only helped to determine the different level of influence exerted by the party organizations on the masses, but also to ascertain the real leaders and the active ideological warriors in the party. Not all of us were able to restructure our work in conformity with the spirit of the time. Not each one of us defined precisely his positions during this decisive period in our country's life.

We often hear today that we have proven to be unready to operate under the new conditions that are unfamiliar to us. But who, properly speaking, was supposed to have trained us for this work? Didn't life attempt repeatedly to prove to us that the party organizations that are in control of the situation are those that work constantly among the people, that react sensitively to their problems, and that quickly, and with a consideration of the situation, restructure the forms and methods of their activity?

Unfortunately, the number of such party organizations did not prove to be so large. The situation of recent months proved that convincingly. We saw with our own eyes the development of the active participation of the informal associations and their leaders. We saw where they were leading the people. We sensed what methods they were using and how time-responsively they were changing them. The only thing is that we did not always make specific conclusions for ourselves and did not undertake any actions that were decisive and understandable by the people. As a result, we gave the opportunity to the extremist leaders of the spontaneously created organizations to destabilize the situation in the republic

I am judging from the situation in the internal affairs agencies. A rather large number of problems accumulated in the militia during recent years. They include the poor rate of being provided with technology; the weak legal social protection provided to the employees of the internal affairs agencies; the low salaries; the lagging system for the training of cadres; and a number of others. Under these conditions, the MVD Board and Political



Department saw their main task in improving the professional training and the responsibility borne by each employee, each Communist, for the execution of his duty, and in the strict fulfillment of the requirements of the oath and the CPSU Rules. Simultaneously there was an attempt to resolve in a concrete manner the most acute questions of our life. It did not prove to be possible to do everything that had been planned, and that, naturally, had a detrimental effect on the operational situation in the republic, which situation continues to be very complicated. To this was added the deflection of forces and time to protect public order during unsanctioned rallies and demonstrations.

In the measures being carried out by us, we attempted not to commit the most terrible thing—the shedding of blood. Our employees showed restraint and self-possession, resisted provocations, and prevented the occurrence of events like those that occurred in Tbilisi, although that outcome was very probable. Suffice it to state that on 12 March, during an unsanctioned demonstration, dozens of our employees received bodily wounds, and three persons were hospitalized. It is obvious to the administrators and Communists in the ministry that, having proven to be on the cutting edge of the events that were evoked by the processes of democratization and glasnost, the employees of the militia and the other internal affairs subdivisions are the most vulnerable persons and the ones who are most subjected to the influence of the informal associations. Therefore one of our most important tasks was, and continues to be, the prevention of support given to the informal organizations that are operating contrary to Soviet laws. The internal affairs agencies were created by the will of the party and serve its ideas.

However, this idea, which is being implemented by the political apparatus and by the party organizations, has not been brought to the complete awareness of all our employees, and a few persons, by their word and by their action, have supported the informal associations. Our further measures convinced us that it is only a direct discussion in the collectives, and direct and honest answers to the questions that disturb the employees, as well as specific actions to resolve the existing problems, that yield a positive educational effect. People can analyze the situation and determine who is who. The only thing that is needed is to help them in this regard. There have also been workers who have stubbornly adhered to the ideas of the informal associations. We did not make a tragedy out of this, but provided them with the opportunity to realize their conviction, except that it had to be done outside our ranks, and we think that that position was a correct one.

Another question is whether we always received the necessary support of the party organizations in the outlying areas. It was correctly mentioned in the report that the false impression being created is that certain party committees prefer to sit things out on the sidelines, and have been avoiding any acute conflict situations

even in those instances when the Communists are crudely violating the CPSU Rules. I do not think that this position promotes increasing the authority of the party agency. That is what happened when we dealt with Communist Bogas, a former employee of the Yalovenskiy Rayon OVD [Internal Affairs Department]. The primary party organization, after censuring this actions, did not, in our opinion, get him a well-principled party evaluation, as a result of which we asked the party's raykom to consider his personal file. And it would have been logical to do this specifically in the Yalovenskiy Rayon party organization, where Bogas was rather well-known. However, the party's raykom allowed Bogas to be taken off the rolls, to go to Kishinev, and now the Leninskiy Rayon committee is attempting to restore the essence of the events. Time has been lost, there has been a reduction in the educational effect, and, in addition, Bogas currently represents these actions everywhere as persecution against him for having expressed criticism.

Incidentally, the slowness to act and the indecisiveness occur not only at the level of the primary organization or the rayon organization. We feel that the uncertainty is also demonstrated by the Central Committee workers, when we have asked for the publication of information from the party meeting of the MVD apparatus that considered the personal file of Communist Plugaru. That was important, in our opinion, since conceivable and inconceivable discussions were already being conducted around that figure. In the apparatus of the republic's Ministry of Internal Affairs, Plugaru has been working for four months, but not once did he take part in the protection of public order during the unsanctioned rallies, although the participants in that work included all the employees, up to and including the minister. Hiding behind various reasons and knowing that the demonstrators who were chanting his name were inflicting bodily harm on the employees of the militia, Plugaru pretends that that does not pertain to him. Moreover, when, on 5 March, a real threat to the next appearance of the rally participants in the square was created, he refused to give authorization to speak at the rally or to call upon people to observe prudence and order. And, finally, knowing that people were planning to nominate him as a candidate for election as a USSR people's deputy, in collectives that were extremely remote from the militia and at a rally of the informal associations to propose making him a member of the Doveriye [Trust] group, Plugaru did not deem it necessary to show any curiosity about what his party comrades, or the party organization where he was carried on the rolls, thought about this. I am not even mentioned the fact that, for a period of two months and 20 days, he did not find the time to get on the party rolls or pay his dues, but, instead, he did so only after being reminded by the party committee secretary.

I think that the Communists who considered this kind of behavior to be betrayal of the interests of the service and to be political immaturity were correct. Assuming that passions were being heated up around his personality, we invited a correspondent to the party meeting so that,



objectively and without any prejudice, he could provide the public with information concerning the content of the discussion. However, we were not supported at Central Committee. It was felt that, by so doing, we would create grounds for the manifestation of sympathy for Plugaru, and the authorization to publish the item was denied. Nevertheless the article appeared in IZVESTIYA, but in a different interpretation—the interpretation of the persons who had not been present at the meeting—and the conclusions were made basically from discussions with the punished Communist. In my opinion, the party agency should act in a more decisive, bolder, and more energetic manner and should not be led around by dubious moods.

At the April Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee it was justly noted that the loss of initiative is fraught with serious harm to perestroyka, and with the appearance of additional moral, social, political, and economic disorders. We must prevent this from happening in any instance. We understand that the internal affairs agencies also have by no means done everything to improve the sociopolitical situation in the republic. The paths of our contribution to the common cause of normalizing the situation lie primarily by way of the intensification of the fight against crime. It will be necessary for us to reinforce considerably the ties with the labor collectives and with the public at their place of residence. In our practical work, more dynamic use will be made of reports given by the employees to the people, and the study of public opinion concerning our work. We could provide considerably more complete information to people about our failures and our successes and about the vital problems of the day if the mass media were more eager to establish contacts with us. We could also do this by way of our own large-circulation newspaper if the party's Central Committee, of course, authorized us to publish it. The resolution of these questions in on the agenda today, and we are applying all our efforts toward implementing them as rapidly as possible.

[passage omitted].

**GSSR Supreme Soviet Official Blames Military for Misuse of Curfew**

18300678 Tbilisi ZARYA VOSTOKA in Russian  
24 May 89 p 3

[Article by V. Kvaratskheliya, secretary of the Georgian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, and I. Chikovani, chief of the legal department: "Necessary Clarifications"]

[Text] The tragedy, which occurred in Tbilisi on 9 April 1989, caused everyone enormous pain.

A thorough and scrupulous investigation of the circumstances, which took place in Tbilisi, is the civic duty of all individuals participating in this lofty mission. Only

truth and candor will help people to gain faith in the shaken ideals of the democratization of the Soviet society, which had embarked on the path of renewal, and to relieve the tension.

It was precisely because of public opinion and with a view to ascertaining the truth that the Georgian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium saw fit, in view of the aforementioned tragedy, to form a commission responsible to the supreme organ of government instead of an ordinary government commission. As is generally known, the commission is comprised of very competent individuals—deputies of the republic's Supreme Soviet and prominent public figures.

Inaccuracies in such an important matter could lead to an incorrect representation and do a disservice to everyone, to whom the interests and future of Georgia are dear.

When we decided to express our opinion with regard to the subcommittee's findings "On the legality of the imposition of a curfew in the city of Tbilisi on 9 April 1989", which was published in the 23 May 1989 issue of ZARYA VOSTOKA, we were guided by exactly these considerations.

We are not disputing these findings in the least, but for the sake of clarity we consider it necessary to make some needed corrections to this document.

First of all, as the press has already reported, the Georgian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium did not make any decision whatever about bringing troops from any arm of the service into the republic's territory, neither prior to 9 April nor afterwards.

Secondly, as was correctly pointed out in the subcommittee's own findings and we quote: "Thus far, the content of the implemented article 119 of the USSR Constitution have not defined a single normative act which falls under the concepts of "a state of emergency" and "a special form of control". The procedure for declaring the emergency measure of "a curfew", which has come into practice, is just as obscure and vague.

It should be noted that as far back as 23 November 1988, a session of the Georgian SSR Supreme Soviet while considering the course of the discussion in the republic concerning the draft law on changes and addenda to the USSR Constitution, emphasized that martial law or a state of emergency must be implemented in accordance with laws governing martial law and states of emergency and raised the question of the necessity of adopting such laws before the USSR Supreme Soviet. Unfortunately, as of the present time the aforementioned laws have not yet been passed.

It is at this point that we consider it necessary to underscore one very important inaccuracy which has crept into the subcommittee's findings.

The point of contention is the reference in the subcommittee's findings to the Union edict dated 22 June 1941 "On martial law". It was adopted on the day that the Great Patriotic War began and corresponded to the problems and spirit of that time. For the sake of information we will state that in this edict there was not even a mention of "curfews". In spite of this, the subcommittee's findings assert that principles which embody the substance of the concept of curfews are set forth in detail in paragraph 3 of the aforementioned edict.

Now for the main point. As the subcommittee's own findings have emphasized, a standard Union law on the order and procedure for implementing a curfew does not yet exist.

Such is the state of affairs. At the same time, as is generally known, the maintenance of public order is entrusted to the Georgian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium by the republic's Constitution.

The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet passed the resolution concerning the implementation of a curfew at 17:00 on 9 April, that is after troops had already moved into Tbilisi and the tragedy of 9 April had become a fait accompli. It will suffice to recall the situation on that ill-fated Sunday: the party and Soviet organs did not handle the situation properly. Troops were stationed in the city and the danger of new excesses and undesirable incidents had not been eliminated.

That is exactly why the republic Supreme Soviet Presidium assumed responsibility and passed the resolution on the implementation of a curfew.

Under those extreme conditions and in view of certain difficulties, we did not manage to assemble the required quorum for conducting a session of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet until 16:00. By 17:00 the resolution was adopted unanimously and was sent on according to procedure.

As regards the time that the curfew took effect, this should have been announced by an official, who should have been appointed the commandant of the city. At the same time the commandant was obliged to explain the regulations, which defined the gist of the curfew, to the population. Unfortunately, this was not accomplished on time, but through no fault of the republic's Supreme Soviet Presidium.

Cases of the most flagrant excesses, abuses of power, and arbitrary rule with respect to the peaceful population, which were displayed by individual representatives of military units after the announcement of the curfew, aggravated the situation even more in the capital and in the republic as a whole. As a result, one citizen was killed and two were injured.

Criminal proceedings have been instituted concerning these cases and a full-scale investigation is being conducted. The perpetrators will undoubtedly be punished to the full extent of the law.

This is everything that we wanted to explain, for the purpose of ascertaining the truth, concerning the reasons for the Georgian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium issuing the decree on the implementation of a curfew in Tbilisi on 9 April 1989.

### **19 May Uzbek Plenum Views Economic Issues, Informal Group Activities**

#### **First Secretary Nishanov Address**

*18300681 Tashkent PRAVDA VOSTOKA in Russian  
20 May 89 pp 2-3*

[Unattributed report on speech by R. N. Nishanov, first secretary of the Uzbek CP Central Committee, at the 19 May 89 13th Plenum of the Uzbek CP Central Committee: "Deepening Perestroyka, Setting the Tone in Affairs"]

[Text] Comrades!

The 25 April CPSU Central Committee Plenum is of exceptionally great importance for the work of the entire party at the present complicated stage. The Plenum re-emphasized that the party takes a realistic and self-critical attitude to its activity and called upon all party links to carry out an honest and open analysis and to define realistic paths for resolving the problems confronting us, to work out tactics of action which correspond to the strategic course, and to extend energetic work in all areas.

Something else that obliges us to do this is the sociopolitical situation that is developing in the republic, a situation which, to put it plainly, is by no means simple. On the one hand, the political and economic reform has led to the movement of processes of democratization and the broad politicizing of the masses, and there has been a rapid rise in people's self-awareness. On the other hand, a factor that has become a real one in our present-day life is the buildup of people's dissatisfaction with the slow resolution of problems that have been accumulating for years—problems of the social sphere, the ecology, and interethnic relations.

These questions were raised sharply and with a large amount of concern at the party meetings to hear reports and hold elections and at party conferences, in the course of preparing and conducting the election of USSR people's deputies, and at meetings and conversations with the workers. All of this requires responsible and accurate political analysis. It is for that reason, properly speaking, that today's Central Committee plenum was convoked.

I

First of all, we must make practical conclusions from the recent electoral campaign, which, as was noted at the CPSU Central Committee Plenum, became a referendum to support perestroika. The election showed that the overwhelming majority of people unambiguously link their future with the renewal and improvement of a life based on socialist values. This is the chief political result. By voting, as a majority, for the Communists, the republic's workers reconfirmed their attitude toward the party as an authoritative and reliable political force that is capable of realistically guaranteeing the renovation of society and its consolidation.

The election was conducted in a complicated situation in the republic. Against a background of dissatisfaction with the practical results that were linked primarily with people's welfare, there was an increase in the activity of certain groups of persons which were not operating on the political level, and, not infrequently, also of simply careerist elements. Speculating on the unresolved problems, they attempted to incite the situation, to play on people's emotions, and to drive a wedge between the nations living in Uzbekistan. They predicted that people would not take part in the election, or, if they did, they would vote against. Moreover, they made attempts to discredit the new electoral system and called upon people to express their distrust in the registered candidates for election as deputies.

Under these conditions individual party committees and soviet agencies were not always in sufficient control of the situation, they lagged behind the events, and displayed a definite amount of confusion. One could discern the effects of complacency and the inability to fight for the support of the broad masses or to carry out daily work with the population at their place of residence, especially with the youth.

It is in the fact that the nation is joining more and more actively in sociopolitical activity and that people are discontent with the way in which the urgent problems are being resolved in a specific city, rayon, oblast, or republic and are making rigid demands on the work of the party, soviet, and economic agencies that we must see, first of all, the completely natural phenomenon of perestroika. And in this regard we are not in favor of increasing democracy by giving out measured dosages. But, as we deepen the democratic reforms, we must boldly defend them both from conservatism and from "leftism," using the force of conviction and the force of law.

"Soviet citizens unambiguously voted for perestroika," M. S. Gorbachev remarked, "but by so doing they had in mind perestroika not as an abstract idea, but as an effective process that is saturated with specific content and tangible matters."

We encounter among the workers an understanding of the fact that the resolving of critical problems takes time. But they do not want to reconcile themselves anymore to

the disruptions in the supplying of products or to the increase in the number of waiting lines, the creation of artificial shortages, the unsatisfactory organization of the work of trade, the personal-services sphere, or urban transportation, or the neglected state of the sanitary and ecological conditions in cities and other populated places. They are indignant at the rampant extent of poor business practices and violations of law and order. And people are especially upset because, in many institutional offices, they encounter the very same stagnant bureaucratic atmosphere that formed over the decades and the same obvious lack of desire to take the needs of the ordinary person into consideration.

Without a doubt, we cannot cross out the fact that, despite certain difficulties in perestroika, it is still been possible to a certain degree to reduce the tension in the national-economic complex, to a certain degree to cross over the line of stagnation, and to give the economy greater social directedness. A radical economic reform is being carried out consistently, and the changeover of associations, enterprises, and farms to the principles of cost accountability and self-financing has been mostly completed. One sees the greater and greater striving by people for their economic independence, for their rise up the ladder of the economic reform to progressive forms of cost accountability and rental.

Oh the whole, however, I repeat that the situation remains extremely complicated. Today, in order to evaluate the economy and the social sphere it is fundamentally important to analyze the reasons for the drawn-out lagging behind in many sectors. It is important for ourselves to understand and for us to explain to people why those positive shifts that we have mentioned are not leading to the fundamental improvement of the situation with regard to food products, consumer goods, and housing, or, even moreso, why in many instances these problems are becoming even more acute. But the most important thing is to make political conclusions from this and, on those conclusions, to construct tactics for further actions.

Deeper analysis has shown that the main inhibiting factors are the structural disproportions that developed over the years in the development and placement of the productive forces. These factors include the preferential orientation of the republic's industry on the production of semifinished goods and semifinished products, and the backwardness of the processing branches. They include the planting of cotton as a single crop. They include the concentration of industry in the oblast with the capital as the center and in several major cities, which concentration leads to the buildup of excessive labor resources in other regions. And they include the "leftover" principle in allocating funds for social needs and environmental protection.

The seriousness of the situation led the Central Committee and the republic's government to an understanding of the need to develop a fundamentally new concept for

accelerating socioeconomic development in the period until the year 1995. The goal is to carry out major measures to achieve a territorial equalizing of the economic potential, to develop the labor-intensive branches in regions where there are considerable labor resources.

At such time the priority is given to the formation of a complex of the processing branches with a completed cycle of production based on local raw materials. It is planned to double the industrial processing of raw cotton, and to convert the republic from a region into which articles made from cotton fabrics are shipped, into a major producer of those articles. It is planned to carry out a major restructuring in the cotton complex and in the agricultural branches as a whole. But the most important thing will be to shift the emphasis to the social questions, to raise people's standard of living sharply, and to shorten considerably their lagging behind the nationwide level.

Our proposals found support in CPSU Central Committee Politburo and the country's government. The draft version has been published in the press and is being broadly discussed in labor collectives and at people's place of residence. While, on the whole, approving the measures that have been planned, the workers have expressed a large number of proposals and made a large number of comments that will be taken into consideration.

The implementation of the program will require considerable additional capital investments that exceed 60 billion rubles. Also, in conformity with the draft of the concept of regional cost accountability and self-financing, two-thirds of these investments must be made up of funds from the republic and local budget, as well as the public's monetary means.

In order for the program to start operating, it is necessary for us to engage immediately in the resolution of the urgent tasks, and, first of all, to improve the republic's financial position.

Stating it plainly, during the current five-year plan we have seen the continued aggravation of the situation with regard to the formation of state finance, an intensification of the strain in monetary circulation, and the rapid growth of the budgetary deficit.

The enterprises that are operating at a loss lie as a heavy burden on our budget. Many of them are in Minmestprom [Ministry of Local Industry] (U. K. Ismailov); Minbyt [Ministry of Personal Services] (B. I. Bugrov); Gosagroprom [State Agroindustrial Committee] (I. Kh. Dzhurabekov); and Goskomvodkhov [State Committee for Water Management] (E. T. Tursunov). Last year 290 enterprises, organizations, and farms, instead of making a profit, incurred losses totaling 180 million rubles, and 189 enterprises with a planned loss ended the year with losses of 69 million rubles in excess of plan.

Under conditions of real inflation there has been a sharp outstripping of the rise in wages as compared with the increase in labor production, and an increase in the payment of money that actually has not been earned.

What can be proposed under these conditions? How are we to overcome these losses? There are many alternatives. Large reserves lie in changing the enterprises, organizations, and farms to the second model of cost accountability, which actually precludes completely the possibility of paying out unearned funds. Another promising alternative is the changeover of the enterprises and production entities that are operating at a loss to a rental system, or to cooperatives, or the changing of their area of specialization to the production of more profitable output. But the only important thing is that this must be done more boldly.

An important task is completing, by the end of the five-year plan, the changeover of all branches in the national economy to complete cost accountability and self-financing; establishing the smooth operation of the economic mechanism; and achieving the confirmation of relations of cost accountability in the entire diversity of their forms and in all links of the national-economic complex, from the ministry and departments down to the low-level production links and each individual worker.

By the beginning of the 13th Five-Year Plan we must form the principles of an integrated system of management and administration that will guarantee the complete application of the USSR laws entitled "The State Enterprise (Association)" and "The Cooperative System in the USSR," and that will create the good prerequisites for changeover to republic-level cost accountability.

Something that requires further work is the general scheme for administration of the national economy. And although quite a bit has been done to implement it, it is necessary to correct a few things promptly, especially with regard to administrative-territorial division. There has been no noticeable restructuring in the work style of the ministries and departments. The reduction of their administrative apparatus did not reduce the bureaucratic forms and methods of leadership, and they do not want to give up their previous functions that were based on the exertion of administrative pressure. Moreover, at the level of enterprises, associations, and organizations the number of administrative workers not only has not been reduced, but has even increased by 60,000 persons.

The republic's Council of Ministers, its Presidium, and G. Kh. Kadyrov personally must act as quickly as possible to correct the errors and miscalculations that were made by us when developing the general scheme. The acceleration program will not start operating if we do not completely overcome the leadership style of

issuing an administrative fiat. It is necessary to delegate rights and powers more boldly to the local administrative agencies and to increase their independence and responsibility.

It is necessary, first of all, to concentrate on the administration of the agrarian sector, which determines the resolution of the problem of providing people with food products. We considered these questions in detail at the "kurultay" when discussing the results of the March 1989 CPSU Central Committee Plenum. They were also in the center of attention when CPSU Central Committee Politburo members, CPSU Central Committee secretaries N. N. Slyunkov and Ye. K. Ligachev recently visited this republic, during the meetings with workers, collectives, renters, and the aktiv.

Today, as a result of the steps being taken, the administrative agencies in the outlying areas and the kolkhozes and sovkhozes have been given greater independence and their rights have been expanded. This is a completely new situation. Wherever its has been skillfully used, the first promising results have been achieved. For example, in Tashkent Oblast, where, with a relatively high level of urban population, a stable increase in the per-capita production of food products has already been achieved for several years. During the past three years that increase has been, for vegetable and melon crops, 15-20 percent; potatoes, 9 percent; and milk and meat, 4-5 percent. Under the new economic conditions there has been a noticeable increase in the initiative shown by the farms in Surkhan-Darya Oblast to make better use of the favorable climatic conditions to expand the production of early vegetables.

At the same time a conclusion that was justly expressed at the CPSU Central Committee Plenum was that party organizations, soviet agencies, and administrative economic cadres continue to work in the agrarian sector.

You can see what happens. Under what could be called the most favorable conditions last year, there was a sharp reduction in the production of vegetables per-capita of population in Namangan and Samarkand oblasts. Moreover, the slump figure, as compared with 1985, was 10-12 percent. There was a reduction of almost 4-8 percent in meat production in Namangan Oblast, and a 5-percent reduction in per-capita milk production in Samarkand and Syr-Darya oblasts.

The party's oblast committee secretaries (Comrades Aripdzhanov, Allamuradov, Ikramov, and Klepikov) and the administrators of the oblast ispolkoms and agroproms must make serious conclusions from the facts that have been pointed out.

In order to reach the parameters assigned by the acceleration program, it is necessary within the current year and in 1990 to assure an average annual increase in meat

and milk production by 17-20 percent; potatoes, fruits, and berries, by 26 percent; vegetable and melon crops, by 12-15 percent; and feeds and fodders, as a minimum, by 25 percent.

Each of you can compare your own actual increase rates with these indicators and determine what acceleration must be given to developing all the basic branches of agricultural production and how strenuously it is necessary to work.

The fulfillment of all these tasks is complicated by the sudden and prolonged cooling spell that has encompassed our region. The abundant precipitation that we had in late April and early May, the sharp temperature drop, and the frosts caused serious damage to agriculture. Almost a million hectares of cotton sowings were damaged, 900,000 hectares of which were resown. Orchards, vineyards, and mulberry trees on a total area of more than 150,000 hectares were damaged. It was necessary to replant vegetable, melon, and other crops on an area of more than 600,000 hectares. A total of 680,000 private plots belonging to the public suffered. The losses from eliminating the consequences of the natural calamities in the social and individual sectors come to 850 million rubles.

The CPSU Central Committee and the Soviet government responded sensitively and attentively to the republic's misfortune. Steps to render emergency assistance to the republic were considered personally by M. S. Gorbachev and N. I. Ryzhkov. As you know, Ye. K. Ligachev recently visited a number of oblasts in Uzbekistan and also Karakalpak ASSR. He penetrated deeply into the state of affairs and became personally acquainted with the rate of operations to overcome the consequences of the natural calamity. USSR Council of Ministers, Gosplan, Gosagroprom, Gosbank, Minfin [Ministry of Finance], USSR Gosstroy, and other union ministries and departments promptly considered urgent measures to render immediate assistance to the rayons and farms that had suffered.

Considerable monetary resources are being allocated to the republic to compensate for the losses incurred by kolkhozes and sovkhozes, as well as the citizens' private plots. The republic is also receiving an additional quantity of mineral fertilizers and diesel fuel to carry out operating to eliminate the consequences of the frosts, and is receiving seed potatoes for replanting. It is also being allocated the necessary funds to pay for the labor involved in replanting, and to compensate for the losses of some of the orchard and vineyard harvest. The plans for 1989 contractual shipments are being refined. Considerable amounts of money are being allocated by USSR Gosstrakh to pay the farms and citizens.

All of us must have sufficient bravery not to give in to despair and to carry out, under these complicated conditions, our plans for producing and selling agricultural output. This is a difficult task, but it is a realistic one.

The reserves exist. On areas where alfalfa crops were destroyed, it is completely possible to sow corn to be used for silage and green fodder, and subsequently, in August or September, to sow alfalfa on those areas. The natural conditions allow us, even after resowing, to obtain, albeit somewhat later, harvests of vegetables and melon crops. Many consequences of the natural calamities can be eliminated by intensified cultivation of cotton, orchards, and vineyards. The most important thing is for everyone—managers and specialists—to display completely their knowledge, experience, and ability to organize people and to lead them.

A powerful lever for achieving a fundamental turning point in agrarian policy is the new economic relations. Putting it directly, their advantages are still having a very weak effect on the final results, and in this matter one continues to see a rather large amount of formalism. Judging by reports from the republic's Gosagroprom, lease and other contract relations encompass the overwhelming majority of vegetable-husbandry and animal-husbandry subdivisions. But where is the result? A hundred forty-five farms ended even last year, which was a very favorable one, with losses, and 525 kolkhozes and sovkhozes had a low profitability of less than 15 percent. The production costs of raw cotton, vegetable and melon crops, fruits, and grapes rose.

Meetings with rank-and-file workers in rural areas convince us that, for the most part, they are ready to lease land and livestock and to strive for high indicators in producing valuable output. But a rather large number of barriers on the path of the lease contract are being erected by the farm specialists and managers, of whom there are approximately 40 on every sovkhoz and more than 20 on every kolkhoz.

Here a very great deal depends upon the position of the party's obkoms and raykoms. For example, in Fergana Oblast the obkom and the raykoms succeeded in making most of the farm managers and rank-and-file agricultural workers active proponents of the lease. One saw here the manifestation of the concern for reliable protection for the lessees against administrative arbitrariness, and a road block was erected to prevent possible abuses or extortion when assigning plots or determining the contract terms. Similar examples could be given for a number of other oblasts.

There is one more extremely important question—increasing the contribution that is made to resolving the supplying of the population with food products that is made by the subsidiary farms attached to enterprises, and by the citizens' personal vegetable plots, orchards, and truck farms. Currently the republic has approximately 1500 agrarian shops at enterprises, which have been assigned more than 230,000 hectares of land; they have 260,000 head of various kinds of livestock. But how is this being used?

Every hectare of irrigated plowland in the subsidiary farms in Surkhan-Darya and Khorezm oblasts yields only 10-14 quintals of vegetables each; and in Bukhara, Namangan, and Tashkent oblasts, 4-9 quintals each of fruits and berries. So the land is being used not only inefficiently but also, one might say, irresponsibly.

We also have large opportunities in the private farms. Currently those farms produce half the meat, two-thirds of the milk, and more than 40 percent of the fruits and vegetables. The land that has been handed over to the population is being used highly effectively. The production of output per hectare is as much as 12,000 rubles, which is 6 times greater than in the social sector.

However, the development of this sector is being held back by the unjustified limitations of the size of the farmsteads, at the level of no more than 0.1 hectare. In their letters to the party and soviet agencies, certain inhabitants express their discontent with the fact that they still cannot receive land for farmstead or orchard plots and truck gardens, and still encounter other difficulties that shackle their desire to engage in growing agricultural produce. They criticize the managers of local agencies for their slowness in executing the decisions that have been made in the country. They emphasize the need to remove all obstacles and to search for ways to turn over land to the citizens for increasing the production of food products.

Yesterday the Central Committee Buro supported the proposal of the Central Committee's Commission on Questions of the APK [Agroindustrial Complex] concerning the increase in the size of the private plots of kolkhoz members and sovkhoz workers by, on average, a factor of 2, and concerning the allocation of land for family lease, developing individual labor activity, and expanding housing construction.

It is necessary for us to assure that all the land that is occupied by food crops and perennial plantings are transferred to the population for their use, with the condition that they fulfill the state order with regard to established procurement prices, and that the surplus output is sold at the price agreed upon. This will guarantee the more complete employment rate for the nonworking rural population.

But the land that has been set aside for the cotton complex and for the grain complex will be used by the state and collective farms with the application of industrial technological schemes. It would seem that the people would support this and everyone would benefit from it.

We are also in debt today to thousands of city dwellers who want to have their own vegetable plots and orchards. The republic's Council of Ministers, the oblast ispolkoms, and the Karakalpak ASSR Council of Ministers must fulfill their decisions that were made in this

regard. And today we ask I. Kh. Dzhurabekov, P. M. Abdurakhmanov, V. V. Sudarenkov, and K. Kh. Makhamadaliyev to display in this matter a truly organized approach.

The investment decisions in rural areas require serious changes in the republic's economic policy. Two years ago, concerned about the growing deterioration of the land, we asked the country's directive agencies to increase the investments for the operations linked with land reclamation. At that time it was decided that as much as 70 percent of the funds intended for water management would be channeled into this use.

However, that fundamental principle was violated by Communists E. T. Tursunov, R. R. Kasymov, and K. A. Raktinin. For these purposes, under their leadership, it was planned to use in 1989-1990 half as much money, which is an action with which the Central Committee's Commission on Questions of the Agroindustrial Complex disagreed. And the commission acted correctly. No one today should harbor any illusions concerning any instances of easing up in order to benefit their own departmental interests.

This also pertains to building up the base for processing and storing agricultural produce. Are we really supposed to think that it is admissible that this is the sixth year that the plant to produce canned baby food is under construction in Kattakurgan? Not once has the plan for construction-and-installation operations been fulfilled at that construction project. Because of the uncoordinated actions of the contract organizations and the customer-enterprises, in the food branches of industry as a whole in 1988, 10 million rubles of capital investments were unused. The persons responsible for this are primarily Communists—Gosstroy deputy chairman T. B. Baymirov and Gosagroprom deputy chairman B. S. Khamidov.

In addition, the available capacities are also being used egregiously badly. The production lines for the drying of raisins have been practically inactive for several years at the Yangiaryk Branch of the Samarkand Canned-Fruit Plant, at a time when the requisitions for the purchase of a large quantity of imported equipment are continuing. The grape acceptance station at the Plant-Sovkhoz imeni Usman Yusupov in Fergana Oblast, on the basis of a decision by the oblast Agroprom, has had its area of specialization changed repeatedly to the production of juices and grape products. As a result, the situation has gone to a point where this rather solid enterprise is incapable of producing any output.

In a word, as was mentioned at the CPSU Central Committee Plenum, we must be persistent and persistent in our agrarian policy. Only then will be achieve a major turning point in the supplying of the public with food products in the immediate future. The saturation of the market with products and commodities that are the essentials of life is the primary political task of the day.

The unsatisfactory purchasing demand seriously complicates people's lives. Even household soap has begun disappearing from the stores, and certain types of furniture, clothing, and footwear are scarce. The public's needs for nonedible commodities are being satisfied by only 60 percent.

Despite the acuteness of the situation on the commodity market, 143 enterprises and associations in 1988 reduced the production of commodities for the public by almost 120 million rubles. Practically speaking, light industry failed to satisfy the needs for even a single type of article. Last year alone, basically at the fault of the Andizhan Cotton-Fabric Combine and the Tashkent and Fergana textile combines, there was an undershipment to the trade system of cotton fabrics with a total value of 50 million rubles. For the Ministry of Light Industry as a whole (E. A. Taymazov), every seventh enterprise is operating at a loss, and every sixth enterprise is failing to meet its contractual obligations. Of course, difficulties do exist, but it is necessary to overcome them as rapidly as possible and to strive for a more tangible effect from changing over to the new management conditions.

We have been making weak use of the opportunities for additionally channeling into the consumer market the output intended for technical-production use, and lumber materials. Of the total amount of 6 million rubles planned for sale of these kinds of output, during the current year the total value of output sold to the public is only 900,000 rubles.

Essentially speaking, many union enterprises have been remaining aloof from this very important problem. The Aviation Association imeni Chkalov (V. N. Zhuravlev) last year was supposed to assimilate the production of the Aygul washing machine, and the Tashelektromash Plant (V. I. Beregovskiy) was supposed to assimilate the production of a juicer, but so far all that exists is promises. It is necessary, in the final analysis, to encourage the labor collectives in all branches, including those in Group A, not to raise their prices, but to increase the production of consumer goods. This is one of our emergency tasks, and it is primarily the republic's government, Gosplan, the ministries and departments, and the ispolkoms of the local soviets of people's deputies which must engage first of all in resolving it in a real manner. It would seem that we must take the path of creating, at every industrial enterprise, special shops or production cooperatives to produce the commodities that the public needs.

The breakdowns in implementing the housing program are also unforgivable. Last year the amount of housing that was activated was 330,000 square meters less than the plan, and 95 million rubles remained unused. The workers' attempt to build individual homes frequently encounters the bureaucratic methods and red tape of the local soviets. We are justly criticized because the seriousness of the housing problem not only is not being reduced, but is continuing to grow. Last year the waiting



list for apartments for the republic as a whole increased from 243,000 to 260,000 persons needing apartments. The most unfavorable situation is developing in Samarkand, Fergana, and Tashkent oblasts and in the city of Tashkent.

Therefore it is simply outrageous when, in Kashkadarya, Namangan, Surkhan-Darya, and Samarkand oblast, a reduced plan was accepted for the first quarter of the year for activation of housing, and it was considerably overfulfilled. Who is deceived by Gosstroy and the ispolkoms of the corresponding oblast soviets, when they activate more than 10 percent of the yearly plan and considerably less than in the first quarter of last year? Why is it that the party obkom secretaries who are members of the ispolkoms—and many are also Central Committee members—have not hindered that, and have not yet a political evaluation?

One cannot fail to see behind these facts the overall failure in capital construction. For the national economy as a whole, as of the beginning of the current year, fixed assets with a total value of 1.7 billion rubles were not activated; and almost one billion rubles of capital investments were unused. One continues to observe a catastrophic increase in the amount of uncompleted construction. Last year alone, the volume of uncompleted construction in excess of quota increased by 1.2 billion rubles and came to more than 5 billion rubles.

All this is the direct consequence of the lack of organization and of sloppiness in the subdivisions of the republic's construction and central economic departments—Gosplan (A. R. Atadzhanov); Minfin (I. I. Mamatisayev); and Uzpromstroybank (T. S. Azimov). There have been no serious efforts visible on the part of K. Kh. Makhamadaliyev, or of ministers Ye. S. Temkin and A. G. Manannikov. More than half a year has passed since the formation of the new committee, but there have not been any real results so far. Gosstroy and its subdivisions Tashgorstroy (K. N. Tulyaganov) and Tashoblstroy (U. K. Khakimov)—instead of working together to attract the available reserves and opportunities for the more efficient use of the capacities of the construction base, and the resources for building up the volumes, or for prompt activation of industrial and social projects—have been attempting to justify their miscalculations and their incomplete efforts by citing the imperfection of the structure of the construction complex.

The task currently consists in reducing not the volumes, but the construction front, because it is within our power to discontinue, to put in mothballs, the construction of projects that are beyond our capabilities, and that can only result in delays. The managers of these sectors will bear personal party responsibility for disrupting the construction of housing, and for developing the base of public education and public health, especially in rural areas, and the construction of environmental-protection projects. This will be evaluated as flagrant irresponsibility and inefficiency. And you know how sharply the

CPSU Central Committee Plenum has raised the questions of waging a decisive struggle against inefficiency, of the need to establish elementary order in the use of money and everything that we have at our disposal.

Because of our difficulties, since the beginning of the five-year plan in our republic, for all the enterprises and projects that were newly activated or remodeled since 1981, output with a total value of 1.6 billion rubles was underproduced. For Gosstroy enterprises, in particular, because of the underuse of capacities, last year alone construction materials with a total value of 66 million rubles were not produced.

## II

We are continuing to incur considerable losses as a result of numerous violations of labor and production discipline. Last year, as compared with 1987, there was an increase in the losses of work time, and as a result we failed to receive industrial output valued at a total of 100 million rubles. This is the true price of our failures. We are obliged—as the CPSU Central Committee has demanded—to take immediate steps, in a party procedure, to analyze the poor business practices that have been allowed to occur, and to give a fundamental evaluation to this. Moreover, this must be done publicly, so that everyone can see who is to blame for having squandered resources and means, and can see what responsibility he has borne and what steps have been taken to restore order. Apparently it will be correct for the monitoring of the fulfillment of this task to be assumed by A. S. Yefimov, candidate member of the Central Committee Buro and chairman of the republic's KNK [People's Control Committee], and by R. Kh. Abdullayev, Central Committee member and chairman of the Party Control Commission.

With regard to the establishment of order, special attention must be paid to trade. Recently we discussed this acute problem specially at a meeting of the republic aktiv. Unlike all the other social problems, this is on which must be engaged in every day. It is simply outrageous that the allocated products do not reach the customer. Numerous instances of the hoarding of manufactured commodities and food commodities have been discovered, as well as instances of selling them from warehouses, bases, and from under the counter at speculative prices. The party's gorkoms and raykoms and the city and rayon ispolkoms must establish daily monitoring of the distribution of the allocated products and their getting to the customer. It is only if this condition is observed that it is possible to achieve major shifts, and we are obliged to do this decisively, uncompromisingly, with the broad involvement of the workers' control and the public.

It is also necessary to seek and to find new forms for the operation of trade enterprises and customer desks. In the Fergana Valley and a number of other places in the mountain villages, small family stores are being created



everywhere. They operate round the clock and completely provide the inhabitants with the available commodities and products, and sell them on credit. This would seem to be a simple matter, but the benefit is tremendous. However, they are not being organized everywhere.

We all must engage seriously in the rapidly developing cooperative movement. For the time being, we have not got the necessary return from it. The republic has 6980 cooperatives, and during the first quarter of this year alone they were issued cash by the special banks from their accounts in the amount of 166 million rubles, but the proceeds from them constituted only 32 million rubles.

An extremely negative influence upon the state of monetary circulation is exerted by the activity of the cooperatives that operate exclusively on the basis of production orders from enterprises and organizations. The services provided by these cooperatives are paid for by the enterprises in a noncash procedure, but the issuance of funds from their settlement accounts is done in cash.

Thus, in the first quarter of this year the Pioneer, Triumph, and Garant cooperatives in Tashkent fulfilled 100 percent of their total operations and services on the basis of production orders from enterprises and organizations; and the Master Cooperative fulfilled for the population operations with a total value of only 8500 rubles, out of a total work volume of 468,000 rubles. Therefore one of the most important tasks of the recently created UzSSR Cooperatives Union is, in our view, an increase in the flow of cash into the bank's cash offices and the guaranteeing of the increase in the percentage of services rendered to the public.

Cooperatives have been called upon to play an important role in providing the republic's population with scarce consumer goods, but frequently their activity can be summarized as frank speculation. Taking advantage of the shortage of soap and detergents, the Sogdiana Cooperative that is attached to the Mekhnat Factory for Work Done at Home, in Tashkent, purchased 20 tons of powdered detergent at the Almalyk Household Chemistry Plant at a price of 600 rubles a ton, and sold it in Barnaul at a price of 1700 rubles a ton, receiving in this transaction 22,000 rubles of illegal income.

Under the conditions of a lack of supervision, a rather large number of cooperatives that conceal and reduce their income do not pay any tax payments into the budget and illegally appropriate the monetary funds. And certain managers who are supposed to keep an eye on this, and to establish order, have no objection themselves to warming their hands and enriching themselves.

Since August 1988, the Mysl Cooperative has been in operation under the Planning Commission of the Samarkand Oblast Ispolkom. Included in Mysl are U. N. Nurullayev, deputy chairman of the oblast ispolkom,

and chairman of the Oblplan; B. KH. Shadiyev, T. N. Talibov, and F. F. Khakimdzhanov, deputy chairmen of Oblplan; E. B. Umatov, deputy chief of the financial administration of the oblast ispolkom; B. N. Tagayev, deputy chief of the administration of statistics; and Ya. S. Sayfitdinov, chairman of the oblast Agrobank.

The cooperative actually resolves questions which, by virtue of their direct official duties, the oblast planning commission and the other financial organizations in the oblast should deal with. And what is interesting is that the work schedule for the cooperative coincides point for point with the operating mode of Oblplan. Putting it figuratively, the members of Oblplan sit simultaneously on two chairs—a state chair and a cooperative chair—and receive a salary in two organizations.

Recently the cooperative concluded a series of contracts with the Samarkand Confectionery Factory, the bread combine, the Oblrembyttekhnikha Production Association, and the oblast volunteer firemen's society for a rather substantial amount of money. For various types of services that are rendered, I repeat, during work time and that are included among their regular duties, deputy Oblplan chairmen T. N. Talibov and M. N. Fatullayev, and department chief S. A. Ashurova received 500-600 rubles each.

What does this happen? Where is it stated that workers at state institutions, during official working hours, can work simultaneously in a cooperative and receive additional payment for this? This is nothing else but blatant trickery and fraud perpetrated against the state.

Unfortunately, this slippery path was taken by M. D. Mukhortov and O. G. Pshenichnyy, deputy chairmen of the republic's Gosplan; department chief Ye. K. Slepko; Yu. I. Slashchinin, editor in chief of EKONOMIKA I ZHIZN magazine; and V. E. Stashis, chief of the economic-planning administration of Gosstroy.

Those republic-level managers organized the Menedzher Cooperative, allegedly for the purpose of training cadres for cooperatives, but they actually began looking for income at the expense of organizing all kinds of courses to train administrative workers at state enterprises.

That cooperative organized such courses in Dzhezak, Tashkent, and Akhangaran. The cost per student was from 350 to 450 rubles, paid from enterprise funds. Moreover, the family members of the cooperative members were included in performing paid services. Using his position as cooperative chairman, Yu. I. Slashchinin involved his wife and son in his work. During a four-month period of working in the cooperative, his family's income came to 7200 rubles.

M. D. Mukhortov's wife and daughter were involved in working in the cooperative, as well as his son-in-law A. A. Mogutnov, all of whom received 2997 rubles in the form of wages. For executing a one-time job, O. G.

Pshenichnyy's wife was paid 2642 rubles. Travel expenses were paid at the rate of 30 rubles a day, not including the cost of travel. Moreover, crude financial violations were committed in the cooperative.

By their actions M. D. Mukhortov, O. G. Pshenichnyy, Yu. I. Slashchinin, and others, essentially speaking, took the path of illegal enrichment, for which they were brought to party responsibility. And the republic's Council of Ministers acted correctly when it released them from the positions that they occupied.

There have been other instances of abuse of one's official position and of bribe-taking. Literally a few days ago L. Sagdullayev, deputy chairman of the Kirovskiy Rayon Ispolkom in the city of Tashkent, was arrested for having taken a bribe from cooperative members in the amount of 1000 rubles for renting accommodations to them.

The connivance, laxity, and poor business judgment of the local agencies in a number of instances provide entry into the cooperative movement by obvious scoundrels and compromise that movement. For example, in the city of Yangiyer, a certain Abiyev, taking advantage of the official sloppiness of former chairman Biballayev, created the Kholodok Cooperative, allegedly for the purpose of producing cooling beverages. But, so to speak, without offering any beverages to anyone, he engaged in operations as a go-between in concert activities, carried out improprieties on a massive scale at the stadium, and pocketing approximately 10,000 rubles of a state loan, took off for parts unknown.

In a word, we can no longer reconcile ourselves to the uncontrollable situation that has been noted in the cooperative movement. Everything must be in strict conformity with the laws and it is our primary duty to guarantee the strictest monitoring of this. Where this movement is beneficial, it is necessary to give all kinds of assistance and encouragement, but where there is fraud, profit, and speculation, we must set up a road block and establish order.

I would like to turn attention also to the following. The resolution of national-economic problems is impossible without the proper scientific services. This requires the carrying out of an active scientific-technical policy and the intensification of the scientific substantiation of the processes of intensification and the increase in the effectiveness of social production. The responsible tasks in the acceleration program require the fundamental reconsideration by Academy of Sciences, SAO VASKhNIL [Central Asian Branch of the All-Union Academy of Agricultural Sciences imeni V. I. Lenin], Minzdrav [Ministry of Health], and the other ministries and departments of the trends that have developed in the activity of the scientific institutions and the role that they play, and require the concentration of the scientists' efforts in expanding and deepening the fundamental and applied research to resolve the regional and republic-level national-economic problems. It will be necessary to

carry out steps that are coordinated with the USSR State Committee for Science and Technology and with USSR Academy of Sciences to accelerate the buildup of scientific-technical potential and to develop and substantially raise the level of scientific-research work in the republic.

### III

Comrades!

I have said previously that the party's political will and practical activity are currently being harnessed together with the aroused powerful initiative of the workers who have put their faith in perestroika. However, this striving toward the revolutionary renewal of society is still in contradiction with the relatively ineffective forms of ideological work that formed during the past years and that are still alive at this time. In daily life we have encountered the lack of knowledge, if not the inability, of certain party organizations, soviet agencies, and party and ideological cadres to act in the spirit of the time, or to lead the people's movement for fundamental changes in the economy and in the social and spiritual spheres.

At the present time, it is true, the party committees, ideological subdivisions, and party workers are assimilating to a greater and greater degree the new approaches in an atmosphere of expanding democracy and glasnost. It can be said that the comprehension of the new realities in ideological work has begun. At the same time the situation is such that one cannot fail to sense serious concern with regard to the state of affairs in this area. This question today is a very complicated one. "The task consists specifically," it was emphasized at the recent CPSU Central Committee Plenum, in assuring that the party heads the process of building up the social participation of the nation, sets the tone, and reinforces in it the creative principles in the interests of the revolutionary renewal of socialist society and in the interests of perestroika."

Something that is becoming increasingly intolerable is the fact that the ideological work is completely cut off from people's everyday needs, from the specific wants and interests. A rather large number of our workers have begun to shy away from a live dialogue and to avoid open discussions. Even many Central Committee members and candidate members, ministers, and managers of major organizations are loath to enter labor collectives or the student environment, and prefer in this situation to make statements through the apparatus of their institutions.

Without a doubt, it is calmer this way. But it can no longer be tolerated. Any manager in his work with people has only one choice—to go to the people. That is the command of the time. People want to see the administrators of ministries and departments, want to meet them and hold a discussion with them. On the basis of

common interests and serious problems, they rapidly unite and invite us to take part in the dynamic actions, and this occurs dynamically, but, obviously, not always smoothly or peacefully.

Currently the republic has more than 350 different social organizations and informal associations, with a total membership of tens of thousands. The Central Committee, in a specially enacted resolution, defined its attitude to these social formations. For the most part this is a normal, healthy movement that is striving to assist the part in the practical resolution of various problems of socioeconomic and spiritual life.

However, it must be noted that it is not only the healthy forces that are being encouraged to develop actively. In individual spontaneously formed groups there have appeared a rather large number of persons who have delusions of grandeur, who camouflage their are self-seeking, selfish, or group goals by revolutionary phrases and slogans. They want to have nothing to do with laws, or practical work, or order, or even that very democracy that they themselves announce more loudly than anyone else.

The recently published communique from a session of the Uzbekistan CP Central Committee Buro contained an evaluation of one of these informal associations, which calls itself Birlik. The pretentious claims of the self-proclaimed leaders to the role of some kind of the sole preserver of the material, natural, and spiritual wealth of Uzbekistan, and their categorical denial of the practical situation that has developed, are by no means as inoffensive as may at times appear at first glance. Stating it plainly, the thing that has become the visible result of the active propagandizing in this instance of the one-sided, frequently distorted, ideas concerning the situation in the country and the republic is the increasingly frequent use of comparisons on the basis of nationality.

Recently at Samarkand University, and also in Nukus and Dzhizak, leaflets appeared with open nationalistic appeals that were signed in the name of Birlik. The leaders set themselves apart from such actions. However, it is completely obvious that the seeds that have been poisoned by national conceit can produce and already are producing, perhaps not in accordance with the will of those who sowed those seeds, poisonous sprouts. One has only to consider, for example, the foreign mouth-piece Ozodlik, which today thrives on besmirching everything in the republic exclusively from this source.

Activists in the so-called Free Association of the Youth of Uzbekistan attempt to attract people into the channel of political and social demagoguery. There have been attempts to create groups to support the not unknown Democratic Union, that acts on the basis of a frank anti-Soviet platform.

Under these conditions it is inadmissible when Communists sit in silence at rallies and meetings, and at times display the desire to win mild applause by saying yes to various loud declarations. Recently at the Termez Pedagogical Institute, one of the visiting agitators succeeded in organizing a meeting of the students and the professor and instructor staff. A few of our respected mentors of youth not only nodded their approval of the poorly camouflaged nationalistic sermons, but also, for example, like Yu. Valikulov, deputy secretary of the institute's party organization, made a statement in support of the dubious declarations.

Unfortunately, one could cite a rather large number of similar situations at other institutions of higher learning and at technicums, and also at institutes of UzSSR Academy of Sciences.

One is alarmed by what are definitely the erroneous statements by an individual misled individual. It is surprising that a number of administrators and Communists, in private conversations, seemingly censure the extreme interpretations and irresponsible appeals, but when it comes down to open polemics and the need to defend the interests of perestroika, it is as though some of them are overtaken by the shyness syndrome.

We are obliged to see soberly that, with this approach, with this kind of political shyness, opponents cross over the limits of the reasonable and worthy, gather inflammatory petitions, and are not averse to using even children's crudely drawn lettering. It is also known that the people who refuse to sign these petitions are frequently subjected to ostracism. An atmosphere of intolerance is instigated around them and they are accused of being traitors and of disdaining the national interests, with the actions toward them going as far as issuing threats. It is necessary to talk about this because people are writing to us and asking for protection.

We actually do have a large number of problems. And the overwhelming majority of people understand this. A few things are being resolved, a few are waiting for their turn, and a few others, because of the slowness in the outlying areas, are not being resolved. We are also carrying both the load of the past and the responsibility for the present and even more for the future of the republic. Much as we would like to, none of us can promise golden mountains tomorrow.

However, while admitting the existence of all these complexities, the party organizations and ideological workers are slowly searching for everything that we are experiencing a shortage of today: funds, resources, efficiency, the ability to work well, discipline, and order.

People are still being poorly informed about the actual affairs and concerns of the Central Committee, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, the government, and the local agencies of authority. Recently, we have made it a practice to hold regular press conferences and

meetings between the Central Committee Buro members and workers at higher educational institutions, scientific and cultural figures, and workers. Efficient dialogue with activists in informal associations is being organized. A number of them participate in the work groups of the Central Committee's Ideological Commission and the permanent commissions of the republic's Supreme Soviet. However, one observes in all of them a large amount of inconsistency, promises, and unwillingness to execute orders.

At times one hears complaints by party and soviet workers concerning a particular incorrect statement in the press. Unfortunately, we are not yet rid of this, and we see both expressions of lack of moderation and manifestations of incompetency. But it is also necessary to say that the administrators, specialists in the national economy, and the party aktiv themselves are not striving for active public polemics.

The party committee secretaries, ministers, and administrators of organizations must give up their falsely understood modesty. They must speak more frequently on television and the radio and in the newspapers, and must go out and engage in conversations with the people.

There is no need to promise a land of milk and honey. But it is necessary to meet with people and, in a completely open, party manner, to give an honest answer to any question, even if it is the most unpleasant one. But, most important, it is necessary to be very obliging to people.

As for the press, it is necessary to make it a partner with whom one can cooperate skillfully, intelligently, on a business basis. And just as the press must be concerned about forming in people's awareness the correct idea of the realities of the economy and social life, the party and economic aktiv must have the readiness and self-interestedness in communicating directly with the nation.

Perestroika has created a situation when no one can ignore public opinion. It is necessary to learn how to derive lessons from it, to keep up with it, and to lead people. It is only this approach that will help us orient ourselves correctly in the extremely complicated social environment that the religious situation is today.

The processes of the further deepening of democratization could not bypass this important sphere of public awareness. In the interrelationships between the state and the church, methods of administrative fiat have become a thing of the past, and various kinds of accretions and artificial limitations are being removed. A positive reaction by the believers, for example, was evoked by the official registration of more than 20 new Muslim associations, the transfer to them of a number of religious holy places and buildings, and the involvement of the clergy in active sociopolitical life.

At the same time the loyal attitude of the party and the soviets to the principles of the freedom of conscience is perceived by some people as the possibility of snatching from the agencies of authority definite concessions and of constricting the atheistic nature of the socialist state.

The party committees and ideological institutions must intensify the atheistic education of the population, and the soviets must strive for the strictest observance of the legislation governing cults. We do not have the right to look apathetically at individual undesirable excesses in this area. More than in any other matter, what is needed here is common sense, calm dialogue, and the method of persuasion, and, at the same time, the putting up of decisive counteraction to violations of the laws.

Are we really supposed to believe that it is admissible in Andizhan, Samarkand, and Namangan oblasts that certain believers have been allowed to commit violations of the law that are linked with attempts to use sit-ins to occupy accommodations for use as cult institutions?

Our position must be as clear as possible. The entire work must be built on the basis of the strict observance of the freedom of conscience that has been guaranteed by the USSR Constitution, and must promote the consolidation of all the workers, including the believers, around the resolving of the tasks of perestroika.

It should be obvious to everyone that we will never agree with those who, under slogans of democratization, propose forcing women to wear the yashmak again and making the religious factor the basis of the entire way of life for the Uzbek nation.

The party, trade-union, and Komsomol organizations and the ideological institutions must fill all the means and forms of atheistic education with deep content. They must find the optimal combination of group and individual forms of exerting an influence on people.

It would seem that in this work, as in the forming of an active moral position and high political culture, much must be done by the Communists who are engaged in the sphere of science and culture. And yet a rather large number of our intellectuals continue to remain aloof from dynamic actions to explain the processes that are occurring and to increase people's civic responsibility for the fate of perestroika.

It is necessary to increase the Communists' responsibility for the political situation in every collective, rayon, and city. There is a need to discuss these problems at meetings in primary party organizations, and a decision by the Central Committee Buro concerning this has already been made. There are no ready-made recipes or instructional guides concerning how the party committee should behave in the present situation, and there cannot be any. The situation requires the maximum amount of independence and decisive actions on a well-principled

party basis. And the line concerning behavior is determined here not by instructions from above, but by the party conscience and the active civic position of each individual.

Recently we have disregarded such a very important reserve in ideological work as the effect exerted by the worker collectives. The decisive word—both in the past and currently—must be said by the working class. The working class is the party's backbone and it undoubtedly supports during this complicated time the well-principled party line. Therefore, without weakening the work in the youth environment and among the intelligentsia, we must see our chief support in the labor collectives. Let us take more decisive steps to put all kinds of excessively liberal advocates and propagandists of national exclusivity face to face with the labor collectives at plants and factories, where the moral-ideological and internationalistic traditions are not ritualistic phrases, but living flesh.

The public—all of us—are serious concerned about the increase of crime. The alarming situation in the republic in these matters was justly mentioned at the CPSU Central Committee Plenum. There has been an increase in the number of premeditated murders and instances of heinous bodily harm, rapes, robberies, thefts, and the stealing of personal and state property. There has been a particular aggravation of the situation in Karakalpak ASSR and Fergana and Samarkand oblasts. A third of all crimes are committed in the city of Tashkent.

The workers in the republic's law-enforcement agencies have proven to be unready to operate efficiently under conditions of democracy. Many of them do not possess sufficient competency, high professionalism, high principles, or responsibility. The republic's Procuracy and MVD, and the court and justice agencies, must immediately correct the situation, and must proceed from the assumption that, within the confines of real democracy, there must be no mercy shown to criminal elements.

It is also necessary to note the fact that recently there has also been a sharp decrease in the public's participation rate. Many volunteer people's *druzhinas*, comrade courts, prevention councils, and strong points have ceased operating. And yet, in the fight against crime, it is difficult to count on success if the law-enforcement agencies cannot rely on the support of the healthy social forces.

#### IV

Comrades!

The entire responsibility for the fate of perestroyka, for carrying out the fundamental tasks of the republic's socioeconomic development, and for increasing the workers' prosperity is borne by the party committees and organizations. Their ability to head the aroused initiative of the masses and to direct people's efforts into the

reinforcement of organizational efficiency and order in all spheres of production and social life determine not only the future, but also the authority of the party itself.

The party workers and all our cadres are attending a complicated schools as they acquire experience under the new conditions.

It is difficult for us today to name the party committees whose style and methods completely conform to the present-day requirements. But at the same time there has been a noticeable striving on the part of many of them to work in the new way.

For example, the Tashkent and Karakalpak obkoms and their buros have put their chief reliance on the *aktiv* and on asking people's advice on a broad scale, and have been decisively shifting their work to the primary organizations and labor collectives. There has been a noticeable turning toward the individual and toward social problems by the party's Bukhara and Khorezm obkoms. People can see and have sensed that others are listening to their opinion attentively and have begun working in a more initiatory manner.

Nevertheless it must be admitted that there are still many administrators, both on the republic level and in the outlying areas, who are having difficulty overcoming the stereotypes that have developed, and who fail to demonstrate decisiveness or sharpness in evaluating the events and the results of their own activity.

Recently the work style of the buro of the Party's Andizhan Obkom and its first secretary, M. M. Aripdzh-anov, have been repeatedly subjected to sharp criticism for having weak ties with the primary organizations. The Communists, it is true, trust him and the people elected him as deputy. But Markhmur Maripovich must make serious conclusions. Many problems in the oblast not only are not being resolved, but, on the contrary, are accumulating and becoming aggravated. During the first three years of the five-year plan, the oblast failed to cope with the assignments for production of the basic types of agricultural output. In addition, the state of psychological morale has become especially acute here. Sensing the indecisiveness of the party committee and the lack of consolidation among its *aktiv*, antisocial elements have begun exerting an effect on the masses.

The Central Committee Buro is seriously concerned about the state of affairs in the Samarkand Oblast party organization. We understand that the current leadership of the oblast has inherited a difficult situation, but nevertheless the state of affairs is being corrected slowly. The per-capita production of agricultural products is continuing to drop. The lagging behind in the development of the social sphere is being aggravated by the nonfulfillment of the plans for the construction of housing and of projects intended for cultural and everyday purposes. The factors that have been exerting an influence are the same ones. In resolving the tasks that have

come to a head, A. S. Ikramov and the other members of the obkom buro must demonstrate more initiative and persistence, while simultaneously relying on the aktiv.

An important role, if not the principal one, in guaranteeing perestroyka is played by the party's gorkoms and rayons, which are situated closest to the labor collectives, to people, and are always on view. In the process of perestroyka a number of party committees have stood out by assuming the boldness of taking unusual approaches and by acting as actual agencies of political leadership. The Bekabad Gorkom, the Khankinskiy and Uychinskiy raykoms, and certain other party committees have been increasingly shifting the center of gravity of organizing and political work to the labor collectives and have becoming real organizers of the masses.

But one cannot say this of many others. For the most part, the raykoms are continuing the strong-willed and not always competent interference in the work of the soviet and economic agencies. In Termezskiy, Pakhtabadskiy, Nishanskiy, and other rayons, the farm managers continue to be unable to take a single step without orders from the raykom.

After recently considering at Central Committee Buro the question of the rate of perestroyka in organizing and political work at the party's Kirovskiy and Oktyabrskiy raykoms, we came to the conclusion that the weakest link in their activity continues to be the tie with the low-level party organizations and the masses of the workers. Unfortunately, the raykom buros are making no attempt to correct the substantial neglect. Their apparatus continues to sit things out in their offices, engages basically in the preparation of papers and the issuing of orders over the telephone, has little knowledge of the life and problems of the collectives, and does little to help the primary party organizations. They have disregarded the urgent social tasks which, incidentally, were mentioned by Communists in reports and in the election. To put it plainly, the picture is typical. Life and the interests of perestroyka require, as was noted at the CPSU Central Committee Plenum, that both the party apparatus and the party aktiv climb out of the trenches, take a bolder move into the masses, respond to their needs and wants, and decide specific tasks in the outlying areas. It is in this, and only in this, that we today see the main task of all the party committees, from the Central Committee to the party's raykoms.

Today we are obviously underestimating also the potential of the primary party organizations, which are in the midst of the nation, at the hottest spots of perestroyka. Practically every other primary party organization is frankly passive. If we do not enliven their activity, if we do not increase correspondingly the participation rate of the more than 600,000 persons in the Communist detachment, we will be unable to resolve the tasks of renewing society.

In this regard I would especially like to isolate the question of increasing the combat capability of the low-level party links. A number of oblasts have accumulated experience in this regard: for example, in Fergana Oblast there is a review of combat readiness, and in Tashkent Oblast, the certification of Communists. There has been a noticeable increase here of participation, initiative, and their responsibility for the affairs of the collective.

The primary organizations must skillfully orient themselves today in the situation, must combine the flexibility of their actions with an uncompromising attitude in making evaluations, must possess initiative, must take active steps to influence the formation of a climate of psychological morale in the collectives, and must consolidate people. And it is the duty of every party committee to help them in this work.

The combat capability of the primary links and, on the whole, the republic's party organization currently is largely influenced by the influx of fresh forces. An analysis of the rate of fulfillment of the CPSU Central Committee's resolution dealing with the Tashkent Oblast party organization indicates that many party committees and organizations are moving slowly to implement the principles stated by the 19th All-Union Party Conference concerning the democratization of accepting persons into the CPSU. Instead of bringing into the party active champions of perestroyka, they proceed along the old, well-traveled path of formalism. As a result one observes the processes of aging and the deterioration of the quality makeup of the party organization and the reduction in the number of representatives of the working class in its ranks.

We are alarmed by the increasingly frequent instances of the turning in of party documents and the indifferent attitude taken to what I would call these emergency situations in the intraparty life of the party committee secretaries and their large aktiv. These facts attest primarily to the unfavorable state of affairs in these party organizations, to the low level of individual work with Communists, and to the ignoring of their needs and wants.

The party committees must carefully analyze each such instance, must take effective steps to prevent them, and, most importantly, must organize the work in such a way that every Communist is in the center of attention, has found his place in perestroyka, and carries out the party line in a well-principled manner.

Perestroyka persistently requires the democratization of cadre work as a whole. A number of party organizations have accumulated experience in publicly promoting cadres and forming a reserve, and in electing administrators on a competitive basis.

The party committees must take decisive steps to shift the center of gravity in cadre work to a study of the cadres, to ascertaining the public's opinion concerning them, and to developing the position of the party committee and implementing its recommendations—by way of the Communists, by means of persuasion, agitation, and the force of arguments. Broad and complete glasnost must prevail in cadre work.

This pertains primarily to the cadre reserve. It is necessary to depart from the rigid assignment of the reservists to specific positions, and to form the reserve chiefly on the basis of the type of workers. This kind of experience exists in the party's Syr-Darya and Bukhara obkoms. Today we are bringing before the Central Committee Plenum a proposal concerning a cadre reserve at the republic level. It would seem that this will also help use to improve the cadre policy.

And I would like to mention something else—the attitude toward people. It was correctly stated at the CPSU Central Committee Plenum that it is necessary to increase the demand placed on Communist workers for the job assigned to them. Are we really supposed to consider it to be a normal situation when instances of callousness and lack of attention to a person frequently are not given the proper evaluation, or when the administrators look at a visitor as though he is an undesirable phenomenon.

Many people complain that it is difficult to get to see the administrators of party committees in Kashka-Darya and Surkhan-Darya oblast, the ministries of communications, trade, and public health, and the republic's Supreme Court. Frequently the job of dealing with visitors is shifted to persons who have no legal right to decide the questions that are raised. More than 70 percent of the letters received by the Central Committee pertain to the competency of the local agencies and are linked with questions that are of great concern to people—questions of improving their housing conditions, interruptions in the trade system, the poor operation of transportation, and abuses committed by specific officials. Having lost their trust in a just resolution of their questions, people have recently—and this is especially alarming—begun resorting to sharp forms of protest and to extremist acts.

The successful activity of the republic's party organization today especially depends on how its elected agencies work. To a large extent this responsible work is only beginning to unfold. We have jointly created the appropriate commissions at the party committees. They must become truly equal, permanently operating, guiding agencies of the party organizations. Their members include experienced Communists. We have the right to expect them to perform active work, and to create in every party committee a situation of efficiency, demand-iness, and the unity of word and deed. Each of them, as was noted at the CPSU Central Committee Plenum,

must sense the personal responsibility for the specific sector of party work, and especially for how the party decisions are being fulfilled.

As you know, organizational questions are being brought before the plenum today. A number of members of the elected agencies of the republic's party organization from among those who are retired and who have left the confines of the republic, have submitted statements concerning the cancellation of their powers, giving as their reason the fact that it is becoming difficult for them to fulfill the increasing tasks in full measure. We must approach this carefully and must make a decision that will make it possible to regroup our forces correctly and to increase their practical potential.

We understand that the reasons why perestroyka has been proceeding with difficulty in the republic include miscalculations at the Uzbek CP Central Committee, its Buro, secretariat, and departments. It would be correct for the plenum participants to make direct and frank statements with regard to these questions. It is only by understanding the situation and by uniting our efforts that we will fulfill our duty to the nation, and our role as the political vanguard of the republic's workers.

#### Various Issues Highlighted

18300681 Tashkent VOSTOKA in Russian 23 May 89  
pp 2-4

[Unattributed report: "13th Plenum of the Uzbek CP Central Committee: Deepening Perestroyka, Setting the Tone in Affairs"]

[Text]

#### Discussion of the Report

**M. M. Mirkasymov, first secretary of the party's Tashkent Obkom.**

Comrades! The serious discussion that developed at the April Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee calls upon us once again to analyze deeply the work style and methods of the party committees at the present-day stage, and to reconsider its place and role in the processes of perestroyka. Not without good reason, people are linking the slow resolution of many problems of developing our society with shortcomings in the work of the party committees and of administrators at various levels.

Taking this into consideration, the party's Tashkent Oblast Committee has been taking definite steps to restructure the party work. The activities of the members of the party's oblast committee have been intensified, and the work of the appropriate permanent commissions has been extended. The obkom members, which now include a larger number of rank-and-file Communists, are taking direct part in preparing and adopting the



decisions at board-action agencies, in selecting and promoting cadres, in working out decisions, and in organizing their execution. The functional duties of the apparatus workers have been reconsidered, there has been a considerable increase in the amount of time that they spend in the low-level party links, and there has been a reduction of almost two-thirds in the volume of correspondence. All the apparatus workers have been placed on temporary party rolls in the primary party organization for specific social work in the labor collectives. The basic attention of the party committees has been directed toward the search for ways to resolve the existing questions.

It is possible that in the republic's party committees there are also a rather large number of other forms for reinforcing their ties with the labor collectives, but we are not always informed about this. In our view, in these questions there has been an obviously amount of work that has not been done by the Central Committee apparatus and the republic's mass media.

Visits to the labor collectives and conversations with people have shown that the problems in developing the economy and the social sphere that were mentioned at the CPSU Central Committee Plenum are also completely typical of Tashkent Oblast. In order to resolve them, we are placing the emphasis on developing the independence and initiative of the party committees and organizations and the labor collectives. However, this initiative from below frequently encounters departmental barriers. Take, for example, the production of consumer goods. The Uzbektekstilmash Production Association came forward as long as a year ago with a proposal to organize in the republic the production of complicated household appliances: two-section washing machines and household electrical water pumps. For this purpose they requested the republic government and our oblast ispolkom to consider the possibility of transferring to a compensatory basis the incompletely built and unused projects at the plant for repairing hydromechanical and electrical-engineering equipment, of Uzbek SSR Goskormvodkhoz [State Committee for Water Management]. However, because of departmental red tape, it has been impossible to resolve this question during the course of the year. We certainly share some of the blame for this, since we did not demonstrate consistency or right-mindedness or resolving this question.

Unfortunately, situations like this are by no means infrequent for us. Recently we held an out-of-town meeting of the oblast party and economic aktiv to expand the production of and improve the quality of consumer goods, where an extended program for resolving this problem was adopted. In the course of the meeting and prior to it, many party organizations and labor collectives came up with the initiative of organizing the production of consumer goods on the basis of a number of incompletely constructed or neglected buildings in the cities of Narimanov and Tashkent and in Ordzhonikidzevskiy Rayon. But, once again, departmental diktat prevented us from resolving this task.

It would certainly be desirable, under these conditions, to consider in a centralized procedure the question of creating special state commissions to engage in the inspection and withdrawal of all the so-called "dolgostroy" [long-term construction projects] and the available capacities, and subsequently to re-equip them to produce consumer goods and as processing and food-product production entities. That would be an important trend in the fight against poor business practices that was mentioned at the April Plenum.

A similar approach must be taken to analyzing the activity of the cooperatives. In particular, in Tashkent Oblast we adopted a decision to have a commission inspect the activity of all the cooperatives and cooperative members, and we shall do everything to encourage the activity of those who are working in the sphere of production, especially of consumer products. But attempts to live parasitically on the neck of society, such as those that were mentioned in the report, will be discontinued in the most decisive manner, from the imposition of high taxes to the shutting down of such cooperatives.

Among the other problems that are no less important, one that is the most critical one for us is the improvement of the supplying of the public with food products. This question was considered rather thoroughly at the recent plenum of the party's obkom. Although Rafik Nishanovich said in his report that there has been an increase in agricultural production, there has been practically no per-capita increase in this production. We think that the decision that has been made concerning the homestead plots on personal farms will become a serious support in increasing the production of food.

However, it must be admitted self-critically that the party committees have not yet managed to confirm everywhere among the cadres the new approaches and methods, to overcome the passivity in actions, or to strengthen the questions of the intensive use of the existing potentials of the agroindustrial complex by means of specific political and organizing work.

But I want to mention something else. Life persistently demands that we reconsider as quickly as possible the structure of the administration of the APK [agroindustrial complex] both in the republic and on the level of the oblast and rayon. At the present time our kolkhozes, sovkhozes, and enterprises in the APK, prove to belong to more than ten different republic-level departments, and this hampers their operation and makes it impossible to use completely the available reserves for agricultural production.

Our oblast, like the other regions of the republic, suffered greatly from the unexpected frosts. We have resown approximately 90,000 or the 137,000 hectares of cotton. The vegetable and other agricultural plantings that were destroyed are being restored. The situation in agricultural is extremely serious. This is the time, right now, to



put the initiative into the hands of the farm managers, rather than shackling their actions with instructional guides and red tape, and the time to emancipate the peasant.

We have submitted to the commission of the Uzbek CP Central Committee our proposals for reorganizing the system of administering the APK in the oblast and we hope to change over to that system, starting in the second half of the year. We think that our proposal will receive support.

The complicated socioeconomic situation has also had an effect in the city of Tashkent. As was pointed out in the report, for a long time the economic and urban development in the republic's capital was under the influence of the extensive methods of running the economy. The buildup of production volumes without regard from the proportional development of the social and municipal infrastructure contributed to the increase in serious disproportions in the development of the urban management. From year to year the city has seen the chaotic construction of various institutions, enterprises, bases, and warehouses that could easily have been housed in other places. There has been a postponement of the questions of reorganizing the ecologically harmful enterprises and of moving outside the confines of Tashkent the antenna fields that occupy a tremendous area within the city, as well as moving the prisons and other structures. At the present time only 11,000 out of 25,000 hectares of the city's territory are occupied by housing, with more than 70 percent of that housing being structures with only a few stories. We feel that something that can be a way out of the critical situation that has developed is the adoption within the near future of the government's special program, entitled "The Intensification of the Socioeconomic Development of the City of Tashkent by the Year 2010," the working out of which has been broadly extended by us and in which we are broadly involving the city's public.

There is yet another problem that was mentioned with a large amount of concern in the report—the increase in crime. The fact that more than a third of the crimes in the republic occur in Tashkent Oblast and in the city of Tashkent attests, of course, to the serious gaps in the work of the law-enforcement agencies. The level of qualification of many of the employees of the internal affairs agencies is still insufficiently high. The party organizations and the soviet agencies have not been able to arouse broad segments of the public to join the fight against social evil. We are currently working on these problems and we completely support the thesis expressed in the report concerning the need to take all steps to reinforce discipline and to assure socialist legality everywhere and in everything.

At the same time, in our opinion, we ought to consider and resolve the questions of seriously improving the material-technical support of the internal affairs agencies.

Much in resolving the complicated tasks confronting society depends upon selecting and assigning cadres in the key areas of perestroyka. The factor that has become the main link in renewing this work of the oblast party organization is the concern for training an effective, publicly promoted reserve of cadres, for instructing that reserve, and the selection of the administrator on alternative principles, and their periodic reporting to the labor collectives. This work still has a rather large number of shortcomings, and frequently it is conducted in a haphazard manner with spasmodic all-out efforts, as a result of the lack of any proper systems approach. It has proven to be impossible to resolve instances in which Communist administrators have been punished for having committed misdemeanors by by-passing the primary party organizations. At the same time the further democratization of cadre policy is still being restrained by the excessive regulation of certain questions by the center. Are we really supposed to consider it correct that the republic's party agencies still have not been given the right to decide independently the questions of isolating the rates of workers who have been released? In our opinion, the practice of conducting individual discussions and approving elected party workers requires considerable simplification.

In the report it was correctly stated that the combat capability of the primary links, and in the republic's party organization as a whole, is largely influenced by the influx of fresh forces. Fulfilling the CPSU Central Committee's resolution "Serious Shortcomings in the Work of the Tashkent Oblast Party Organization in Accepting People into the Party and Reinforcing the Party Ranks," the obkom granted the party's gorkoms and raykoms more independence in the question of selecting and training the party replacements. We attempt to take a systems approach to this question. Last year every eighth person accepted as a candidate was sent to a lagging or complicated sector. During the past two years every second candidate gave a report on his activities at a meeting together with the Communists who had recommended him. The certification of Communists has proven to be an effective means of self-purification. As of today, individual discussions have been conducted with more than 50,000 Communists, or more than one-third who are subject to certification. On the basis of the results of certification, more than 5000 Communists received party punishments, and approximately 700 persons were expelled from the party. All this contributed in a definite way to increasing the participation rate of the Communists. Nevertheless we cannot be satisfied with the rate of fulfillment of the CPSU Central Committee resolution. To no small degree this became possible as a result of the poor monitoring of the fulfilling of the decisions that had been made, the reduced demand- ingness toward the party committees, and the insufficient methodological assistance provided to them.

It would seem to be desirable, in order to help the party organizations in the outlying areas, for the Uzbek CP Central Committee also to involve the scientific forces in

theoretically elaborating the problems of forming the party ranks. In our opinion, something else that requires clarification is the system of determining the category of the social status of the party member, which would eliminate many of the questions coming in from the outlying areas in this regard.

Time requires of us decisive, extraordinary actions and bold approaches. It would seem that the resolution passed by today's plenum should be such an action. I would like for it to contain a larger number of specific points that are aimed at renewing the forms and methods of party work. That will help the party committees and organizations when fulfilling the decisions of this plenum and will strengthen perestroika by specific deeds.

**M. A. Zaidov, Uzbek SSR Minister of Public Education.**

Dear comrades! Soon it will be a year since the new organizational mechanism of administration—the Uzbek SSR Ministry of Public Education—was created. That ministry was assigned the task of conducting a single state policy in the area of public education in the republic.

Certain factors of perestroika already exist in our aktiv. The number of students attending 8000 schools is 4.5 million. Moreover, 3500 schools have at their disposal standard buildings that have all the opportunities for the most efficient organization of the instructional process, and their number is growing constantly.

Tomorrow the republic's pedagogical press will publish two versions that we developed for the new curricula of schools with Uzbek and Russian as the languages of instruction. The school programs and textbooks are being completely renewed. The ministry has developed and begun implementing a special-purpose comprehensive program for computerizing public education: 522 classes providing instruction in computer technology also exist in Karakalpak ASSR and in the republic's oblasts. By the end of the 13th Five-Year Plan they will be in every school.

There have been tangible advances in restructuring the vocational-technical education and the higher and secondary special school systems. However, our further advancement is being restrained by a factor that was directly mentioned at the April CPSU Central Committee Plenum. Many decisions, including measures to develop public education, were made without the proper consideration of the real state of finance or the opportunities provided by the economy. So today, when there is broad discussion in the republic of the draft version of the program for accelerating the socioeconomic development of Uzbek SSR and for raising the population's standard of living in 1991-1995, I feel that it is necessary to inform the Central Committee members of the state of

affairs in public education, which, as M. S. Gorbachev remarked, is directly linked with the development of socialism and with perestroika.

The development of the republic's public education, like that of public education in the country as a whole, if we do not want to repeat the mistakes of past years, must be combined with the parallel supporting of the entire series of cadre questions. Otherwise there will inevitably be chronic disproportions both in the next five-year plan and in the long-term period.

However, this approach is not being completely implemented. For example, the draft version of the program stipulates the activation in the 13th Five-Year Plan of 750,000 additional work stations. If one considers the increase in the number of workers even without taking into consideration the shift-operation factor, even in this instance, in order to train qualified workers for this number of work stations by means of the providing of instruction in the republic's vocational-technical schools, it will be necessary carry out in 1991-1995 the construction of new complexes and the expansion of the existing PTU [vocational-technical schools] to accommodate 73,200 additional students, which will require 400 million rubles of capital investments for the system of the Ministry of Public Education alone.

At the same time, this kind of development of the material base is not been taken into consideration. Nor is the posed problem exhausted by the new long-range expansions of the training of worker cadres within the confines of direct ties with the major industrial enterprises in other parts of the country, as was mentioned by R. N. Nishanov at the 14 May meeting.

If one touches upon the prospects for developing higher and secondary special education, then, by implementing the proposals in the draft version of the program, by 1996 we shall be lagging behind the standards that are in effect in the country for providing instructional laboratory areas as follows: at institutions of higher learning, by a factor of 2.5, and at secondary special educational institutions, by a factor of 3; and for providing the students with dormitories: at institutions of higher learning, by a factor of 4, and at secondary special educational institutions, by a factor of 8.

In other words, if the republic's higher and secondary special school systems develop at today's rates, the resolution of the tasks that have been assigned to them will require 20-25 years. We understand the great responsibility that is borne by the ministry in providing cadre supply to the republic's socioeconomic development and are increasing our exactingness toward the workers in all links of public education for the effectiveness of instructing and educating young people by using the existing material-technical base.

If we admit, not in words but in deed, the role of the human factor in guaranteeing the acceleration of the socioeconomic development of Uzbek SSR, it is necessary to give the Communist administrators the responsibility of determining with all responsibility for every ministry, department, and association the real need for qualified workers and specialists with higher and secondary special education, individually for the years in the 13th Five-Year Plan and until the year 2000, and of introducing contract relations for training them, with partial compensation of the expenses.

Comrades! The basic factor for the increase the population of Uzbek SSR is its natural growth [birth rate minus death rate]. Every year more than 700,000 children are born in the republic, and there continues to be an increase in the birth rate. It is inadmissible not to take into consideration completely the demographic factor when computing the plans for our development. But the extent to which children are provided with permanent preschool institutions in Uzbek SSR constitutes 34.5 percent, that is, 2.3 million children in the republic do not have the opportunity to attend preschool institutions. Moreover, 343,000 of the available places (one-tenth of the number) are in improvised accommodations.

In 1988 preschool institutions with accommodations for 48,400 children were activated, and the draft of the program stipulates during the 13th Five-Year Plan the construction and activation of children's preschool institutions for 600,000 children—120,000 children annually.

According to our computations, the contingent of children needing preschool institutions as of 1 January 1996 will be more than 4 million. If the planned construction rates are maintained—and they exceed the current only by a factor more than 2—even in this instance the extent to which the children are provided with permanent preschool institutions in the republic will be 36.2 percent, rather than the 65 percent that is mentioned in the draft of the program.

Moreover, on the basis of the results of the 14th Five-Year plan, if we proceed at this rate, and with a consideration of the demographic factor, we will reach the year 2001 with only 45.9 percent of the need being met. In other words, even at the beginning of the next century, more than half the upcoming generation of Uzbekistan will be deprived of the opportunity to get an education or to develop under conditions of children's preschool institutions.

A situation that is no less complicated is developing in the school matters also. The program draft stipulates the construction and activation during the 13th Five-Year Plan of 1.5 million student places, that is, 300,000 places annually. Today we have in the republic 3.6 million student places and a 4.6 million contingent, with 1.2 million places being in improvised accommodations, and 70 percent of the schools conduct classes in two shifts.

In 1987 the Uzbek CP Central Committee, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, and the republic's government made a decision to eliminate completely by 1990 the schools that were in an emergency condition. The number of such schools at that time was 390. During the discussion of the draft of the State Plan for the Economic and Social Development and the Budget of Uzbek SSR for 1989, I spoke at a session of the republic's Supreme Soviet, expressing concern for the fact that 62 schools in an emergency condition had proven to be outside the confines of the 12th Five-Year Plan, that is, the nonfulfillment of the previously mentioned resolution had been deliberately allowed to occur.

But when the ministry, jointly with the party's obkom and the oblast ispolkom in Kashka-Darya, and then in the other oblasts, began the work of inventorying the schools in detail, it was ascertained that, as of today, the republic as a whole as more than 1000 schools in emergency condition that should only be demolished.

The bad weather during the spring of this year reconfirmed this. We are currently preparing the necessary proposals to be sent to the government with regard to this question. According to our computations, the contingent of school students as of 1 January 1996 will be 5.5 million students. If the planned construction rates are maintained—and they exceed the current ones by a factor of 1.5—then even in this instance the shortage of places for organizing single-shift classes will be 729,000, but 437,000 places will continue to be in improvised schools.

Moreover, on the basis of the results of the 14th Five-Year, if we proceed at the same rates, and with a consideration of the demographic factor, we shall reach the year 2001 with a shortage of 583,000 student places to guarantee single-shift classes.

Dear comrades! We understand fully the complexity of the economic situation and we do not want to ask for the impossible, but we feel that the Central Committee members must know the real situation in public education and must strive to exclude the "leftover" principle in planning it. Obviously, it would be desirable at the stage of discussing the draft of the program for accelerating the republic's socioeconomic development, for Gosplan and the ministries and departments to reconsider attentively the questions that have been raised, keeping in mind the fact that they have been defined by the directive agencies as the priority areas in the development of the national economy.

**U. K. Kunnazarov, first secretary of the Party's Nukuskiy Gorkom.**

Comrades! The question being discussed at today's plenum forces us to think carefully about many things. Having undertaken, in the course of perestroyka, the job

of eliminating the ugly deformations that had accumulated in our system over a period of many decades, the party proved to be in a very extraordinary situation.

We shall state frankly that, under the conditions of democratization and glasnost, we saw in a few places the appearance of all kinds of informal organizations of the type of the well-known Democratic Union and the so-called Birlik movement, a definite part of which organizations, unfortunately, occupy an extremist, destructive position, frequently acting in alliance with corrupted and nationalistic elements and making the obvious attempt to constrict, or in definite circumstances to deprive the republic's party organization of its guiding role. The nation and the Communists of Karakalpakia are profoundly indignant at their attempts to disseminate handwritten leaflets and political slogans of a nationalistic nature. Stating it bluntly, these are no childish pranks.

However, this concern, in my opinion, was not apparent in the statement made by Comrade Mirkasymov.

And we Central Committee members have the right today to demand of the Central Committee Buro, the Secretariat, and the republic's mass media more decisive, more aggressive work in the fight against these undesirable phenomena.

Everyone must learn how to live and work under conditions of the fierce political struggle, which is something that many of us are not ready for. That is why at today's plenum, on the threshold of the election to the local soviets, it is critically necessary for us to work out a precise strategy and tactics in order to give a well-principled evaluation to those undesirable phenomena. The law governing elections to local soviets must be thought out very well. Otherwise, losses will be inevitable.

Our strength lies in the unity of the party ranks. It was for good reason that in the last century Berdakh, the classic author of Karakalpak literature, bequeathed to us:

*"When the tribes are united, what force do they fear?"*

Comrades! The processes that are occurring today in society, their deviations at times from the main trends in perestroika, are largely determined by the dynamism of political initiative, and it is that initiative that we frequently have in short supply. I have in mind both the party committees of our autonomous republic and those of the republic's party organization as a whole. In my own city committee we are well aware of the fact that wherever we operate with a lead time of two or three months, it is better than with a lead time of a half-year or a year, and wherever the rates are higher, the results are more tangible both in socioeconomic life and in political life.

Take, for example, such an acute problem as the Aral Sea. Recently, on the initiative of the oblast committee of the Uzbek CP Central Committee, serious decisions were made with regard to this matter, and long-term proposals were made, which we first discussed with the public. And it immediately became obvious that public opinion had begun to turn in the direction of our party. But I must say self-critically that this definitely is not happening everywhere or always, and the persons who take the initiative into their hands are those who need perestroika as a screen to satisfy their personal and extremist aspirations. One can find a rather large number of expamples of this both in the autonomous republic and in Uzbekistan as a whole.

Another fundamental shortcoming in our work today is the backsliding into our second disease—the disparity between word and deed. We accept many pretty programs and decisions and then forget to fulfill them.

We are puzzled, for example, by the low executive discipline of many ministers and Communists in guaranteeing the unconditional implementation of the resolutions of the CPSU Central Committee and USSR Council of Ministers with regard to Karakalpak ASSR and the problems of improving the ecological situation in the Aral Sea area. It is obvious that all the rayons and the capital of the autonomous republic have proven, for well-known reasons, to be in a disastrous situation. The population understands the backwardness of our region's development and the causes of that backwardness. I think that the workers are justified in criticizing Uzbekistan's planning agencies as the basic factor that is impeding the elimination of the calamities that have overtaken us.

Take, for example, the problems of the socioeconomic development of the capital of the autonomous republic, and its industrial potential. There is not a single industrial enterprise here in its present-day sense. And it is not surprising that in a city with a population of 200,000, the total amount of industrial output produced during the year has a value of only approximately 100 million rubles, and in per-capita terms, products with a value of only 500 rubles are produced per inhabitant. The share of persons working in industry, as compared with the overall number of persons employed in the national economy, is only 11 percent. This fact can be explained either by the lack of desire to cope with the needs of autonomy, or simply by the incompetence of those who determine such disproportions.

As of today, more than 3000 persons in the city's able-bodied population are not employed in socially beneficial labor because of the lack of jobs. Among other

things, the criticism directed at the autonomous republic was justified—criticism that the apartment and state thefts here are not decreasing, and the size of the unemployed population also is not decreasing.

Meanwhile, at the fault of the ministries, construction has not been begun at the following projects: a dyeing and finishing factory; a plant to process household waste; a plant to clean alfalfa seeds; an experimental-production base for the production of polyethylene drainage pipes; a bread-products combine; and other important projects, although, comrades, the current five-year plan is already coming to an end.

And what is typical is that not a single one of the Uzbekistan ministers who allowed the failure to fulfill the resolution of the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers to occur and who thus discredited the party and the government has shown the bravery and civic self-awareness to resign.

All of this is occurring within the sight of the Uzbek CP Central Committee, its Buro, Secretariat, and departments. It is as though they do not want to become angry, like the republic's Council of Ministers, and are reconciling themselves to the irresponsibility. However, this must not go on this way any more, if we do not want to pull down perestroika in demagogic logomachy.

People are tired of our promises and currently they do not trust words. They are demanding real shifts toward the better, and when those shifts do not occur, there is also no trust in us party workers. Failure to see these processes or, even moreso, failure to do anything to oppose them, is unforgivable. So let us admit honestly that, with regard to executive discipline, we have gone today far down a blind alley somewhere.

This was mentioned very justifiably at today's plenum in R. N. Nishanov's report.

An especially alarming situation has developed in the region with regard to providing people with drinking water. Water analyses that were conducted during the winter and spring periods at the Takhiatash Dam attest to the fact that, as judged by the GOST [All-Union State Standard], the water does not even conform to the category "water for industrial use," and yet people are drinking it.

Meanwhile, at Uzbek SSR Council of Ministers, we have been promised that the construction of the first phase of the Tuyamuyun-Nukus-Takhtakupyr water pipeline, with collection at the Tuyamuyun Reservoir, is supposed to be completed as early as this year or in 1990. Now it has turned out that pumps of the necessary capacity are not being produced in our country, and they must be ordered from Romania. And yet the activation of the water pipeline is subject to regulation by the well-known resolutions of the CPSU Central Committee and USSR Council of Ministers. Therefore, before the activation of

the water pipeline, it is necessary to resolve the question of constructing a reservoir in the area of the Takhiatash Dam. This water is needed by Nukus and by the Takhiatash GRES, that is, we receive the water with a half-day reserve. These questions must be resolved immediately, since people simply have nothing to drink. The water that we get, comrades, is a disgusting mixture of poisonous chemicals and nitrates and is the chief cause of mass disease among the people. Judge for yourselves, if, according to data from provided by the clinic system, which has handled more than 40 percent of the people in Karakalpakistan, 63 percent are ill, and have more than one disease. Adults are used to suffering, but what can we tell our children, among whom, starting at birth, two-thirds are ill? Our descendants will not forgive us for delaying even a single hour.

The situation will improve if we actually achieve a demarcation between the functions of the party agencies and the executive agencies. For the time being, we give only lip service to this thesis. And if this continues, the accusations of bureaucratism will continue in the future to be heaped on the party, beginning with the Central Committee and ending with the primary party organization.

Currently, in our autonomous republic, a broad dialogue with people has begun. Every month we have meetings with the intellectuals, with scientific and creative workers, with war and labor veterans, with students, and with school guides. It seems to me that it is necessary to employ this experience. For example, we discuss everything, even the national questions, together. People like to come to talk to us. And a few things are already being decided. But even in those questions the Central Committee's Ideological Department could give us better orientation. For example, recently a good resolution concerning the fight against antisocial manifestations was enacted, but it was delayed, as a minimum, by half a year.

We understand perfectly that the main path in resolving these problems consists in mastering the political methods of working among the masses. It is necessary, first of all, to think out completely the paths of restructuring the elected agencies, and of increasing their rate of activity, beginning with the Central Committee and ending with the buros of the primary party organizations, so that they will actually become the working headquarters of perestroika. From this point of view it would seem that we have drawn out the work of the commissions both of the central agencies and the local ones. Take, for example, the activity of the ideological commissions. Communists ask us a large number of questions about what the Leninist conception of socialism is, what will be the fate of socialist competition, or will it be crowded out by an economic competition? What are the correlations between class ideology and the problem of humanizing socialism? I must say that we must have the opportunity to receive the answers to all these questions in our newspapers and magazines, on radio and television, and

in statements made by our Buro members and the members of the Uzbek CP Central Committee. But the delaying or the simple statement of the situation in the resolutions, or the transferring by the Central Committee of the responsibility chiefly to the local ideological workers for the fact that the extremist elements have not been rebuffed properly from the party workers in the oblasts and the rayons, obviously, are not resolving the problem.

What we need today is constructive, concrete work to increase the activity rate of the party organizations. And yet we do not have any elaborations or recommendations for mastering the political methods of leadership. We are not armed with the proper tools for working with the primary party organizations.

The intellectuals who have become somewhat skilled in speculating in national relations also include Communists. It would seem that the Party Rules should operate with respect to those who actually have placed themselves outside the party, who propagandize views that are incompatible with membership in the CPSU.

Comrades! The tactics of perestroika are varied and many-sided. They include not only a positive, but also a negative. But we Communists of Karakalpakstan are filled with optimism, and with the support and understanding of the CPSU Central Committee, the Uzbek CP Central Committee, and the government of the country and the republic. This is attested to by the active work of the deputy group of Uzbekistan Supreme Soviet under the leadership of V. P. Anishchev. Confirmation of the increased attention was provided by the arrival of Ye. K. Ligachev, Politburo member and secretary of CPSU Central Committee, in the autonomous republic. His familiarity with the problems of the Aral Sea and the area around it and the constructive nature of the steps that were worked out at the conference that was conducted by him inspire in our people a conviction about a tomorrow in which the Aral Sea will live.

**D. S. Yadgarov, first secretary of the Party's Bukhara Obkom.**

Comrades! The acute and prompt discussion that occurred at the April 1989 Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee affects each of us, and forces us to be imbued with a single concern—the providing of reliable guarantees for the irreversibility of perestroika. Actually, we are resolving tasks of a historic scale, but the thing that interests people primarily is the possibility of rapidly improving the real living conditions right now.

The changeover to the new management conditions promotes the development of the process of improving the oblast's economy. It proved to be possible to stabilize the state of affairs in industry and there has been a rise in the production volumes and labor productivity. The quality of the output being produced is improving.

The lag in capital construction has been overcome, and the activation of housing and of projects intended for social and cultural use has been increased. The harvest yield of the basic crop—cotton—has increased. There has been an increase in the production and sale to the government of products of animal husbandry. Positive changes have also been occurring in other branches of the national economy. Organizational efficiency and order has increased.

The most important factor is that there has been a change in people's attitude toward labor. They now see a real possibility of participating in administration, of being the real owners of production. At the same time the serious deficit that has been created in implementing the customer's demand is, in our opinion, the chief cause of social tension.

It is no secret that in our oblast there have been instances of failures of certain collectives to show up for work. There have been hooligan actions at the May Day holiday in Romitanskiy Rayon, and attempts were made to exert an influence on the public awareness by means of rumors and leaflets... The obkom Buro and the party aktiv have not been ignoring such instances, but instead carry out explanatory work, listen to the public's opinion, and resolve the questions that are posed.

At the same time the primary party organization has not yet become the basic coordinator of actions in carrying out the economic reform. According to the results of a sociological study, 120 party organization secretaries in the production branches mentioned the weak influence exerted by the Communists on the implementation of the economic reform. Moreover, 7.5 percent of them expressed the opinion that the party organization, practically speaking, is remaining aloof from this vitally important area of perestroika.

In addition, the party organizations, following the old procedures, are waiting for instructions "from above" in the forthcoming election. In the situation that has developed, we in the party obkom carried out the instruction of all categories of the cadres and the aktiv, we did not attempt to find out how this had been done previously, but instead we came to an understanding about the unity of actions. Everyone knew what he had to do, and we set as our chief goal the making of contacts with the maximum number of people, and the increasing of the force of their public awareness.

Life suggested to us that, in order to be truly in control of the situation and to know people's mood, it is necessary to study systematically and thoroughly the public opinion. For these purposes, a commission that has been called upon to forecast and to react promptly to the aggravation of the contradictions that arise was formed under the party's oblast committee.

It can be said today that our actions found understanding among the people, and as a result of the dialogue, we were able to remove the irritation that individual groups felt.

In the report mention was made of the problems in the agrarian sector of the economy and in the implementation of the party's Food Program. I also want to mention this, inasmuch as our oblast is basically agrarian.

The Communist Party's Central Committee acted as the initiator in having the management policy turn from cotton as the single crop to the intelligent and scientific use of the land and water resources, and to the introduction of crop rotations, and to the need for ecological purity. All this is so. But the approaches largely continue to be the old ones.

For example, in the work of implementing the Food Program. In questions of building up the output of animal husbandry, the party's oblast committee and the oblast ispolkom have made repeated proposals to the republic agencies concerning the use, in the outlying areas, of a by-product of cotton-growing—oil cakes and husks. The benefit of this is obvious. From each hectare of cotton field we obtain from these types of products as many fodder units as from a hectare of grain crops. As has been shown by computations, by use of these products alone it would be possible to increase by almost one-third the production of meat and milk on the oblast's farms.

However, there has not yet been any reaction to our proposals. And if we are to be completely frank, today even the output in excess of plan is completely redistributed outside the confines of the oblast. And this runs completely contrary to the decree of CPSU Central Committee and USSR Council of Ministers, entitled "The Further Improvement of the Economic Mechanism of Management in the Country's Agroindustrial Complex."

This question is further aggravated by another circumstance. We are carrying out work to develop the private plots. We try to convince people of the benefit of fattening up livestock on their private plot, as was mentioned in the report. As of today, 800 peasants' private animal farms have been created. Those farms maintain 3500 head of cattle. Said Safarov alone, on the Kommunizm Kolkhoz, Kaganskiy Rayon, after buying 21 head of cattle outside the confines of the oblast, will sell the state this year 5 tons of meat and more than 7 tons of milk. And examples such as this are not isolated ones.

However, the public and the managers of enterprises and farms are not convinced that they will be provided with fodders. This is hampering the development of the family and lease contract in animal husbandry.

In developing new forms of management and in increasing their contribution to social production, a restraining factor is the old style used by the planning agencies, and at times their unthinking attitude toward the job at hand. For example, in the program for the socioeconomic development of Uzbek SSR during the 13th Five-Year Plan, which was published by the newspapers in April, it was pointed out that, in addition to reducing the volumes of cotton production, scientifically substantiated indicators are being established for each territory. I simply made a computation for all the oblasts of how the plans had been changed. It turned out that, for all the oblasts, there had been a purely mechanical addition, on the average, of 20,000 tons each, and, as in the olden times, the decision had been made to "insure" the republic against any possible nonfulfillment. What turns out as result was, instead of a steady 5 million tons, 5.21 million tons.

And that is the entire scientific approach. So what will happen then to planning and state discipline? It is as though the comrades in the republic have been fascinated by the reorganizing of the central agencies of the agroindustrial complex and are reacting slowly to the resolution of specific tasks.

I feel that the Uzbek CP Central Committee must impose more responsibility for implementing the party's agrarian policy on the Communist administrators who allowed the failures and miscalculations, and must achieve from them perestroika in fact.

We were all witnesses to a phenomenon of nature that is unusual in our part of the country, when, before May Day, cold Arctic air invaded our territory. As a result, agriculture suffered colossal losses. The losses in Bukhara Oblast alone came to approximately 100 million rubles. But this did not faze the rural workers. They rose as one to fight the forces of nature. And we are convinced that the catastrophic consequences will be overcome.

In this regard I would like to ask the comrades from the republic's Gosagroprom and Gosstrakh to render assistance immediately to all the farms that have suffered, and first of all to the lessees and collectives that are operating under conditions of cost accountability.

Comrades! The large amount of work being done by the Communist Party's Central Committee to allow the republic's party organization to improve its condition has cleared our ranks of corrupted functionaries and has made it possible to improve the moral and psychological situation in the republic. At the same time, as the processes of perestroika build up, the concern about our work style and about cadres is becoming more tangible, since there has now arrived a generation of party workers with little experience, workers who undergo training practically on the run, under the conditions of perestroika. The times that are being criticized by us inflicted tremendous damage on our party affairs. The



moral poverty and moral impoverishment also affected our youth. But even under these conditions we are trying to find creative, dynamic people who are capable of implementing the ideas of perestroika.

However, in resolving the cadre questions, the principles that continue to be in vogue are the old ones that have openly contradicted the developing practice of electing administrators on an alternative basis. Actually, what is becoming increasingly confirmed in life is the election of administrators from among two or more candidates, and frequently it is difficult to predict the outcome. At the same time, something that remains in force is the requirement to send the proposed candidate to a personal discussion at the higher agencies. But what if they do not select him? Or if all the candidates are sent to the discussions?

It is still better, I think, to put more trust in the local party agencies. In our oblast last year alone, out of the 880 workers in the nomenklatura of the party's obkom, gorkom, and raykoms who were replaced, half of them were elected on the basis of competitive choice. The secretary of the party's obkom, the secretaries of the party's Sverdlovskiy and Gizhduvanskiy raykoms, and the chairman of the ispolkom of the Fayzulla-Khodzhayevskiy Rayon Soviet were elected from among several candidates.

Incidentally, in order for the situation to go farther, we need precise, up-to-date orientation markers that do not allow local interests or group selfishness and that promote the expansion of the process of democratization in the selection and promotion of cadres.

In conclusion I would like to say the following. I am in complete solidarity with those who have not lost all control of themselves, who are attempting to understand profoundly the dialectics that govern the events occurring at this exceptionally complicated stage in the development of our society. And with those who are attempting to enrich the policy of perestroika, who are proving, not by conversations but by deed, their faith in socialism and its ideals and are attempting to resolve the tasks in its renovation by means of their specific acts.

**V. I. Chernoshn, laboratory assistant, Samarkand Chemical Plant.**

Comrades! Today we are discussing the decisions of the April Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee. And if one summarizes the report by M. S. Gorbachev and the comrades who spoke at the Plenum, one can conclude that that Plenum was the confirmation of party discipline and the consistency of the fulfillment of the decisions made by the 27th CPSU Congress, the 19th All-Union Party Conference, and the subsequent CPSU Central Committee Plenums.

It is from that position that I would like to evaluate the activity of certain Communist administrators in our republic. Over the period of a number of years our plant failed to fulfill the plan. But then, in 1988, we fulfilled the plan for the first time. That was achieved by means of the remodeling of the plant, which was carried out by the in-house method over a period of two years. That remodeling is currently continuing. In April we concentrated on remodeling the sulfuric acid shop. Today the collective is ready to fulfill the plan for product of mineral fertilizers and even to produce output in excess of the plan. But we have a number of unresolved problems. And the first one is the shipment of lime.

By CPSU Central Committee and USSR Council of Ministers, the supplying of lime was made the responsibility of the republic's Council of Ministers. How, then, has our government been resolving this problem and rendering assistance to our plant? The plant has made repeated requests to G. Kh. Kadyrov, Chairman of the Council of Ministers. We have also appealed to the chairman of the republic's People's Control Committee and to the editorial board of PRAVDA VOSTOKA, but, unfortunately, all our appeals have been ignored.

In March 1989 there was a session of the republic's Council of Ministers at which a good resolution was adopted, concerning the granting of assistance to the plant in being provided with lime, and promises were given. But they also have remained unfulfilled.

I would like to hear from these comrades: how is it possible to make such decisions and fail to fulfill them? Because this too is a matter of our party discipline. Could it be that our enemies who are making statements in the so-called Birlik are taking advantage of this lack of discipline?

Apparently so. The Council of Ministers, and primarily Comrade V. V. Sudarenkov, who is responsible for this sector, must engage seriously in dealing with our problems and must resolve them.

I feel that perestroika will win only when we fulfill by 100 percent all the decisions that we have made. And I would like to hear a reply from those comrades about how they plan to fulfill all the future decisions made by them. And I would also like to have Comrade Kadyrov come to our plant and report to the workers who have been left without any pay how he has been fulfilling all the decisions being made.

And another question. We ship mineral fertilizers to the rural areas, but the farms do not want to pay us. The indebtedness comes to 17 million rubles. For this reason alone, in 1989 the plant does not have a sufficient fund for developing production and new technology, the social development fund, the material incentives fund, or sufficient money to develop the social, cultural, and personal-services sphere at our plant or in our settlement.



We do not have the right to refuse to fulfill shipments to the rural areas, because these are state production orders. If we ask to have our plan reduced, we are given the explanation that this is impossible. And yet it is possible not to pay for the output, putting our collective in a difficult financial situation. How can one understand that?

Let's work under conditions of real partnership, rather than under conditions of force. We have appealed several times with regard to this question to the party's obkoms, the oblast ispolkoms of Kaskha-Darya, Syr-Darya, Bukhara, and Samarkand oblasts, the republic's People's Control Committee, the republic's Council of Ministers, and the republic's Gosagroprom—and we have not received even a single answer.

Once again this is a question of discipline and the responsibility borne by the Communist administrators for the job assigned to them. If we make decisions, then let's fulfill them.

As far as we workers are concerned, we shall apply all our efforts to fulfill the plan and produce output in excess of plan.

**R. Khudaybergenova, first secretary of the Party's Khorezm Obkom.**

Comrades! At the April 1989 Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee there was an extremely frank and well-principled discussion of the need to increase the responsibility borne by the party's Central Committee and the local party agencies for the fate of perestroyka. We must all display the maximum amount of cool-headedness, purposefulness, efficiency, strict discipline, and demandingness. People have already become tired of the excessive talking and the suppression of practical actions, and are awaiting tangible results from perestroyka.

The profound changes that affect all spheres of life have been occurring with difficulty, at times in an extremely painful manner, coming up against the solid resistance of our opponents, whose influence should not be underestimated.

Under these conditions it is very important for the party organizations to keep the initiative constantly in their hands. People must see clearly that all our efforts are aimed at providing for their welfare. Today it is no longer sufficient simply to issue appeals and to give promises. It is time to strive for at least small, but visible, shifts toward the better, especially in the social sphere. This is the goal that our party obkom has set for itself.

Steps have been taken to accelerate the construction of projects in the social, cultural, and personal-services sphere, and especially housing. During the past three years, we have activated as many schools as were activated during the entire previous five-year plan. The plan

for activation of hospitals and clinics has been fulfilled. However, for all the social projects the problem continues to be acute. Cost accountability, the lease, the cooperative system are becoming widespread. Industrial-goods combines and processing enterprises are being created. We attach special importance to the development of people's private plots. In this regard we are in complete agreement with the report. Using the example of one farm, we have begun to resolve these questions, and this is already yielding tangible results.

The party's obkom attempts to act by using political methods. But there are quite a few complexities and a large number of unclear situations in the activity of the commissions of the party committees and departments where the staffs have been reduced. If only for the sake of justice, it must be said that recently the Uzbek CP Central Committee and its Buro began to consider frequently the specific vitally important questions of perestroyka. For example, the activity of the deputy group for monitoring the fulfillment of the decree of CPSU Central Committee and USSR Council of Ministers that deals with the Aral Sea, which group is headed by Comrade V. P. Anishchev. Every month the group punctually considers the rate of implementation of this decree issued by the party and the government, which is of tremendous importance for the persons living in the area around the Aral Sea.

It is becoming increasingly obvious that the situation both in our oblast and in other oblasts depends largely upon the degree to which the party administrators have been trained for political work under conditions of democratization and glasnost. Not everyone has proven to be ready for this. At one time, serious flaws were allowed to occur in cadre work, and now this is having its effect. We sense an acute shortage of experienced workers in the party, soviet, and social organizations. Therefore it is necessary to seek new approaches. The emphasis is placed on working with the reserve that is being formed on an open, democratic basis. At the party obkom's plenum in April 1989, members of the reserve were nominated for positions as party obkom secretaries. Fifteen candidates were nominated, and a list of them was published in the oblast newspapers. We shall study the opinion of the Communists and the broad public. We have already begun receiving various responses, comments, and proposals with regard to this candidates. It has become a practice to hold meeting between the secretaries of the party's obkoms, gorkoms, and raykoms with the reserve and with young specialists, students in the final year at institutions of higher learning and in secondary special educational institutions, and also with school graduates.

Thus, we are working out a system for forming a reserve and for purposefully instructing it. During the past two years, 70 percent of the workers in the nomenklatura of the party's obkom were nominated from the reserve. At the same time, in our opinion, the existing mechanism

for holding elections of administrators, especially economic ones, is still far from perfect. There have been instances when, ignoring the recommendations of the party and social organizations, individual collectives have given their preference to "comfortable," undemanding administrators.

**V. P. Khomyak, first secretary of the Party's Saryasiyskiy Raykom.**

Comrades! Much that is linked with the April Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee is unusual. Something else that was unusual and self-critical was the report at our plenum today. Everything that was said is very objective, the analysis is serious and it requires conclusions on our part and the serious improvement of the work of the party committees.

As a candidate member of the Central Committee, I also bear my share of the responsibility for the state of affairs during this critical moment of perestroika. Perestroika is primarily the specific results at every work station, and then, unfortunately, are far from being completely eliminated. We explain this by own miscalculations, and currently, because of the organization—or, rather, the reorganization—and introduction of cost accountability, the number of them is becoming even larger.

We do not always keep in time with life. We have not yet learned how to conduct a dialogue in the party manner with all segments of the population. As we work, we are learning how to live and operate.

The party organizations and the workers in the rayon and oblast are taking all steps to assure that each one, at his work station, without hiding behind anybody's back and without waiting for instructions, carries out perestroika in his collective independently, and first of all in the fight against poor business practices.

We attach special importance to the Food Program. We are increasing the production of fruits and vegetables. For that purpose and with a consideration of the long-term situation, we are taking steps to use the unirrigated foothill areas by means of terracing and drop sprinkling on an area of 10,000 or more hectares.

We have entered into direct long-term economic ties with the Tomskneft Association and have concluded a contract for the construction of hothouses and the delivery of fruits and vegetables to Siberians on mutually advantageous terms. The steps being taken will make it possible within the immediate future to ease the food problem somewhat.

We have mobilized all the labor collectives to overcome the consequences of the natural calamity. We try to convince people that all the problems are being resolved

by those people themselves and at their work stations, primarily by their organizational spirit, their friendship, their discipline, the quality of their work, and their high labor productivity.

Putting it frankly, democratization and glasnost are giving rise to situations that are typified by many important phenomena that are seriously complicating our work, and that provide the richest food for thought and for making the necessary conclusions.

In a word, the serious consequences of the past have been augmented by a rather large number of new problems—problems pertaining to perestroika—that must be actively resolved. First of all, a large amount of people's dissatisfaction is caused by the results of the first four years of perestroika. People's expectations are not becoming a reality. There have not yet been any of the desired changes. People ask why. It is very difficult for us to answer. Particular dissatisfaction has been created by the distortions in the creation of cooperatives which do not produce anything themselves, but buy up output in the stores, grab up everything at the bases, and sell everything at several times the regular price—this occurs especially in public nutrition. Considerable mention was made of this in the report. We are taking all steps to correct the situation, but, once again, this gives rise to the corresponding conflict situations.

There is much that is incomprehensible with cost accountability. The ministries and departments continue to extract as much as 80 percent or more of the profits from the enterprises, and the ministries and departments are left with nothing. People are also concerned about the high prices of manufactured commodities, and in particular by the fact that simple, inexpensive items have disappeared from the market. Here too the reasons given are perestroika and cost accountability. If the things that we produce are needed, they say, then we also need a profit. But many people cannot afford the expensive commodities, and if that right is given to the factories and plants, then why cannot the kolkhozes and sovkhozes also enjoy the same right. If we are talking about glasnost, then we request the publicizing of the names of those people who are issuing these poorly thought-out decisions. Because the present form of cost accountability does not direct the production collectives toward satisfying the needs of the market and the national economy. Instead it gives rise to group or narrowly departmental selfishness and aggravates the contradictions between the public and collective interests.

And where, then, are our economists, theoreticians, doctors of sciences, and academicians? Even the capitalists who reject Marxism-Leninism have made the correct conclusions from the theory of Marx and Leninism, and whatever is beneficial for them, they are employed excellently. They have also learned out to approach the working class and have established order at the work stations, but we have done just the opposite: in words we

keep appealing for things, but in actuality we reject them. But it might be a good idea to ask what are these groups doing in the center? These economists and other scientists are just sitting around. Where are they leading us? But right now everything looks as though it might come tumbling down at any moment onto the lower levels. Because it is we who are the executors, if we speak honestly. Sometimes you see on television individual shortcomings and you wonder about it: recently a certain commentator expressed the idea that maybe these bureaucrats ought to sit around at the lower levels—and that especially pertains to the first secretaries of the gorkoms and raykoms—because it is harder to get to see them than it is to get to see, for example, the General Secretary. The General Secretary is accessible, but I guess we aren't. So, if I may use this analogy, we're really in the fire, but in the fire, but ideas do get thrown to you there. We are all interconnected into a single organism, into a single complex.

And there is something else: something that is a serious problem in the rayon, as well as in the oblast, and one that causes the workers' considerable concern, is the pollution of the environment and the atmosphere by toxic substances from the Tajik Aluminum Plant. This is causing considerable harm to agriculture and to people's health. The danger zone is expanding, and people feel this in their own health. The steps that have been taken as of today on our part and the help that we have received from the republic government are insufficient. It is necessary for the union government to intervene.

The construction of an aluminum plant in a beautiful, picturesque, subtropical—and also thickly populated—part of the country is not the state approach, to say the least. People are justifiably demanding the publicizing of the names of the guilty individuals, and the taking of steps to reduce the plant's capacity, and then, in the long term, the restructuring of the plant's area of specialization.

Please allow me to express the point of view concerning the great amount of concern for the future of the country and the party that was expressed at the April Plenum.

In particular, it was mentioned with alarm that the democracy and glasnost that are building up power require the reliable legal protection against any obvious or hidden opponents of perestroika, and against any anti-Soviet and antisocialist elements. We have seen the appearance of people, including those with party cards, who are speaking out openly against the CPSU. And in some places, even in Moscow and Leningrad, the cradle of our revolution, it has become fashionable to distribute leaflets, posters, and all kinds of appeals calling for the overthrow of the Soviet authority, and there have been appeals to hang the Communists. Those are the alarming thoughts that were mentioned at the CPSU Central Committee Plenum. A coworker and I share this concern. It must be frankly admitted that this not only

worries and troubles people, but also makes them indignant. Many people even say that, under the guise of perestroika, in a skillful and camouflaged manner, the extremist forces are doing everything not only to disrupt perestroika, but also to destroy socialism. This was made perfectly clear in the report. In my heart I am satisfied, and this is a good frame of mind for us. Comrades, this is the reality of today, and we cannot cover ourselves here with the pluralism of opinions. Phenomena such as these do not have anything in common with it. What we need here are measures, and definitely urgent ones. The so-called Democratic Union in Leningrad, Birlik in Tashkent, and the other informal groups are harboring obviously delirious ideas and programs, and are a real nutritive medium for carrying out the plans of class enemies from without. There have already been examples of direct contacts with them. All of us—from the raykoms to the CPSU Central Committee as a whole, and especially M. Kh. Khalmukhamedov, secretary of the Uzbek CP Central Committee, and CPSU Central Committee secretaries A. N. Yakovlev and V. A. Medvedev, who are responsible for providing ideological support to perestroika—must take exhaustive measures.

The Uzbek CP Central Committee Buro acted correctly when it gave a political evaluation to the actions of Birlik, which is sowing interethnic enmity. It is the task of the Central Committee members to make all the workers completely aware of the essence of this document in all the labor collectives, and we are doing this.

When meeting people, we are frequently asked questions about the party's authority. People say that they should not accuse the entire party. The persons who are guilty of having made miscalculations are the unsuccessful leaders, the deformed, dissolute individuals who managed to work their way to power. Healthy forces have always existed in the party, they exist now, and they always will. It is only a question of what to do to ensure that they occupy aggressive positions, rather than falling into disgrace, expulsion, or repressions, departing from life ahead of time, in their prime, as occurred during the Stalinist era, when the entire flower of the Leninist guard was annihilated, and even after that this practice continued for long years. There is a dark spot on the party's name and it will take time to wash it away. That is what alarms honest people. But the dishonest ones are alarmed by the retribution. They are delaying the fatal hour. But we Central Committee members must not be indifferent to what they are doing, to what methods they are inventing. The only thing that can overcome the mechanism of this resistance is glasnost and democratization. There is no other alternative. But we must remember that the prolonged violence directed against the individual did not form workers who could form their own opinions or who could discuss issues. Instead, it formed yes-men (people have mentioned that to me here) and boot-lickers—a terrible parody of party cadres. One still encounters a rather large number of cadres who were selected and nurtured in accordance with the old

principles. They gravitate toward the past and harbor the idea of returning to it. In order not to rattle the perestroika, we must anticipate their plans. Without resorting to extreme measures, it is necessary to continue to purify the cadre corps, and to do so openly and unpromisingly.

Today, from the rayon link to the center, the situation that has developed is that no one else but the party committees and their workers who assume the blow and accept all the reproaches for having caused breakdowns in the economy, although we do talk a lot about the delimitation of functions.

The task of mastering the political methods of leadership is so vitally important today that without resolving it it is impossible to move ahead, or to deepen perestroika. Because there still is no strict delimitation of functions among the party, soviet, and state agencies, and to a large extent the old approaches are observed. We understand that this, of course, is difficult, but nevertheless we must analyze it. As a result it turns out that if there are breakdowns in satisfying the public's wants, the accusations are always leveled at the party committees. But where are the soviets? Well, they are simply incapable of resolving the tasks entrusted to them—there is a low material base, and their rights are limited. It is necessary to strengthen the local soviets seriously, and to make Gosplan, the ministries, associations, and the other departments with an entire army of administrative apparatus more accountable. But before making them accountable, it is necessary to give them all the rights and put complete trust in them. Here, in my opinion, at Central Committee insufficient work is being done. The party committees actually want to master the political method of leadership. They must be basically disassociated from everything, and must leave for themselves ideology, the selection, education, and assignment of cadres, as well as the long-term prospects, the strategy of economic and social development. Also, there does not exist today a uniform view concerning political methods, although the party literature contains many judgments in this regard. The Academy of Social Sciences must make a more substantial contribution to developing and assimilating the political methods of party leadership.

I assume that I am expressing a general opinion if I say that it is necessary to bring to its completion the reform of the apparatus at the party committees. It is necessary to grant the right to the party's gorkoms and raykoms to establish for themselves the structure and table of organization for the apparatus, proceeding from the established salary limit.

The time has come to establish the status of primary party organizations as representatives of the ruling party in the labor collective and in official participation when resolving questions pertaining to the life of the collective. It is especially necessary to determine the status of the party organizations when resolving questions of electing or appointing administrators. It is also necessary

to accelerate the resolution of questions pertaining to the introduction of order in the payment for the labor performed by the party workers in order to encourage their promotion to work that has been made available. In this regard, we have a large number of difficulties. It is awkward, but it must nevertheless be said, that the salary even of a party raykom's first secretary is at the level of the managers of kolkhoz or sovkhoz departments. This is, of course, without any bonus payments during the year as a whole. And then we are talking about benefits, etc.

It is necessary to reconsider the payment of the labor performed by party committee workers depending on the contribution they have made to the job at hand, and in zones where benefits are paid to workers in the branches of the national economy as a result of the natural and climatic conditions, to extend them also to the party workers.

**N. N. Ivanushkina, sewing machine operator, Karshi Garment-Production Association imeni 50-letiy SSSR.**

Comrades! I have listened attentively to the report and to the comrades' statements, and I would like to share with you the things that are disturbing and worrying the workers most of all today. First of all, it must be said that the nation is completely in favor of perestroika. Among the ordinary people, it would scarcely be possible to find a person who does not support it. We believe that once the party has begun perestroika, it will definitely bring this matter to completion.

But, at the same time, we cannot remain silent concerning the fact that perestroika is still proceeding slowly, especially in those questions that pertain directly to our everyday life. In a few matters the situation not only is not improving but, on the contrary, is worsening. Take the questions of supplying the public with manufactured commodities and food products. Are we really supposed to believe that things have improved for us in this regard? The only things we see in the stores are empty shelves or things that we do not need. Previously, to state it honestly, it was possible to buy things—admittedly by paying more than the regular price, but at least you could get them. Today this is not possible. Everything has gone up in price. The prices have been rising, so that things are completely inaccessible.

It is ridiculous to say that it has become a problem to wash one's clothing or to take a bath. Where have the soap, shampoo, and detergent gone? It is impossible to find children's clothing. People, in confusion, keep asking the question, but they do not get an answer. At the same time has anyone attempted to explain to a worker why all this is happening? Or, most important, when, finally, will everyone sense, within his own family and on his own table, those improvements that they have been impatiently and hopefully awaiting from perestroika?

Something that causes us serious concern is the fact that, on the wave of the democracy that has opened up, in addition to positive features there are also a large number of negative ones. It is good that people have been emancipated and have begun to speak freely. But it is my personal opinion that it is necessary to train the nation for democracy and to control the processes that are occurring.

You can see how the hooligans have let themselves go, especially on the soil of interethnic relations. We have lived together in friendship, and I have always felt that Uzbekistan is my homeland. But now, while reading in a bus, one sometimes hears various insults. It is becoming awkward not only for representatives of other nationalities, but also for Uzbek women, who are being intimidated and forced both to dress and to behave in accordance with Islamic law.

In labor collectives, various demagogues and chatterboxes, if not obvious provocateurs, have begun to feel carefree, and they are attempting to achieve the position resolution of their questions at various administrative levels, although they do not deserve this.

For example, because of shortcomings in her work, our shop chief was demoted. She literally bombarded all the administrative levels with her complaints, and currently endless checks are being carried out at our association. All kinds of commissions have asserted that she is not right, but still, in response to her latest complaint, they come here again to analyze the situation. At the last meeting in the collective we attempted for four and a half hours to convince her, but she continued to maintain her own opinion, and she continues to send telegrams, except that now they go to Moscow.

The workers today ask the question as whether or not there will be proper order in production. Because dozens of commissions are preventing us from working. In the final analysis we cannot allow personal or group aspirations to get feverishly hot and create a tension situation in entire collectives.

I would also like to make a statement concerning such a serious disease of ours as the gap between word and deed, especially in construction. In the oblast and in its oblast center, the city of Karshi, there has been quite a bit of construction under way recently. Recently, for example, new markets and a modern furniture store were opened. But nevertheless the questions of providing the population with housing, kindergartens, drinking water, and other necessities continue to be very acute.

It is understandable that, in order to resolve these questions, we must all work well. But how does one explain that even the planned projects have been under construction for years. Why is there no order in material-technical supply? Why is it necessary, as it was during

the worst years of stagnation, to go around everywhere in the attempt to beat people out of building materials, or to get them by roundabout methods?

I would like to say here that, for example, we send trucks from Karshi to Tashkent for building materials. And the answer given to us there is, "Wait until we provide for our own needs, and then we'll take care of you."

So, for example, we provide many regions with gas, but back home we just cannot resolve the questions of gasification. Apparently we ourselves here, in the republic, are primarily to blame for the fact that proper order has not yet been established in this matter.

For many years, remodeling has been in progress at our factor. I spoke repeatedly on the problems of remodeling, and today, once again, I have to talk about this. At a meeting with the Chairman of Council of Ministers, Gosplan Deputy Chairman A. V. Berezhnny was given the responsibility of turning over for operation a personal-services building in April 1989. But May is already coming to an end, and as in the Krylov fable, "The cart is still stuck in the mud." If anything has been planned, then it should be fulfilled. Because everyone has become quite adept at giving nice-sounding promises. But when it comes down to actually doing anything, everything is still hanging.

And I would like to mention another problem. Our associations has changed over to the new management forms, but we have not yet felt any real benefit from this. The lion's share of the profit is deducted for payment to the local budget, our ministry and the bank take their share, and we ourselves are left with a meager sum, of the order of 18 percent. This isn't enough for anything—either renewing the production, giving incentive payments to the workers, or building anything for ourselves.

What kind of reform and independence is this, then? This can kill anyone's eagerness to work under the new conditions. In order not to push people away from the reform, it is necessary to reduce the deductions by at least 50 percent.

It is difficult for everyone now—the workers, the ministry, and the Central Committee. But I am convinced that we will overcome all these difficulties, that it is only for this that we must all fight responsibly for the job at hand, must engage completely in the work and resolve as quickly as possible specifically those questions that exert a direct influence on people's mood.

**Kh. Umurzakov, first secretary of the Party's Yangikurganskiy Raykom.**

Comrades!

Today it is not so simple to meet with people and talk to them. People have become bolder, more complicated, more enterprising. They demand precise answers to the

questions that are troubling them. But the only way that it is possible to move perestroika ahead successfully is in an atmosphere of high organizational spirit, discipline, and respect for the law. Proceeding from what has been said, all the efforts of our rayon party organization are directed toward the resolving of the specific questions linked with satisfying people's needs for food, housing, and their spiritual enrichment. In the rayon there has been an improvement in the rate of providing the public with consumer goods, the housing program is being fulfilled successfully, and from year to year there has been an increase in the volume of paid services rendered to the public. The plans for the other branches of the national economy are being systematically fulfilled. Broader and broader application is being made of various forms of the collective and family lease contract. Cost accountability is becoming a reliable regulator of production relations. For example, at the present time there are 6300 family collectives and 1200 collectives operating in the rayon in accordance with the lease-contract method. All the animal-husbandry farms in the rayon have been changed over to the family and lease contract.

All this has had an effect on fulfilling the planned assignments and improving the economic indicators. But these are summarized indicators, and they conceal a large number of shortcomings and miscalculations. The new opportunities are by no means being used efficiently everywhere. Alongside of valuable experience, backwardness is still alive and well. And the load of problems from the past continues to be rather great.

This is sensed especially when eliminating the consequences of the natural calamities, as a result of which the rayon suffered a large amount of economic and psychological damage. Last year, for example, because of these calamities, the rayon's agrarian sector bore losses of 7 million rubles, and this year, approximately 11 million. In cotton-growing alone, there were three resowings. From year to year a large number of documents are drawn up, requesting the compensation of the damages from the Gosstrakh agencies, and competent workers even come from the republic and express their sympathy, but in many instances the results of the inspections remain only on paper. The compensation is made only partially. For example, the total amount of money paid out to compensate for the losses incurred as a result of the bad weather conditions last year was 1.2 million rubles. And this constitutes 17 percent of the total losses. At the present time all the kolkhozes and sovkhozes are operating under conditions of cost accountability, all the orchard-growing and viticulture have been changed over to the family and lease contracts, and, naturally, the workers are requesting compensation for the losses inflicted by the natural calamities. The time has come for these questions to be thoroughly studied and resolved by republic agencies promptly, without waiting for the year's results. The nation demands this of us, and in this matter the nation is right.

In general, the work with people requires a more attentive approach. However, not all the party workers have a clear understanding of how they must work under the new conditions. Therefore people have been slow to reject the old schemes and stereotypes, the irresponsibility, the adherence to formal-bureaucratic leadership methods. At the same time we do little to teach the cadres how to see the goal clearly, or how to distribute their efforts skillfully in order to achieve it. Obviously, it is with a consideration of this that various refresher courses, including those in the system of the higher party school, should construct their work.

There is something else that is clear—everyone must begin with himself. Self-discipline and self-criticism, self-education and self-training are the areas in which one can see the essence of the major change in the cadres' awareness and psychology. To use Lenin's words, it is important "for the vanguard not to be afraid of working to improve itself, of remaking itself..."

Because it is no secret that many party committees and organizations, many Communists, are losing their authority, are afraid to enter into polemics, and are making all kinds of concessions, especially in the ideological sphere. Take, for example, the aggravation of the religious situation, when, in the city of Namangan and a number of other places, there have been unsanctioned assemblages of believers with demands that mosques be opened, and when religious marches to many party agencies have become more frequent.

Even experienced party workers have begun to lose control of themselves. Some have taken a wait-and-see position, and have proven to be unready for aggressive work. It must be noted here that certain republic organizations, include the republic's Institute of Atheism, have not been on top of the situation. But there has been more than enough criticism. It would seem that it is time for certain comrades to come down to real life. The nation is looking to our scientists and our creative intellectuals for a response, for concrete, necessary work.

Life poses sharply and uncompromisingly the questions: will the party committees be able to overcome the difficulties in the economy, to carry out the plans that have been set down, and to defend and reinforce their vanguard role? This depends first of all on the combativeness of the primary party organizations.

The conciliatory attitude toward the misdeeds of Communists has not been eliminated. Last year, for example, the decisions made by primary party organizations with regard to eight personal files of CPSU members and candidate members were annulled by the party's raykom as being too liberal.

A large stream of complaints and disputes was caused by the uniting of our rayons.

The ratification of the Uzbek SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium ukase, entitled "Deconsolidation of Rayons," was met favorably. Hasty decisions must not be made in the future.

The conference that was recently held in Tashkent will serve to improve the resolution of the country's Food Program. In the light of this, our rayon's farms have concluded a contract with the industrial enterprises of Chelyabinsk Oblast, and we hope that the results will be rather good.

Last year the rayon's kolkhozes and sovkhozes shipped more than 43,000 tons of high-grade output. But at the fault of the railroad and the customers, 4.7 million rubles were lost. We propose, first of all, that these millions can be saved if the entire shipment is kept to just one oblast in Russia, that is, Chelyabinsk Oblast. Secondly, it is necessary to resolve the question of the acceptance of output in the outlying areas, although this is not the first time that this question has been posed.

It is paradoxical that our representatives travel to other republics to accept potatoes locally, but for some reason we do not have any representatives from other republics.

There are still many unresolved questions in the rayon. One of them is increasing the yield from the land. For example, one hectare of vegetables produces 4370 rubles; grapes, 3400 rubles; hollyhocks, 4500 rubles; and cotton, 2380 rubles of monetary income. This low level of income in cotton-growing is explained by the fact that our rayon, as well as Chustskiy and Kasansayskiy rayons, is situated in the difficult foothill climatic conditions. Thirty percent of the area of cotton plantings is cultivated in one direction, and, this, naturally, requires large expenditures. Hence the high production costs of raw cotton. These real facts have not been taken into consideration. When elaborating the plans for the republic's socioeconomic development in 1990-1995 and the plans for Namangan Oblast, the procurement of raw cotton was decreased insignificantly. We would request taking into consideration our recommendations that the procurement be reduced by a minimum of 20,000 tons.

In conclusion I want to say that today's plenum makes a strict inquiry of us: what have we done? What have we added? Evaluations are not very pleasant, but they are realistic. The activity of the party in certain areas has been subjected to just criticism. We shall seriously discuss our work, we shall make the correct conclusions, and we shall work to eliminate our shortcomings.

#### **Tajik Republic Conference Speeches on Party Leadership**

*18300627 Dushanbe KOMMUNIST TADZHIKISTANA in Russian 13 Apr 89 pp 1, 3*

[TadzhikTA report: "The Political Vanguard and Perestroika"]

[Text] As has already been announced, a republic scientific-practical conference on "The Political Nature of Party Leadership and Problems" has completed its work

in Dushanbe. Its participants focused basic attention on the questions of the activities of the party committees, the primary organizations under the new economic conditions.

#### **1. Theory and Life**

We now can see clearly how both the supporters as well as the opponents of perestroika have linked its fate to the activities of the CPSU, said the head of the Chair at the Leningrad Higher Party School Yu.I. Tarasov in his speech. The role and place of the ruling party in Soviet society, its history, present and future at present are causing heightened interest among the broadest strata of the population and are at the center of the political debates. Contradictory positions have been clearly defined: from dogmatically conservative to openly anti-communist.

In line with the establishing of the principles of democracy and self-government, the question of the very concept of "political power" becomes very pertinent. It, in my view, is not exhausted and not limited to state power. The entire political system of our society is a system of power which we intend to reform for the sake of the main goal of the development of the people's socialist self-government. And here each social institution within this system—the party, the soviets, the public organizations and labor collectives—should assume its own rightful place.

The entire reform in the political system presupposes the establishing of the best conditions for the normal and healthy development of all component parts. The relationships of the party and the soviets are crucial here.

The unifying role of CPSU policy in society is exercised through the elucidation of common interests in all the large and small social groups, nations and nationalities. If the interests of the various population groups coincided on everything and they could be easily and simply satisfied, then generally the problems of social administration would come down to the solving of technical and organizational tasks. They would generally lose their political nature. But such a state of social relations can only be imagined, in arguing abstractly about the distant future. Reality is harsh and merciless toward such illusions.

We know the bitter attempts to improve the lot of the peasant, the intelligentsia or the workers. There is a rigid dependence between the content and goals of a policy and the methods of implementing it.

In following Lenin, we should remind one another of the unity of theory and practice. At present, the question can be raised on a wider basis, that is, on the unity of theory, policy and practice.

The trend in social development forces the party under the new conditions to employ methods and forms of political struggle in its arsenal. It must be recognized that



we at times are poorly prepared for this. A valid fear of the danger of the resurrecting of Stalinist methods for "resolving political problems," it seems to me, has sometimes paralyzed our will and as yet we still have little experience in working under the new conditions. This has been taken advantage of by all sorts of extremists, nationalists, organized criminals and outrightly antisocialist elements. But this is not the only problem. We must generally accept methods of political struggle as a normal phenomenon in a democratic society under the law, where the clashes of various interests and the solution to socioeconomic and political questions can assume forms which are in no way near academic debates.

For this reason it is essential that we learn to utilize the methods of political struggle and, in particular, be able efficiently and clearly to provide a political assessment for various facts, phenomena, actions, publications, rumors aimed at exacerbating the situation and discrediting the policy of perestroika and be able to actively defend the elaborated position, without capitulating to social demagoguery and hysteria.

I am acquainted with the situation in the Baltic. There the problems of an active position and capitulation to demagoguery and hysteria are not a theoretical thesis but rather a question of daily practice.

At the same time, it is essential to be ready to make a compromise, to collaborate and have a partnership with those social forces and groups which stand on positions of perestroika and legality, in maintaining, nevertheless, one's own tactics. It is essential to employ methods for the political neutralizing of extremist elements. For example, in the Baltic, in my view, in the future it will not be as yet possible to break the force of the people's fronts or Sajudis in Lithuania which is the same. But clearly it is a realistic task to think of politically neutralizing their influence in the foreseeable future.

We are all moving toward the 18th CPSU Congress. We will analyze and discuss the acquired experience, we will propose our ideas, proposals and general thoughts in the congress documents but this will be a matter for tomorrow. Although we must understand clearly that this "tomorrow" is already very close.

Perestroika in the party comes down in essence to resurrecting the functions of the party as a political vanguard in society, that is, to resurrecting our ability and art to work and realize the leading role in the party by political methods, said the speaker and consultant from the Section of Party Construction and Cadre Work of the CPSU Central Committee **V.M. Legostayev**.

The process of a radical renewal of the socioeconomic, political and spiritual structures of Soviet society and which was commenced consciously and responsibly by the party in April 1985 has assumed ever-greater scope

and depth. The party itself is changing along with society. The style of thinking and the actions of the communists are being fundamentally revised. The party apparatus has been substantially reduced and political work methods have moved to the forefront.

It is well known that only under the conditions of the ideological and political leadership of the CPSU can the aims of perestroika be achieved. But it is also well known that this very leadership can be provided only under the condition that the restructuring of the party will outstrip the changes in all other social spheres. Otherwise, both the authority of the party and the policy of perestroika as a whole will suffer harm.

As of now, I feel, a clear understanding has not been formed in the broad party masses of the goals, paths and means of restructuring the party. This in no way means that the CPSU does not have a fully elaborated overall concept for such restructuring. This exists, of course, and has been set out rather fully in the materials of the 19th All-Union Party Conference and the decisions of the CPSU Central Committee plenums held after the conference. However, it is a misfortune that the assimilating of this overall concept has occurred little deep in the party. A concerned discussion has not arisen around it involving all generations of the communists and at times everything has been reduced to the repeating of the correct perestroika words without a serious investigation into the essence of the problem. And as of now there has been no serious, open party debate full of innovative ideas on the party's problems and which would involve equally not only the center but also all the creative and thinking forces of the CPSU on the spot.

At some stage, under unbelievable pressure of circumstances of an objective and subjective nature, our party abandoned its intellectual positions and, as was stated at the 19th All-Union Party Conference, let fall from its hands intellectual initiative. Moreover, the party milieu was permeated by attitudes of anti-intellectualism and a disrespectful attitude toward persons in the humanitarian professions. These attitudes were accompanied by a rapidly growing technocratic illusion that it would be possible in some manner to split in time and then in turn resolve two different problems. First to shod, cloth and feed the people, to provide them with housing and only then, so to speak, in warmth and with a full stomach to take up spiritual problems.

But in actuality this would mean depriving party policy, including in the economic sphere, of its humanistic and spiritual guidelines and forgetting the truth which perestroika has presently reminded us of with great urgency: man does not live by bread alone. This would also mean a shifting of the true and long-term interest of party work from the area of ideology and policy into the area of management techniques and into the sphere of daily economic concerns. Has the time not come to look more widely at certain professional fetishes in the selection of the party cadres? Has the time not come to again



decisively attempt to escape from not only in the center but also on the spot of, in Lenin's expression, the belittling of our political and organizational tasks? The time certainly has come where on all levels of the leading party bodies there would be equal representation of economists and lawyers, historians and sociologists, literary critics, current affairs writers, pedagogues, the artistic intelligentsia, natural scientists and journalists. The years-long exaggeration of the economic aspect in party activities has also had a negative impact on our ideological work. Ideology in our country has somehow been secondary and subordinate in a definite sense to the interests of current affairs. The expression "ideological support" has appeared and was generally recognized. But certainly the party ideology has its own independent and absolute value for the party and for the working class, it has this as it provides an answer to all the main problems of human social existence.

It is an incorrect tradition to consider the main content of Marxism to be the teachings about man's complete dependence upon the economy. We are beginning to forget that the profound essence of Marxist-Leninist—and hence party—ideology is in the teachings about the future and about the liberating of man from the suppression of economic concerns. And this now has a definite destructive influence on our ideological work.

At the June (1988) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee one heard the words: "Life can overtake us." For a party the historical calling of which is to be the political vanguard, this was a major alarm.

## 2. Dialogues

The conference participants met at a roundtable to discuss urgent problems of modern times. The discussion were held in four rayons of Dushanbe.

### Frunzenskiy Rayon

The relaxed atmosphere determined the mood and the focus of the discussion which was commenced by the Second Secretary of the Tajikistan CP Central Committee P.K. Luchinskiy.

At times, it is rather difficult to make a distinction between organizational and political work. But it is perfectly certain that a communist, and particularly a party organizer, should be able to master the situation in the collective, relying on such criteria as persuasiveness, unity of word and deed and personal example. Under the conditions of perestroika, many new problems of our society have arisen. It is impossible to solve them by the old methods. Hence, each party activist should have a good mastery of the facts and be able to speak, defending our ideals in a well reasoned manner.

As for the question of the unity of positing the goal and realizing it, it is best of all in mass political work to rely on the primary party organizations. Precisely in the

organization one can best see the way for a rapid resolution to one or another question. Here is where the real struggle against shortcomings occurs and it is here where the loudmouths are rebuffed who endeavor to make an issue of these shortcomings. The primary organizations in the course of the pre-election campaign showed increased effectiveness from the organizational and political work. An example would be the election results in the Frunzenskiy National-Territorial District of Dushanbe where a predominant majority of the voters voted for a leading worker.

Ideological work is going on today under conditions of the democratizing of our society, emphasized the discussion participants and any command, prohibitive and volitional methods become and impediment to perestroika. To reach the people, to know their aspirations and help solve urgent problems—this is the purpose of the activities of the party members. Instructive experience in cooperating with the so-called informal groups—the Union for Assisting Democratization and Perestroika—can be gained from the communists in the town of Chkalovsk. People possessed by the rapid changes are actively helping the town soviet and enterprises effectively weed out all sorts of weak spots which built up during the times of stagnation.

"The people support those who solve their problems and from this comes both ours and the party's authority" said the Chairman of the Leninskiy Rayispolkom N.I. Ibodov. "At present, each leader should feel that he is under the supervision of the 'grass roots'."

Participating in the discussion were the Dean of the Vilnius Higher Party School, Docent Yu.V. Grigalyunene, the second secretary of the Frunze Gorkom of the Kirghiz CP G.S. Kuznetsov, and the Rector of the Saratov Higher Party School, Prof V.A. Rodionov.

### Tsentralnyy Rayon

Here in a lively and polemical clash of opinions there was a debate at the "roundtable" on the role and relationships of the secretariats, buros and apparatus of the party committees.

In the opinion of the First Secretary of the Nurek Party Gorkom V.V. Vetokhin, the corresponding party committee in the most active manner should influence this process, participating in it from the moment of the electing of the delegates to the report-election conferences. And precisely it should organize the buro which will determine the policy of the party committee in the ideological and social areas on its territory. Here for overcoming the passivity of the delegate group it is essential to maximally involve it in working out the conference decisions and give them the right to evaluate and make proposals on the candidacy of the elected body

members. This will make it possible to provide a principles party position in opposition to the group interests which have appeared in a number of places in the course of last year's report-election conferences.

Such a positing of the question raised arguments from the Second Secretary of the Isfara Party Gorkom A.P. Ryabov who feared pressure from the apparatus on the course of electing the delegates. As for the structure of the elective bodies, he proposed abandoning the organizing of the buros, having turned over all powers to the secretariats elected at the conferences and to the plenums of the party committees.

This same notion was partially taken up in the comments of the Dean of the Kiev Higher Party School A.I. Goncharenko who sees a way to solve the problem in greater trust for the opinion of the primary organizations, the rank-and-file communists and the members of the labor collectives. The membership of the elective bodies in the Ukrainian party committees is determined precisely in this manner.

In the opinion of the First Secretary of the Tsentralnyy Party Raykom of Dushanbe Sh.M. Sultanov, the role and authority of the elective bodies can be raised only in the instance that they, in working out their policy, will rely on a close study of the state of affairs and public opinion in their rayon.

Different, at times polar viewpoints were voiced in the course of the debate on the role and place of the party worker in society. Thus, many speakers were convinced that the adopting of a special legal status and providing a number of social guarantees will help increase his authority. In turn, the CPSU veteran of 40 years, the buro member of the Tsentralnyy Party Raykom V.G. Shin was against such a measure, feeling that the weight of a party worker in society depends solely upon the quality of his ideological work.

The debate was carried out under the chairmanship of the Secretary of the Tajikistan CP Central Committee A.D. Dadabayev.

#### **Oktyabrskiy Rayon**

The activities of the party committees and organizations under conditions of a delimiting of functions were at the center of attention of the dialogue which developed here. The roundtable debate was chaired by the Secretary of the Tajikistan CP Central Committee G.G. Veselkov.

The First Secretary of the Oktyabrskiy Party Raykom M.S. Abdurakhmanova told those present about the organizational measures for strengthening the primary party organizations. In particular, she shared the experience of the work done by the socioeconomic commission of the raykom and the setting up of councils for the

secretaries of the industrial and transport party organizations and which would aid in a broad discussion of the questions of party political support for cost accounting and the reports of the managers.

The speech of the party leader set the tone of the debate. Among the questions asked her was the following: How is party influence to be extended to the activities of the cooperatives which number more than 120 in Oktyabrskiy Rayon. M.S. Abdurakhmanova was forced to admit that there are numerous problems in this area. The communists working here have limited their activities to the payment of membership dues while some considered this unnecessary. A decision was taken to strengthen the primary party organizations in the rayon's cooperatives.

The absence of telephone calls on economic questions in the party gorkom, in the opinion of the Chairman of the Pendzhikent Gorispolkom A. Dzhabarov, has become a dependable barometer for the clear delimitation of functions. But this does not eliminate the responsibility for the soviet workers. Undoubtedly they should be competent in their job.

The Secretary of the Party Committee at the Tadzhikgidroagregat [Tajik Hydraulic Equipment] Association I.G. Tkachenko, the First Secretary of the Yavan'skiy Party Raykom A.M. Guseynov, the Instructor at the Dushanbe Party Gorkom S. Ikramov and others concentrated their speeches on the ways for returning to the Leninist leading role of the party in the political leadership system and which is being realized by the recruitment, training and placement of cadres and the supervising of their work.

V.V. Shinkarev, professor at the Minsk Higher Party School, A.F. Nedilko, first secretary of the Novokubanskiy CPSU Raykom in Krasnodar Kray and K.V. Zhigalov, consultant for the Kazakhstan CP Central Committee described the particular features of carrying out CPSU policy through the communists employed in various spheres.

Taking part in the session of the section were A.V. Loyko, second secretary of the Tashauz Obkom of the Turkmenia CP, Sh.M. Sultanov, director of the Institute of Party History under the Tajikistan CP Central Committee, Yu.I. Tarasov, chair head at the Leningrad Higher Party School and M. Ibodulloyev, first secretary of the Syrdarinskiy Raykom of the Uzbekistan CP.

#### **Zheleznodorozhnyy Rayon**

None of the participants was left indifferent by the debate on the question "On the Ways for Renewing Cadre Work Under the Conditions of Broadening Democracy" and which was held in a section under the chairmanship of the Head of the Section for Party Organizational and Cadre Work of the Tajikistan CP Central Committee Yu.Ye. Sukhov. The participants

concentrated basic attention on the mechanism of forming a cadre reserve, the training and realization of them and the role of the party organizations in this process.

The most debated was the question of the nomenklatura in its modern understanding. The First Secretary of the Matchinskiy Party Raykom K. Turayev said that until recently there were over 300 persons on the raykom nomenklatura. It was virtually impossible to evaluate the activities of each. The general list did not provide any notion of the specific individuals and the work areas for which they were answerable. Presently, the nomenklatura includes 160 persons but still in the cadre work in the rayon they have not moved far from the questionnaire style. This was shown by the elections on one of the sovkhozes, when out of the three recommended candidacies for the position of director, no one was chosen. A completely different person put up by the workers themselves was elected.

Not quantity but rather quality should determine the work with the nomenklatura cadres. In defending this opinion, the First Secretary of the Sovetskiy Party Raykom S. Safarov described the attempts to include in the nomenklatura not the enterprise leaders but rather the chairmen of the labor collective councils and the realizing of party influence with their aid. The First Secretary of the Zheleznodorozhnyy Party Raykom in Dushanbe A.P. Vysochin was in favor of including in the nomenklatura only the leading workers of those sectors which are presently a bottleneck.

The present system of nomenklatura has demonstrated its complete worthlessness, from the middle level to the superior groups, stated the Secretary of the Party Committee of the Dushanbestroy [Dushanbe Construction] Trust R.M. Mamurov. The prestige of the enterprise leader has declined sharply and it has reached such a point that often no one wants to become such, as he must bear responsibility for the end result. The time has come for the appearance of the specialty of "leader" and for this we must have schools where they could be trained. The speaker was also in favor of introducing democratic principles in the existing procedure for the appointment and approval of the leaders of the ministries and departments.

The Second Secretary of the Shaartuzskiy Party Raykom V.I. Postovalova voiced the opinion that only the secretaries of the primary party organizations should be left in the nomenklatura area. The leaders can be influenced by the voter aktiv which exists in each raykom and where they actually are included.

In his speech the Professor of the Chair of Party Construction at the Academy of Social Sciences Under the CPSU Central Committee V.A. Kulichenko spoke on the relationship of democracy and centralism in cadre work. The debate participants gave significant space to the training of party cadres through the Komsomol.

From the results of the debate, the section members worked out recommendations which were then submitted for discussion by all the conference participants.

Also participating in the debate were: the First Deputy Chief of the Section for Party Organizational and Cadre Work Under the Kazakhstan CP Central Committee A.R. Zholshibekov, the Rector of the Tashkent Higher Party School M.I. Iskanderov, the Head of the Section for Party Organizational and Cadre Work at the Chimkent Obkom of the Kazakhstan CP, A.V. Kozarev and the First Secretary of the Belorechensk CPSU Gorkom in Krasnodar Kray, K.G. Meremyanin.

### 3. Discussions

The discussion was opened by a guest from Uzbekistan, the First Secretary of the Syrdarinskiy Party Raykom M.A. Ibodulloyev.

In exercising political leadership over the socioeconomic development of a rayon, the party raykom relies above all on the soviet and economic bodies which are given full independence in carrying out national economic tasks. The party committee has decisively abandoned the practice of sending all sorts of representatives to supervise production and has eliminated the various staffs which hindered the initiative and independence of the leaders on the spot and often took over for them.

Moreover, the party raykom in the buro sessions and plenums has actually ceased reviewing questions of an economic nature. They have begun sending fewer directives and instructions of all sorts to the primary party organizations.

In his speech the Docent from the Chair of Party Construction Under the Academy of Social Sciences of the CPSU Central Committee B.D. Usimov described the specific features of a political approach to party work under the conditions of perestroika.

The heart of political means of influence is persuasion and education, vital organizational work with a reliance on democratic principles considering public opinion, the interests of various social and age groups and the nationality features of the population.

A specific feature of the political approaches to party work is that they repudiate command-pressure methods and in the decisions taken and practical actions rely on profound scientific analysis of reality and a knowledge of real life.

The main task for the present is to help consolidate the social forces around the idea of perestroika, to shape a Marxist-Leninist ideology and turn convictions into practical actions. This is precisely what is being done by the party committees of the Leninabad Garment Production Association imeni N.K. Krupskaya, the Sovkhoz

Technical School imeni V.V. Kuybyshev, the Leningradskiy Party Raykom and a number of other party committees. But there are other examples of taking over, administration by injunction, a weakening of atheistic work and the inability to find the key to those who are not always inclined to "unanimous approval." This was mentioned at the Gornyy Badakhshan Oblast, Kulyab City and Moskovskiy Rayon Party Conferences and by the party meeting of the Amir Production Association.

The First Secretary of the Kulyab Party Gorkom **Ye.A. Bazhenov** devoted his speech to the experience of the party committee in improving the forms and methods of party organizational work.

In the course of perestroika, he said, three categories of workers were determined and these are characterized by their attitude to the occurring changes. In the first group are the workers who are totally in favor of perestroika and are endeavoring to do everything to carry it out. The second group includes workers who support perestroika but do not know how to carry it out. And, finally, the third group includes the workers who favor perestroika only in words but in fact do not consciously undertake anything to implement it.

Certainly, this division to a certain degree is arbitrary. But it does actually exist and the party gorkom in its work endeavors to find a mechanism for studying and disclosing the workers who relate to one or another category. The party committee wagers on those who in fact carry out perestroika, it relies on them and recommends them for promotion to more responsible work under the condition that all other essential qualities are present.

The Professor from the Academy of Social Sciences under the CPSU Central Committee, Doctor of Historical Sciences **M.A. Semichayevskiy** devoted his speech to the question "The Unity of Political, Organizational and Economic Work in the Activities of the Party Organizations."

The idea of the unity of political, organizational and economic work, he said, has been reinforced in the decisions of the 27th Congress and in the new version of the CPSU Program. The restructuring of party leadership means to a certain degree a skillful combination of these aspects in leadership and an understanding of their integrity and closest linkage.

However in life, in practice, this interaction, unfortunately, is constantly violated due to the lack of experience and competence of the cadres and their inability to combine an intelligent word with the organization and persuasion of people, due to the lack of coordination in the actions of the party committees and economic leaders or the taking over for the economic organizations by the party committees.

The party gorkoms and raykoms are the core link in the political work of a region, said the Dean of the Kiev Higher Party School, Docent **A.I. Goncharenko**, in his speech. These party committees form the social composition of the party and together with the primary organizations regulate it.

At present, virtually all the secretaries of the party gorkoms and raykoms have a higher education and over two-thirds have a higher political education. They are the first to engage in political struggle and have direct contacts with the defenders and opponents of perestroika. They are in direct contact with the labor collectives and together with them work to implement economic and social policy.

At the same time, in the work of the gorkoms and raykoms we know of many problems both of an objective and subjective nature. The forces inhibiting perestroika and its direct opponents endeavor to utilize these problems.

The Rector of the Higher Komsomol School Under the Komsomol Central Committee **G.S. Golovachev** devoted his speech to the problem of the interaction of the party committees with the Komsomol and youth associations.

The speaker took up in detail the cadre problem in the Komsomol. As a total in the Komsomol, he said, at present there are around 100,000 full-time Komsomol workers of different levels. An analysis has shown that 30 percent of this number has worked under a year, 40 percent from a year to 2 years and only 30 percent more than 2 years. What can a Komsomol worker do if he has worked under a year? Nothing, except the formal executing of instructions. For this reason, in making up for the cadre shortage, we were forced, with the support of the Party Central Committee, to resort to broadening the network of training facilities and at present in each kray we are organizing a training procedural center or a Komsomol school.

The First Deputy Head of the Ideological Section Under the Tajikistan CP Central Committee **M. Khudonev** devoted his speech to the urgent tasks of ideological work under the conditions of democratizing all spheres of life.

The situation existing in the nation, he said, confronts the party committees with the task of a fundamental renewal in ideological work and this must help develop in the people the ability, using the words of V.I. Lenin, to correctly "employ" and correctly "use" democracy in the interests of the matter and instill in them a high level of democracy.

Only on the basis of mutual understanding and collaboration, with the leading role of the party organizations, is it possible to unite all the healthy forces and focus them on carrying out the complex, crucial tasks confronting the society.

"Forming high political culture in the cadres is an essential condition for raising the effectiveness of party leadership"—this was the main idea in the speech given by the Rector of the Tashkent Higher Party School **M.I. Iskanderov**. Political culture, he feels, means the ability to provide a correct evaluation of events, to find a dependable guide in a complex aggregate of phenomena, to think scientifically, soberly and boldly, and combine political thinking with economic. This also presupposes the ability to establish contact with others, to educate them not only with slogans but also by clear organization of labor and by personal example. Only by achieving high political culture can the party cadres surmount such phenomena as political naivete, lack of political culture, ignorance and apoliticalness. At present, we must admit with great regret that moral decay and the moral decline of former leading workers with party cards, bribery, padding and theft of national property in large amounts have sunk down deep roots and we must wage a long, tenacious and decisive struggle against this evil. High political culture also means both a correct understanding and constant observance of the principle of social justice and this is an important condition for the unity and stability of society. The violating of this brings not only economic harm but, chiefly, political and social harm.

The Party Committee Secretary at the Tadzhikgidroenergostroy [Tajik Hydropower Construction] Trust **S.M. Kanoatova** shared her experience in working to develop democratization and glasnost in the party leadership system. The enterprise party committee, she said, in fighting for perestroyka and for acceleration has relied chiefly on the shop and primary party organizations and the party groups. For this purpose, extensive work is carried out aimed at increasing the effective content of their activities. Here we are endeavoring to give extensive glasnost and democratization to the party leadership.

In his speech the Second Secretary of the Isfara Party Gorkom **A.P. Ryabov** spoke about the experience of realizing the functions principle of the formation and activities of the party gorkom apparatus under the conditions of perestroyka.

The current reorganization of the party apparatus is one of the most important over the entire history of our party, the speaker said. Having touched on certain aspects in the realization of the functional principle in the formation and activities of the party gorkom apparatus, the speaker particularly noticed the necessity of strengthening the party and auditing commissions and broadening their rights and powers. In following the new procedures, he said, we naturally are not protected against errors. Some of them can even be seen now. They must be decisively eradicated and we must move on farther. This is the guarantee for the success of perestroyka.

The plenary session of the second day of the conference's work was opened with the report "Democratization in

Internal Party Life" and which was given by the Professor from the Chair of the Academy of Social Sciences Under the CPSU Central Committee **V.A. Kulichenko**. The question raised touched on many painful points and invited debate....

In the opinion of the First Secretary of the Zheleznodorozhnyy Raykom of the Tajikistan CP **A.P. Vysochin**, at present, when in the economy the social and spiritual spheres, the obsolete approaches and stereotypes are being broken, the party committees must show particular purposefulness, profound competence and professionalism. For this reason, the speaker emphasized, fundamental changes are needed in the forms and methods of the organizational and ideological activities of the party bodies. They must above all firmly master the art of political leadership on the basis of extensive collectivism.

The Second Secretary of the Khatlon Party Obkom **N.V. Nikolayev** described how the process was going on of mastering political methods in the party committees of Khatlon Oblast. In the activities of the party committees, the speaker commented, democratization and glasnost are becoming evermore established. The party workers have become closer to the people, to the rank-and-file communists. It has become a practice to hold days of the party obkom, gorkoms and raykoms in the primary party organizations. In the course of these, the workers from the apparatus of the party committees provide concrete aid to the inferior levels. The traveling sessions of the obkom buro have left a noticeable trace in the life of the rayon party organizations. The activities of the workers of the apparatus are also changing gradually. They are acting now not in the role of auditors but rather as assistants of the aktiv on the spot. Positive results have also been gained from questionnaires and the polling of the communists and workers in studying the professional and moral qualities of the cadres and their reserves. All the same, the speaker stressed, a restructuring in the style of work of the apparatus of the party obkom, gorkoms and raykoms in mastering the new forms and methods is going on slowly.

I am certain that until we can raise the work of the primary party organizations and the party's authority in the labor collectives to the proper level, it will be hard to expect success, emphasized the First Secretary of the Tsentralnyy Raykom of the Tajikistan CP, **Sh.M. Sultanov**. In his speech devoted to the relations of the party committee with the primary party organizations, he was in favor of granting greater independence to the "primaries" in solving the questions of admission to membership in the CPSU, the selection of cadres, and the holding of communists responsible for infractions which defame the high title.

The First Secretary of the Belorechensk CPSU Gorkom in Krasnodar Kray **K.G. Meremyanin** shared the experience of restructuring the forms and methods of leadership over the primary party organizations with the

conference participants. The speaker described in detail how the work of instructor-curators in their party committee had been organized.

**L.Sh. Liderman**, the party committee secretary at the Dushanbe Komsomolka Hosiery Mill in her speech took up the problems of the interaction of the elective body of the primary party organization and the labor collective council in carrying out the Law Governing the State Enterprise (Association). Using examples taken from the life of the enterprise, the speaker showed in detail the entire process of the conversion of the mill to cost accounting and self-financing as well as the role of the party committee and the communists in this important undertaking.

The Chief Economist from the Hidrostroyaterialy [Hydroconstruction Materials] Production Association and Secretary of the Primary Party Organization **O.N. Yerindzhakyants** described the new approaches in providing party supervision over the administration's activities under the conditions of cost accounting for the conference participants.

The First Secretary of the Ishkashimskiy Raykom of the Tajikistan CP **B. Mirdzhonova** described the work of the party raykom in improving the forms and methods of party leadership over the primary party organizations.

The Prorector for Academic Work of the Minsk Higher Party School **V.V. Shinkarev** devoted his speech to the question of "Problems and Ways of Overcoming Parallelism and Duplication in the Work of the Party, Soviet and Economic Bodies."

In his speech on "Political Methods in Party Work: Essence and Practice of Application," the consultant for the Section of Party Organizational and Cadre Work Under the Kazakhstan CP Central Committee **K.V. Zhigalov** in a way continued the ideas of the previous speaker. The Kazakhstan CP Central Committee, on the basis of the existing experience or more accurately portions of it, has worked out and distributed procedural recommendations to the republic party committees.

With their departure from economic functions, the party organizations must concentrate more specifically on solving social questions, pointed out the First Secretary of the Novokubanskiy CPSU Raykom in Krasnodar **Kray A.F. Nedilko**, in his speech on "The Delimitation of the Functions of Party and Soviet Bodies—An Essential Condition for Political Leadership." Actually, the move toward man, his needs and concerns is the highest purpose of party policy and this also determines the content in the activities of each party committee or political leadership body.

The third, concluding day of debate was opened by the Rector of the Saratov Higher Party School **V.A. Rodionov**, with a speech on the subject "The Role of the Culture of a Party Worker in Carrying Out Political Leadership Methods."

The Secretary of the Primary Party Organization at the Leninabad Silk Combine **M. Kayumov** devoted his speech to the question "Restructuring the Work of the Primary Party Organizations Under the New Management Conditions."

The new management system, he said, has confronted the enterprise party committee with a need to reshape the party organization in accord with the new management structure. Previously one party group included the communists of an entire section and this significantly impeded party work. Now the party groups are being organized respectively in the self-supporting brigades. This primarily provides an opportunity to increase responsibility and the demands placed on the communists for certain areas of party work.

The Dean of the Vilnius Higher Party School **Yu.V. Grigalyunene** described the search for the forms and methods of party work under the new conditions of sociopolitical development.

The revolutionary nature of perestroika in our republic has brought and is bringing even more surprises, the speaker said. The appearance in the republic of informal movements and the very mass movement Sajudis which includes the intelligentsia, the youth, a portion of the workers and kolkhoz members has evoked confusion in the party bodies. Social forces have been polarized in the republic.

The most important conclusion stemming from recent events is the necessity to strengthen the role of the Communist Party. Only a viable Marxist-Leninist party strong in its purity and the unity of its ranks can become the nucleus which consolidates the republic community.

The speech by the Second Secretary of the Tajikistan Komsomol Central Committee **S.T. Panin** was devoted to the practical work of the Komsomol organizations under the conditions of the reform in society's political system. The events in the city of Dushanbe on 24 February and 21 March showed the inadequate awareness among the youth of the real political processes caused by perestroika, the speaker said. Here of definite import was the influence of religion and the socio-class structure of the republic's population. The Komsomol aktiv was also unprepared for the phenomenon of meetinghouse democracy. Also felt was the poor level of information, the ossification of thought, bureaucratic forms of work and an underestimating of the importance of political work with the youth under present-day conditions.

The Second Secretary of the Oktyabrskiy Party Raykom in Dushanbe, Candidate of Historical Sciences **A.A. Kostyrya** continued the question of the relationships of the party committees and the Komsomol under the conditions of perestroyka.

There are, he said, serious mistakes in the relationships of the Komsomol with the nonmember youth and in protecting their rights. There is neither sufficient activity nor a legal basis for this. We are endeavoring to protect the political, socioeconomic interests and rights of the youth through the party organizations, the rayon soviet and through the established rayon association for the chairman of the labor collective councils. But again this is largely a spontaneous start without a legal foundation. So, ahead of us is extensive work in elaborating an effective method for the interaction of the party committee with the youth.

The Chairman of the Executive Committee of the Yavanskiy Rayon Soviet **Sh.G. Shodavlyatov** spoke about the actual relations of the party committees and the local soviets in leading the socioeconomic development of a rayon under the conditions of a delimitation of functions.

In our opinion, the speaker said, the time has come to revise the existing legislation concerning the soviets. We must clearly set forth the articles on the powers and obligations and exclude such general phrases as "within the limits," "assists," "provides," but these "limits of powers" are not set out in the law itself, in the other enforceable enactments or government decrees.

The republic scientific-practical conference concluded its work with a final speech by the Second Secretary of the Tajikistan CP Central Committee **P.K. Luchinskiy** who summed up the results of the discussion.

### Distortion Claimed in New 'History of Kirghiz SSR'

18300692 Frunze SOVETSKAYA KIRGIZIYA  
in Russian 24 May 89 p 3

[Commentary by A. Arzymatov, docent at the Kirghiz State University and candidate of historical sciences: "In the Old Pattern?"]

[Text] The multivolume "History of the Kirghiz SSR" is still in the process of creation, and only several volumes have been published. It is the latest source of information on the history of the republic, and the most objective and truthful. At least, it should be. But volume II of this reliable work, published two years ago, is "cut out" in the old pattern. The volume is entitled "The Voluntary Entry of Kirghizia Into the Composition of Russia and Its Progressive Consequences (The Disintegration of Patriarchal-Feudal Relations and the Development of Capitalist Relations, 1855-March 1917)." In my opinion, almost every word here is erroneous. I will attempt to prove this.

The phrase "the voluntary entry of Kirghizia into the composition of Russia" entered the republic's historiography and literature after the well-known resolution of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Kirghizia "On the 100th Anniversary of the Voluntary Entry of Kirghizia into the Composition of Russia" (1963). Without in any way diminishing the progressive aspect of the acceptance of Russian citizenship, we must not forget that this process was multifaceted and complicated, and not so serenely triumphant as the authors of the book portray it.

After accepting Russian citizenship the Kirghiz, as before, were deprived of national independence and turned into a cruelly exploited colony. This was, as V.I. Lenin showed, the establishment of "forcible relations" between oppressed and oppressing nations.

Using the device of the voluntary entry, the book abounds in phrases about fraternal unity with Russia.

A simple but legitimate question arises: Once the authors introduce the concept of "the fraternal peoples of the Russian colonial empire," how can they distinguish this from the concept of "the fraternal peoples of the USSR"? The association of these two completely contrary concepts is an idealization of reality. It would be entirely legitimate to speak of the voluntary entry of Kirghizia into the composition of the USSR, but not into the composition of tsarist Russia...

As a result of this, the authors of the book unwittingly belittle the role and the meaning of the triumph of the October Revolution and of the construction of socialism in Kirghizia with the aid of the fraternal peoples of the USSR, as well as the functioning of the socialist means of production.

In general the book does not as such examine colonial oppression, as though it had not existed. In the book it is replaced by social oppression, and as a result the book abounds in such artificially inverted phrases as "social and nationalist oppression" and "social and nationalist liberation."

Now, concerning the wording "the disintegration of patriarchal-feudal relations." How is this to be understood? Naturally, this phrase implies the functioning of some special structure distinctive only to the peoples of Asia. It seems to me that this "discovery" is simply a fiction.

As a historian, I view the following three moments as central to a study of the period of Kirghiz history under discussion: the Regulations of 1868 converting the land of the Kirghiz into property of the Russian state, as well as the Regulations for the Steppe Kray; the petitions of the northern Kirghiz over the entire colonial period for land-utilization rights on equal terms with those of Russian settlers, and the invariable rejection on the part of the tsarist administration; and the resolution of the tsarist government in 1915 to expel the northern Kirghiz to the mountains and the Balkhash steppes. Why do the authors of volume II of the history deliberately distort the sources I have mentioned, or pass over them altogether? It is because they frustrate a one-dimensional comprehension of "voluntary entry."

The authors affirm that a progressive consequence of the voluntary entry was the development of capitalism in the nation, both in the kishlaks [villages in Central Asia] and in the nomadic ails [settlements comprised of family groups]; and that a national bourgeoisie developed from the bays [rich landowners in Central Asia] and manaps [members of the Kirghiz ancestral feudal aristocracy]. This is also incorrect: The bourgeoisie and proletariat, as V.I. Lenin showed, develop only from the peasant class. Where did a national bourgeoisie and capitalism come from when there was no material base for it, because the land of the Kirghiz had been converted into capital for the Russian bourgeoisie?

Contrary to the assertions of the authors, an objectively progressive consequence of the acceptance of Russian citizenship by the Kirghiz people was the disintegration of archaic social relations and, consequently, only in social progress was a historic step forward completed, which expressed itself in the transformation of the patriarchal peasants, when they had settled or were settling, into rural hired workers and into a formation of revolutionary forces.

It is disappointing when mistakes and inaccuracies are found in a good book. But it is doubly disappointing when many historic facts, well-known through materials in archives, are simply withdrawn from scientific circulation or are distorted so that they will fit into the Procrustean bed of the old dogma. Do objectivity of evaluation and the dialectic approach really hinder our understanding of social processes which have occurred and are occurring today? Does the detailed truth of the "voluntary entry" really affect the solidity of our bonds today with the Russian people?



### **Polemics on Religion, Youth**

18001337 Moscow MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA in  
Russian 16 Jun 89 p 5

[Article by T. Suvorova, A. Zubov and I. Bestuzheva-Lady: "Between the Clergy and the World: Dialogue with a Theological Academy Student"]

[Text] Yes, for a long time the topic of religion was presented in quite a uniform manner in the pages of most of our publications, by educational articles demonstrating that "God does not exist," and belief in Him is a vestige of the past, something characteristic, for the most part of old men and old women. In general, these publications preferred to remain silent about the fact that there are also young persons who, in search for a meaning in life or for some other reasons, are coming to have a religious faith. However, such a problem does exist, and today we would like to begin a discussion of it.

#### **T. Suvorova, Zagorsk**

At a meeting between students from the Moscow Theological Academy and students from the pedagogical VUZ my journalistic assignment was to interview Andrey Kurayev, a former Komsomol member and Moscow State University graduate who is now a first-year student at this academy. What had been intended as a kind of dispute turned into a unique kind of "press conference." On the stage were the Archpriest Vladimir, the monk Yustinian, Andrey, and his fellow students. In the hall were the future pedagogues. And so the questions poured in: what constitutes a study day at the seminary and the theological academy? what subjects are taught? is the stipend large? do they study on holidays? And—what are mercy, charity, and spirituality?...

Andrey's answers surprised us by their depth of judgment, brilliant erudition, and critical cast of mind. And there was a sense of special participation and involvement in everything that is happening around us. He spoke with bitterness about the fact that numerous voluntary funds are gradually emerging and becoming a kind of "campaigning," that schoolchildren sometimes cannot explain what the concept of "Russia" entails. Sometimes this future priest became so involved and distracted that he even interrupted his holy mentor. Submissiveness and quiet resignation? No, these traits were not part of his profile.

Andrey's comrades also made a strong impression—there was a sense of weighing every word, as well as an inner sense of dignity. Alas the things which our students said, despite all their sincere desire, failed to hit the mark, and they sounded pale and somehow superficial. Unfortunately, they did not win their first competition with the "competing firm."

After the "dispute" we were invited to have dinner in the academy's dining-room. The interview also continued at this meal.

"How did you come to your religious faith?" I asked Andrey. "Because, after all, your parents were non-believers."

"Yes, neither my parents nor I myself were ever seekers after God," Andrey replied. "We were typical representatives of intelligentsia-type families. Speaking frankly, my parents' value system—accumulating knowledge without spiritual depth—did not interest me. But I did not have any system of my own. I chose on VUZ on the basis of the following principle: 'what I dislike the least.' I decided to enroll at the MGU's Department of Philosophy."

"And to what extent were your expectations justified?"

"I quickly became disillusioned—with the level of teaching, its pedantically scholastic approach, and the slogan-like nature of the social sciences. The social scientists are now being criticized for this, but at that time we had to accept on faith everything that was said from the rostrum.

"In my third year I began to study Dostoyevskiy seriously and thoroughly. The creative work of this writer of genius also impelled me toward religious faith. From the beginning Fedor Mikhaylovich's books opened up for me the astounding heights and immeasurability of the human personality; then there arose the desire to study theological literature. After graduating from the MGU, I submitted my application to the theological seminary....

"At the Moscow Seminary one out of every seven students has a diploma from a secular VUZ. A well-known professor at the MGU once bitterly joked: 'This university has now become the main 'smithy' of personnel for the Orthodox Church.'"

"But please don't think that it is only weak persons, broken in spirit, who turn to religious faith," A. Kurayev continued. "It's simply that the people who come to it have turned out to be asocial at one time, that is, outside the influence of society, outside its interests. For example, a person has retired on a pension: society has 'worked him out' and cast him out; it is no longer interested in his subsequent fate. He has already 'played out' most of his social roles—let's say, for example, that of a worker on an assembly line, member of a trade union buro, etc. But what about his soul? Because, you know, the Bible says: the heart knows the bitterness of its own soul. Religion helps him to discover himself, his own unique nature, regardless of his age or social position.

"People are leaving the secular life, but is not society itself to blame for this? How are we to evaluate the consequences of the distortions of socialism which were wrought in our country by the theses of the 'Short Course in the History of the VKP(b)'? And have not most people really lost the main system of coordinates—that of good and evil? What do I have in mind? For example, a person

cannot simply kill another person—his moral sense will not allow him to do that. But if one of them is proclaimed by the society to be an 'enemy of the people,' 'heretic,' 'Mason'—call him what you will—then someone else has taken from him the responsibility for his own actions."

...We came out of the gate of the Troitsa-Sergiyeva Monastery. And in the Mir motion-picture theater, which is located on the opposite side of the square, they had just finished the showing of "Little Vera." Making a big hubbub, a crowd of teenagers poured out onto the sidewalk. Had any of them been reached by the "secular sermon" from the screen? Had it added any spirituality? I don't know.

"What a squalid miserable calculation—to build a movie theater right across from a temple of God in the hope of keeping people on that side of the square," said Andrey. The Clergy and the Mir.... Is it really on such a primitive level that the dialogue between the Church and the secular society must proceed?

**The Opinion of Andrey Zubov, Lecturer at the Moscow Theological Academy**

Many young fellows and girls have become accustomed to thinking in stereotypes and acting in accordance with them. They are convinced that everything is known, that all laws have been discovered, and that the scientists have proved that there is no God. But among some of their peers the everyday hustle and bustle have not dulled their "hunger for truth." Seriously meditating about the meaning of life, these young persons are attempting to reach the very essence of things.

A human being is so constituted that he is always seeking some kind of goal. He asks himself: why was I given life? Philosophers tell us that the goal of life is to become happy. But what is happiness? Some people seek it in love; but love is fleeting. Others seek it in advancement along their service career or in scientific studies. But quite frequently they encounter a world of vile, malicious persons, careerists whose only thought is how to get around you, and where nobody is interested in your innovative ideas. A third group seek happiness in their family lives. But then the children grow up and often turn out to be completely different from what their parents wanted to see.

As a result, a person experiences a feeling of disharmony and profound disenchantment. Why am I traveling along this path, he asks himself. Why am I dragging along this fragile, perishable existence? I'll die, and everything will be finished for me personally. Does that mean that life was lived in vain. Hence, there arises a skepticism, cynicism, and even vandalism as a consequence of the senselessness of life.

Man cannot reconcile himself to the finality of his own existence. He senses himself to be in a bottomless pit, and he can fulfill himself at most by five percent during the few decades that are allotted to him. Because, of course, his individual personality is immeasurably richer than can be produced by that "mountain" of books, manuscripts, and other fruits of intellectual activity. And so the greater part of his individual personality remains unacted, and the "efficiency" of his life is extremely low. But the idea of immortality allows him to carry forward the goal of his life beyond the bonds of his own existence.

This is from a philosophical point of view. There are also social factors.

Young people see that the level of morality in the society has fallen, that human souls have become coarsened, and that many of our fellow-citizens do not know the A, B, C's of normal relations between each other. What is being created in the family? This sphere of life has been almost completely ruined. Quite a few spouses do not remain faithful to each other in their marriages. But, after all, it is here that the future of the entire society is reproduced. Some wise men have said that the gold reserve of a society's health is the chastity of women. When people begin dealing in such "coin," it may be asserted that we are on the brink of disaster. Because, of course, a woman teaches this to her own children, and this is passed from generation to generation.

But religion provides a firm system of coordinates of good and evil; it teaches believers not to violate the commandments—thou shalt not kill, thou shalt not steal, thou shalt not commit adultery, thou shalt not commit evil acts even if nobody would know about them.

In recent times we have witnessed favorable shifts in the relations between the church and the society. The attitude toward believers has changed strikingly—they are no longer considered second-class citizens, as was previously the case. I can assert this based on my own personal experience.

For many long years I engaged in scholarly work at the Oriental Studies Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences. And a year ago I received an invitation to teach, along with my own basic work, the history of religions at the Moscow Theological Academy. The leading officials and my colleagues at the Institute have had an understanding attitude toward my new status. Now, while continuing to engage in my own beloved work, I can also devote myself to God's service, something I have long striven to do.

**The Opinion of Igor Bestuzhev-Lada, Chief, Social Forecasting Sector, Sociological Institute, USSR Academy of Sciences**

A young person turns to religious faith not from a good life. What can he do in the world? Just take, for example, these same students from the MGU. Many of them, prior

to getting accepted by this VUZ, passed through the swamp and mud of the black market in cramming, personal pull, and seeking out the needed acquaintances. But they finally did manage to enroll. And what do they see? My God! What they hear from the lecturer is something inconceivable, something which has been read aloud from notebooks for 50 years already. Most of the measures within a VUZ's walls comprise formalism and things done for show. On the one hand, boorishness, and on the other hand, an unrestrained "grabbing."

It's fine if the young person is capable of adapting to all this. But what if he is not? What if he understands the real value of this deceptive "prosperity"? Disenchantment sets in. He steps aside and turns to the church. And there, at first glance, everything is different. And before the seminarist, if he has a good head on his shoulders, future prospects open up—a black cowl, and in a few years, just look, even a white one. And somewhere there, beyond the horizon, shines even the crown of a patriarch....

People go into religion from two sides. Some by tradition. We often speak about upbringing; this word has become as worn as a five-kopeck piece. But all it means is a handing down of stereotypes in consciousness and behavior. And it is not by accident that in almost every family of believers the children repeat the life path of their parents.

The second stream flowing into religion comes from the opposite side—from where there is, supposedly no faith. There are several causes at work here.

One of them is the fear of death. I have made a special study of this problem. A human being is so constituted that he has a strong thirst for life at any price. Human reason does not reconcile itself with the idea that its own end is inevitable. And this is understandable and sensible. Why? Just look at the onerous conditions under which we live, how often we ourselves turn our lives into a hell. Even nowadays thousands of persons commit suicide. Unless people feared death, tens of millions would decide on suicide. It often happens that a person is ill, experiences sufferings, or is paralyzed, but still the thought of dying is terrible. And suddenly religion opens up for him the groves of paradise, where he will stroll, they say, for an entire age, if he has lead an upright life.

Another reason why people go into religion is the striving to understand the meaning of one's own existence. To a person who has posed this question, our philosophy and cosmology can be of little help. But religion proclaims that the meaning of man's existence lies in serving God and in saving his own immortal soul.

I am not a philosopher, but I see the meaning of life as serving people.

A significant number of people turn to religious faith because they sense an oppressive loneliness. This relates the church and the informals. There would seem to be little, if anything, in common between a young fellow and a praying old woman. There is an abyss between them. But there is something in common—they have both joined a group of like-minded persons, and that means that they have gotten rid of their loneliness.

Social psychology proclaims that a person has several levels of needs. The lowest is food, drink, and clothing.

But when a person is full and warm, another level of need advances to the foreground—self-assertion. He seeks the respect of those around him, since this is necessary for his own self-respect. The first and last words of a drunkard are: "Do you respect me?" Why do we follow fashions, do not engage in certain acts] Because we want people to respect us.

In general, there nothing stupid or evil in the existence of faith. It is one of the seven forms of social awareness, along with world outlook, science, aesthetics, morality, law, and politics. A person can have faith in God, or, perhaps, in the possibility of building communism, in goodness and justice, etc. We must not confuse faith with the church. There are people who have faith without priests. As a form of social awareness, everyone must have faith. It is put down in only a few persons. They are the nihilists. Those in whom morality is put down are the dregs, while those who put down the law are scoundrels....

Though I am a non-believing communist, I am opposed to destroying churches. I did not come to this conclusion right away. But as I remember, I used to engage in disputes with priests while I was still young, but not in any hostile manner. I had an instinctive respect for the rituals, since I felt that they were part of our culture. We must not regard the church as a collection of some kinds of simpletons, fools, or dregs. They comprise a very diverse group of people. Our society pushes many persons into the bosom of religion. And, therefore, we must proceed on the basis of the fact that faith is one of the possible modes of a person's existence.

At the same time, we must not fall into the opposite extreme—to conduct a discussion in the conviction that any priest or seminarist is wiser than any secular scholar, and that the church is the promised land. Here my opponent asserts that things are bad in the world and good in the church. However, it is a well-known fact that in every army there are "chaplains," who bless with their cross those who are killing each other. But the commandment states: "Thou shalt not kill!" And what have believers done over the course of centuries? They have killed, robbed, and raped. And so there are grounds for disputes on such matters. I am in favor a dialogue, but I am against "wooden-headedness" in our propaganda.

**Metropolitan Pitirim on His Program as People's Deputy, Role of Church**

18001243 Moscow SOVETSKAYA KULTURA in Russian 15 Jun 89 p 6

[Interview with Volokolamsk and Yuryev Metropolitan Pitirim by SOVETSKAYA KULTURA correspondent I. Medovoy in the "SK Dialogues" column: "Morality—The Vector of Being"]

[Excerpts] Volokolamsk and Yuryev Metropolitan Pitirim, USSR People's Deputy, Moscow Religious Academy professor and honorary member of foreign theological faculties, Doctor of Divinity, chairman of the Moscow Patriarchate's Publishing Department, and member of the Soviet Cultural Fund's Board of Directors, answers our correspondent's questions.

[Medovoy] Your Great Reverence, while leafing through old newspaper files, I found an item in a 1929 Volokolamsk Rayon Newspaper, containing an accusation of Volokolamsk Archbishop Pitirim. Your predecessor's fault, in the newspaper's opinion, consisted of his having ordained a merchant's son as a deacon, by which he played into the hands of an inside enemy. Newspaper headlines, in those years, were like pistol shots: "Let Us Tear Out the Priestly Thistle By the Roots!" "Higher With Atheism's Banner!" And newspaper pages were splashed with triumphant reports about how churches were being closed.

But, lo, church and state relations have entered a new phase before our eyes. The believers' rights area has been broadened. New parishes have been registered. And you, among other Russian Orthodox Church hierarchs, have been elected People's Deputy. What seem to you to be the church's place under present conditions, and its role in society's renewal process?

[Metropolitan Pitirim] First of all, a few words about Archbishop Pitirim Krylov. He was not in Volokolamsk long, less than 10 years, and he ended his Volokolamsk stay tragically, being purged, and apparently killed, in 1937. This was a gifted and brilliant church figure, and a wonderful man. In Volokolamsk, I was somehow given an icon that had belonged to him. Later it was stolen from my home, along with other icons, and I am very distressed by the loss to this day. I piously revere his memory.

Back at the end of the 1920's, our wise elder, Patriarch Sergey, said: "The church is separate from the state, but not removed from it." Today, church and state interrelationships are being created almost anew. Until recently, although equality of rights has been proclaimed by the USSR Constitution, we have nevertheless been practically forbidden to express our opinions in public places, to do concert work, or to talk about religion's place in the culture's historical development. It has been implied that there may not be several points of view on religion. It is gratifying that certain contrived limitations

and prohibitions, which had divided our society into believers and nonbelievers, were removed during celebration of Russia's [Rus'] 1,000th anniversary of Christianization. Scholars and public figures have obtained the opportunity to express their opinions on religion's problems to the extent of their understanding. In short, a thick layer of ice has been melted on the approach to this subject. A difficult but, in my opinion, fruitful process of improving church and state interrelations is in motion.

In all ages, the church's mission in our fatherland has been, above all, to produce a morally elevated human being through influencing him or her by force of example. The names of the great heroes Sergiy Radonezhskiy, Dmitriy Donskoy, and Iosif Volotskiy are widely known. But how can one fail to remember, as well, the ordinary priest, who arose at 4:00 o'clock in the morning and tidied up his house, then thoroughly washed himself and went to hold service at the church. He christened babies. He performed the sacraments around the villages. He performed funeral and burial rites, and comforted the bereaved. He protected the peasant wife from her enraged husband. He plowed, sowed, and gathered the harvest with the peasants. The Russian Church has always lived a life in common with the people. In this is its mission and its strength. In this is its present and its future.

Any community of people requires organizational forms. Our church seems like a pyramid from the organizational standpoint: at the apex is the Patriarch, with his bishops, and at the base—the laity. But its essence is not in its hierarchical structure. Setting aside the theological concept of the church's essence, I shall define the latter from the viewpoint of the nonreligious. The church—first of all—is a profound, conscientious world outlook, which obliges one to behave just so, and not otherwise, to adhere to the Holy Scripture's strict code, in which, along with the Commandment "Thou shalt not kill," it is said, for example, "Think not evil" of another person. The church's task lies in arousing his conscience and purifying man. And the biblical prophecies' intent, for example, is not at all to predict the punishments of people who have done wrong, but to motivate people to realize the wrongness of their lives and correct it.

If we lived "according to our conscience," I do not think we would need additional supports like the signs encountered on the highway: "Speed Checked by Radar." What difference does it make whether speed is checked by radar or by traffic police [GAI] post! If it is prescribed to drive at a certain speed, one should drive precisely so.

In what is the church's significance in our day? What is its role in the perestroyka process? First of all, it seems to me to be in stimulating in a person the virtues that will make him or her a full-fledged participant in society building. The competent engineer, the capable stove mechanic, and the first-class carpenter are all equally good, both for shaping their own personalities and forming a society. And the church's program, as well as

its plans, presuppose that conscientious and socially active people, masters of their occupations, must become more and more numerous with us.

The church is well-known for its historical experience and self-sacrifice, and for the moral support it gives to those who are weary and ready to enter into self-sacrifice. People are tired of constant destruction, hostility, and internal disorder.

And, lo, today it has turned out, unexpectedly for many, that the problems, with which the church has lived continuously over the centuries, are common to all the people and the entire state. To tell the truth, there was no unexpectedness in this for our clergy. However, the situation's novelty for us is that the church, by virtue of the emergent circumstances, is becoming a full-fledged partner and, to some extent, a responsible party in public life. This puts us in a new position, and creates new types of relationships. The worldly development spiral is reaching the point of seeking special spiritual forms for society's organization....

[Medovoy] What line of Deputy's work do you consider especially important for yourself?

[Metropolitan Pitirim] My most important task is to foster the formation of people's moral character. Similarly to the way in which the ozone layer shields the earth from harsh cosmic rays, so does morality protect the human race from extinction, and guarantee it a future.

This problem has acquired unprecedented acuteness. Our technocratic development has shown that many people belonging to the lofty world of technical culture simply do not think about morality problems, or else they blatantly violate morality. There are profound gaps in society's moral level. The devaluation of such concepts as home and family, sense of duty, and responsibility for the future—this is our common woe. Lowering the individual's religious self-awareness level also entails a moral loss for society.

Heretofore I could strengthen moral values only on a religious basis, by church homily, and in church-life examples. Now, as a People's Deputy, nominated by the Soviet Cultural Fund's Philosophical Society, I have more opportunities. I intend to put the ethical values contained in the program of the Soviet Cultural Fund and its Philosophical Society at the base of my Deputy's work.

At a recent meeting of the "Philosophical Discussions" Club, there was talk about the common human values. Together with other scholars and public representatives, and not departing from religious positions to the slightest extent, I am making a search for the generally accepted and universally understood criteria of the common human values. And I am also engaged in similar

work within the framework of the Worldwide International Fund for Survival of the World and Mankind's Board of Directors—I am developing concepts, common to all, concerning ethical standards for the individual and society.

Certain efforts must be exerted to implement these moral standards in practical life, in politics, economic and social activity, and personal relations. However, everyone can find his or her own calling here—whether it be to care for orphans or the frail elderly, to help war invalids, or to fight for the preservation of cultural monuments.

We have acquired many social ills. We must roll up our sleeves and start working on many of them without delay. Medicine is inadequately supported. Children's homes and dormitories for the very old are in pitiful condition. There are ills everywhere you look. However, our most bleeding wound, in my opinion, is Afghanistan. So many young men returned from that war as cripples, so many widows and orphans were left, and so many mothers weep uncontrollably for their children lost in Afghanistan!

Not long ago, I saw a young man in a Kiev hospital, who had been shot through a cervical vertebra. Bedridden, he nonetheless has not lost interest in life: He listens to music and reads a great deal. To give this young man and his comrades in misfortune the opportunity to feel like fully enfranchised people—this is one of the main lines in my Deputy's program.

[Medovoy] Is there a point in your program concerning life in Volokolamsk? Today its quality, which SOVETSKAYA KULTURA recently told about in the "Letters From the Rayon Center" series of articles, is, alas, not high....

[Metropolitan Pitirim] In my program, there is no single point, but a set of measures and a package of proposals that are called for to promote the enhancement of Volokolamskiy Rayon's culture and economy, and the creation, within its bounds, of a favorable ecological situation and the conditions for holding on to its people.

I have proposed to demobilized "Afghan" soldiers [Afghanistan veterans] that they come to Volokolamskiy Rayon. Houses being vacated, land plots, and the requisite equipment will be allotted to those among them who wish to work in agriculture, and the conditions will be created for operation on a lease basis. The schools being vacated, in the villages abandoned by their residents, can be re-equipped as rest and recreation homes for former soldiers. The Volokolamsk parishes also will help in caring for the former soldiers.

Having restored the Chernyshevs' country estate at Yaropolets, a housing complex for former soldiers can be accommodated there. A rehabilitation center fitted out

with modern equipment, where invalids will undergo a course of treatment, can be created on the grounds of this estate, which once was called the Russian Versailles.

As a Deputy, I shall also fight for restoration of the rayon's historic monuments, for the reasonable provision of modern conveniences to ancient Volokolamsk, and for removal of the casting shop, which is spoiling the city's appearance, from the grounds of the former Krestovozdvizhenskiy [Exaltation of the Cross] Monastery. It is essential to restore Voskresenskiy Sobor [Resurrection Cathedral] in the city's kremlin. It is necessary to remove the jail from within the city limits, and put a repository for valuable state papers in its building on Volokolamsk Kremlin grounds.

[Medovoy] Your Great Reverence, they say that you can sometimes be seen in early morning hours within the walls of Iosifo-Volotskiy Monastery—in solitude, and deep in thought. What do you think about at such moments?

[Passages omitted] I consider it an urgent task to revitalize Iosifo-Volotskiy Monastery in its traditional sense—as a center of self-sacrificing monastic behavior and spiritual life, and as a focus of culture and social service. Here it is necessary to recreate the ancient art of icon painting and calligraphy, to amass a rich library, like the one that was once the object of its pride, and also to organize an international theological center, where meetings and discussions of native and foreign scholars will take place.

Inasmuch as interest in Russian culture is growing throughout the world, Western church and business circles are expressing their willingness to construct modern hotels in the Moscow vicinity for religious pilgrimages. Russian emigrants, living abroad, also are prepared to invest substantial funds in the restoration of Russian antiquity. There is a construction organization that has the capability to do such work. It is essential to take advantage of these favorable circumstances.

First, the tourists will make excursions to the capital, and then, having returned to Pereslavl-Zalesskiy, they will get a chance to travel to Rostov, Yaroslavl, and Zagorsk. The Volokolamsk guests, having stayed in one of the hotels for the purpose, will examine Iosifo-Volotskiy Monastery, Yaropolets, Ostashevo, Mozhaysk, and Zvenigorod in addition to the city. Not far from Volokolamsk is Staritsa, which is not easy to reach just now because of the lack of through roads. After creation of the tourist complex in Volokolamsk, a road will run from there to Staritsa, Seliger, and Torzhok, where the RSFSR Ministry of Culture is organizing a Russian Folklore Center. In brief, an extensive program, the goal of which is development of culture and spirituality, can be carried out in a comparatively modest area.

Our main treasure is man, who must be helped, not only to survive, but also to remain a human being. Indeed, many of our problems, including ecological ones, are a direct result of human immorality.

I submit that it is impossible to increase morality by just negative examples alone. Glasnost in just the exposure sense, pointing out the social ills, can hardly move society forward. Therefore, my Deputy's program calls for publicizing the past's positive experience, the creative experience—political, social, and moral—acquired by our state over the centuries. I consider it essential to talk about this at the top of my lungs, using the press, motion-picture, radio, and television media.

[Medovoy] Your Grace, you have headed the Moscow Patriarchate's Publishing Department for 27 years. Could you, perhaps, tell us when the Bible, which every cultured person is obliged to read, will finally become accessible to a wide range of readers?

[Metropolitan Pitirim] We have completed the most important task—meeting the parishes' need for the required prayer-book and theological literature. The next goal—supplying every Orthodox family with the church literature. And after that, we plan to give everyone who is interested in it a chance to obtain the church literature.

Unfortunately, the job is moving along slowly at present. A shortage of paper and the lack of a printing base are hindering us, and legislative acts and instructions are also impeding our work. We do not have the right, for example, to conclude a contract with the pulp and paper combines for paper delivery. We buy paper with great difficulty, and mainly the leftovers. For example, we have obtained paper for publishing the newspaper TSERKOVNYY VESTNIK [Church Herald]—and we are happy. However, there is little basis for happiness at the moment: Our supply will provide for three issues in all. The small amount of paper that the planning agencies allot us for a year is ridiculous, and is hardly enough for half a day's work in a decent printery. In short, although church and state relations have changed for the better, the Publishing Department, as before, lacks the conditions for solving the problems posed by society.

[Medovoy] The main change during perestroyka must take place within ourselves. In your view, what traits must we abandon first?

[Metropolitan Pitirim] First of all—the self-satisfaction, self-indulgence, and laziness, which creep into our consciousness little by little, but very easily and quickly. These are, unfortunately, common human traits.

[Medovoy] It is told in the Bible how dry bones covered themselves with a fleshy coating and were indistinguishable from people. However, they became people only when the spirit entered them.... Must not our contemporaries and compatriots likewise be inspired by a lofty ideal if they hope to improve their lives?

[Metropolitan Pitirim] That excerpt from Chapter 37 of the Book of Ezekiel really suits our times. And the chapter's meaning lies in the need to arouse the spirit; the spirit, which, for all people, is nothing other than **the trait of responsibility**. A person's merit is not in his or her talents, but, above all—in proportion to his or her responsibility.

[Medovoy] We often console ourselves with the thought that circumstances are stronger than we are. And, as mankind's experience shows, the ideal of moral perfection remains attainable only for the recluse. Can it be that the ideal actually is insufficiently realizable in practical life?

[Metropolitan Pitirim] According to ancient Christian concepts, a man's fate after death is like the trajectory of a stone let fly from a sling. In the course of his life, a man describes orbits: from apogee to perigee, from "bad" to "good...." At whatever point in the moral trajectory death finds him—he continues this path: either upward or downward. If he had been good, and died in a high state of morality and spiritual strength, denying himself—would that not be marvelous!

In mathematics there is the concept of the "asymptote." This is a value that tends toward its absolute, and never reaches it. It tends, asymptotically, toward zero or infinity. However, it will never be either zero or infinity. Morality—this is the vector of being. It is an asymptotic value. "Be perfect like your Heavenly Father!" Who can become equal to God in perfection? Nobody. But one must strive for this!

[Medovoy] Good and evil have fought against each other for as long as mankind has existed. But, despite this everlasting opposition, the amount of evil on earth has not been reduced. Criminality is increasing, and wars are not abating. How do you explain this?

[Metropolitan Pitirim] Man has been gifted with an extremely uncomfortable property—moral freedom. One of the most profound theologians, Aleksandriskiy Afanasiy, said in the 4th century A.D.: "God can do everything, but he cannot save man without man himself."

How does one reconcile the existing evil with the existing good? I answer the question thus: Only what is better survives. Only what is truly moral and improved can survive.

For what reason are disasters inflicted upon us? Why is good fortune given to us? These are extremely difficult questions. To understand why good and evil exist—this is a task for a person's entire life.

[Medovoy] In 1937, when Archbishop Pitirim Krylov was purged, your father, Vladimir Andreyevich Nechayev, a well-known and influential priest, also died. Before he died, he had spent over 3 years in prison. The

number of the despotism's victims is huge.... In your opinion, should the purges' organizers still alive, those who arrested, tortured, and killed people guilty of nothing, be punished?

[Metropolitan Pitirim] To this question, also, it is hardly possible to give an unequivocal answer. Inasmuch as the conversation has touched upon my father, I shall remark: He hardly talked about the years of imprisonment, and, in particular, he never called for settlement of accounts with his tormentors.

After his death, I met with dozens of people—priests, bishops, monks, and nuns—who had experienced, in person, the inhuman living conditions in the jails and camps. And from not one of them (I stress: from not one of them!) did I ever hear words of anger, chagrin, or bitterness; and, what is more, I did not sense a thirst for revenge in them.

In view of the fact that a sense of moral responsibility for what happens to or around him or her is very strong in a true Christian, he or she is a stranger to revenge and retribution (Let us recall the Sermon on the Mount: "Whosoever shall say to his brother, 'Fool,' shall be subject to damnation," "Thou must not repay evil with evil," etc.). However, none other than Saint Joseph demanded the death penalty for heretics—inasmuch as they had reached a certain threshold value in their degeneracy, and there no longer was any hope for their correction.

There is a **measure of personal responsibility**, and there is a **measure of social responsibility**. It seems to me that everything may be forgiven **personally**. **Socially**—the home and society must be protected from the development of vice. Are people who have committed evil to be repaid in the same measure? Evil is incommensurable. What can you do to an executioner, on whose conscience there are dozens, or even millions, of destroyed lives? Throw a body out of a grave? That is not a retributive measure. Hang him? Subject him to torture? Evil, once committed, cannot be offset by evil. So it is necessary to protect society from the criminal, and to remove the latter from society. Bring the criminal to moral trial—personal and social. And punish for the crime in such a way that it will not be repeated, and that the very conditions for its occurrence will be ruled out.

[Medovoy] You have mentioned freedom in the course of our conversation. What do you include in this concept?

[Metropolitan Pitirim] The apostle Paul, in an epistle to the Corinthians, said superbly: "I am permitted everything, but not everything is to my advantage. Everything belongs to me, but nothing must possess me." The apostle Paul was a great dialectician.

Be above your weaknesses, and put the common human values at the base of your election....

Freedom of the spirit, freedom from enslavement by the material world—in the crudest sense, this is culture. Only a cultivated spirit, in which the superficial and temporal—the relations and interests—do not predominate, is truly free.... Whether one is a scientist, an artist, or a politician, he or she must rise above the personal interests that limit his or her flight.

Thus freedom—this is a personality trait having spiritual values. The greater a man's spiritual culture—the freer he is in his self-consciousness and activity. [Remaining passages omitted.]

**Metropolitan Filaret on Uniate Church, 'Religious Russification'**

18001241 Kiev PRAVDA UKRAINY in Russian  
23 May 89 p 4

[Interview with Kiev and Galich Metropolitan Filaret by PRAVDA UKRAINY Lvov correspondent Zh. Rudenko: "Building Bridges of Accord"; interview took place in Lvov on the St. Yuriy Church Holiday 1989]

[Text] Kiev and Galich Metropolitan Filaret—patriarchal exarch of the Ukraine—arrived in Lvov several days ago to perform religious rites on the occasion of the Saint Yuriy Church Holiday. A press conference, for mass information media workers of oblast, republic, and central [Moscow] publications, was held in the Lvov Eparchy administrative office after the liturgy. Our Lvov correspondent presents the answers to PRAVDA UKRAINY's questions exclusively.

[Rudenko] A series of unsanctioned meetings and assemblies has recently taken place in the Lvov area. Some nationalistically inclined citizens are concocting their slogans on a heavily religious basis. On the basis of the broadcasting of foreign radio voices hostile to the USSR, they insist that the 1946 Lvov Council, which abolished the Uniate Church in West Ukrainian areas, was uncanonical; that is, illegal.

They also assert that this action infringed upon the interests of Ukrainian Catholics, who now must fight for restoration of their religious rights. What is the Russian Orthodox Church's position in this issue?

[Metropolitan Filaret] Our attitude toward the Union proclaimed in 1596 is unequivocally negative. The initiative to conclude the Union came from Rome, and, theoretically, Rome's aspiration to unify the Christian Churches explained it. In fact, however, cruel suppression of human individuality was begun, and a bloody struggle developed, not only between churches, but also between people of the same faith and nationality.

The Union also compromised itself by collaborating with fascism, and by inflaming ethnic animosity. Thus, in its own right, it is already condemned by history. The Russian Orthodox Church speaks for the unity of all

nationalities and peoples, and the favoring of some at the expense of others is alien to it. And, to resurrect the Union—this means to agree with the errors that were made in the past.

Now, in regard to the Lvov Council of 1946: Of course it took place without the Roman Pope's blessing. It was also exactly like the Brest Council [Brest-Litovsk Synod] of 1596, which adopted the Union, and which occurred without the blessing, and against the will, of the Patriarch of Constantinople. Moreover, the Union was ratified by bishops who were no longer Orthodox, because they had adopted Roman subordination even earlier. From the Orthodox Church's standpoint, the Lvov Council is canonical. Two bishops, the priesthood, and laymen were at the council. But, most importantly, the council's decision was unanimously approved and supported by the believers in the West Ukrainian areas. So, by the end of the 1940's, about 3,000 parishes, that is, almost all parishes, had reunited with the Russian Orthodox Church. Therefore, the Lvov Council was a legal act in both form and substance. Our Catholics are not restricted in their rights, either. In Ukrainian territory, as in the other Soviet republics, they have a great number of their own churches, where they may freely worship and profess their faith.

[Rudenko] For some reason, both local advocates and foreign Uniates are appealing to Soviet power organs with requests to legalize the Ukrainian Catholic Church. They say, indeed, that they must obtain the final decision there. Is not such appealing an attempt to nudge those organs into interfering in religious affairs?

[Metropolitan Filaret] Such attempts are observed. Essentially, however, they bear no relation to a profession of faith. The unwanted sponsors of the Union apparently are burning with desire to set the church and state at odds on the one hand, and, on the other, to set the Orthodox and Catholic Churches against each other and put their relations in limbo. It probably is not to everyone's liking that an Orthodox-Catholic dialogue has recently begun to develop vigorously, that believers' rights are being increased in the course of perestroika, and that the church will be taking a more active part in public life. Not only are Russians, Ukrainians, and Belorussians included in the Russian Orthodox Church's membership, but Moldavians, Estonians, Latvians, Lithuanians, Chuvash, and other of our country's nationalities as well, to say nothing of people scattered throughout the world.

The interests of the Russian Orthodox Church, as a multinational church, are conditioned upon the requirements for enhancing our whole nation's unity. But look at the way some citizens demanding legalization of the Ukrainian Catholic Church [UKTs] are behaving. They are instigating enmity toward the Russian Orthodox Church, calling it "Satan's Church," and hurting the



Orthodox-Catholic dialogue, the clergy, and the believers. They hinder the performance of Orthodox religious services by rowdy conduct, do not let believers into newly opened Orthodox churches, and threaten the Orthodox clergy.

And what will happen if, God forbid, the Ukrainian Catholic Church is legalized? The new "messiahs" will build up such enmity toward us that we shall all be sorry. Today, you know, our energies go into instituting beneficial changes in the country and living in peace and harmony.

[Rudenko] Your Reverence, in your recent interview, it was said to PRAVDA UKRAINY that the Russian Orthodox Church received its name a thousand years ago, when there still was neither an RSFSR [Rossiya], nor a Belorussia, nor a Ukraine. This name arouses no suspicions among, for example, Orthodox Americans, Spaniards, Englishmen, and Frenchmen.... However, in our country, the national language problem has worsened, and the same hostile radio voices are being heard concerning religious Russification on the Orthodoxy's part. Could you not tell us in more detail about how the range of the Ukrainian language's use is to be expanded in church activity?

[Metropolitan Filaret] Yes, I have already spoken of our church's being multinational. Therefore, by Holy Synod decree, religious service is conducted, not only in the traditional Church Slavonic language, but also in whatever language the laity chooses. The accusations, made against the Russian Orthodox Church, that it is Russianizing the Ukrainian population, are, of course, without substance. Even for Ukrainian Catholics abroad—in Canada, the USA, Western Europe, Australia, and other countries—the service is conducted in Church Slavonic. These Ukrainian Catholics use the same prayer books, in Church Slavonic, as do ours.

However, the Russian Orthodox Church has always delivered God's word, comfort, and assistance in the language understandable to the native population that our missionaries entered. So, when our republic's language is involved, I can repeat: A Ukrainian language religious service is performed in many parishes in Ukrainian Exarchate territory, and, if the need arises to increase the number of such services, there will be no impediments in this regard.

What are we doing to expand the Ukrainian Language area? The PRAVOSLAVNYY VISNIK [Orthodox Bulletin (in Ukrainian)] is being published and distributed throughout the republic. The "Noviy Zavit" [New Testament (in Ukrainian)] has already been translated into the Ukrainian language and published, and several editions of the "Molitvoslov" [Prayer Book] have been published (here the Church Slavonic sounds are printed in Ukrainian letters). Preparations are being made to publish special prayer books (and, first of all, the "Prayer

Book for the Sacraments") in Ukrainian literary language. Beginning with the new academic year, all students in the republic's seminaries will be studying the Ukrainian language and literature as an academic subject.

However, I wish to stress that we view expansion of the Ukrainian language area as a natural process. The Russian Orthodox Church certainly will not undertake to establish the language's primacy and proclaim its "chosen-of-God status" compared to other languages. The apostle Paul's teaching should be sacred to the Christian: "There is neither a Greek nor a Jew," and there is no "barbarian, Scythian, slave, or freeman; but all, and in all, is Christ."

[Rudenko] What is the Russian Orthodox Church's attitude toward the idea of forming a people's movement for perestroika in the Ukraine?

[Metropolitan Filaret] In general, it is critical. In the draft program proposed by the movement's initiating group, I read this sort of statement: "Radically change religion." This means that a task is set to radically change our church; that is, to interfere in the church's affairs and abolish organizational relationships that have developed over the course of a millennium. Furthermore, the draft program contains overtones of Ukrainian separatism. Our church, as I said before, gives its blessing to unity of our peoples, and strives to build bridges of accord and brotherhood.

[Rudenko] Your Reverence, does it not seem to you that the Russian Orthodox Church is failing to take advantage of all opportunities to counter religious extremists?

[Metropolitan Filaret] Certainly. Our parish priests deal with man, and their stimulating, convincing, and sincere words are addressed to him. Not all of them take advantage of their parish-priest potential. Many live far away from their parishes. We feel that a priest should live among his parishioners. We are also learning to work in a new way. Our main goal now—to foster the rebirth of all the moral values in life, and to instill respect for human individuality, the development and blossoming of which is possible only under conditions of peace and law and order.

#### **Saratov Oblast Germans to Get New Catholic Church**

*18001184a Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 31 May 89 p 13*

[Unattributed report: "Church for Volga Germans"]

[Text] The German-speaking Roman Catholic community in the city of Marks has been given permission to build a church of their own.

The community has several hundred believers, the ancestors of those who settled in Russia in the 18th century. The old church is too small to accommodate everybody.

Iosef Vert, the church prior and the only German-speaking Catholic priest in the Volga area, conducts sermons in his native German and Russian languages and is engaged in the educational work.

"I believe that our church can become not only a religious, but a cultural center too," says Father Vert.

The local authorities have already set aside a plot of land to build the church on, and the blueprints of the building have been drawn.

### **Khmelnitskiy Oblast Believers Cooperate On Mutually Beneficial Work**

18001184b Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA in Russian 31 May 89 p 3

[Article by Sergey Kiselev: "Secular Sermons From a Church Pulpit"]

[Text] I can just imagine movie makers shooting the beginning of this episode: a close-up of a sign that says "State Automobile Inspection of the Internal Affairs Department of the Khmel'nitsk Oblispolkom." Two flights of stairs, and another plate, reading "Head of GAI." The door opens into Aleksandr Ivanovich Tkachenko sitting at the table. Another close-up of his Lieutenant Colonel of Militia shoulder straps and then the camera zooms into yesterday's traffic accident report. Next to it is a 1989 Orthodox church calendar with the Yelokhov Cathedral in color on the front cover. The narrator says: "These are the kind of things you can spot on the desk of the head of the oblast GAI..."

I should mention, however, that the archimandrite Antoniy, secretary of the Khmel'nitsk eparchial board, has on his desk a booklet titled "Methods And Recommendations For Ideological Activists of the UVD Apparatus, City Regional Organs and Oblast Subunits" - and the same traffic accident reports.

Let me tell you the secret. The head of the GAI needs a church calendar so he can pay more attention to traffic in the oblast during the religious holidays, when the number of drivers and pedestrians goes up. On the other hand, the eparchy's clergy regularly include figures from traffic accident reports in their sermons, which deal with such secular subjects as the observance of traffic regulations.

So, in the Khmel'nitsk GAI, both the church and the GAI have discovered common ground to promote cooperation of mutual interest. To use GAI's definitions, these

common interests include efforts to bring down the number of fatal traffic accidents. According to church postulates, this spells the preservation of human life, God's sacred gift.

It was two years ago when the Oblast GAI sought the church's help. "We made a simple assumption that it is worth trying to save at least one human life, if the church joins in popularizing traffic rules," says Aleksandr Ivanovich. The late Father Andrey, who headed the eparchial board at that time, gave us practical help when he started covering "GAI-related topics" in his sermons on a regular basis. As a parish dean, he also suggested that other eparchy clergy engage in similar propaganda. Father Antoniy who succeeded him is actively pleading the cause of his predecessor.

"I saw old men coming out of the church after a sermon on traffic rules, come up to a street light, bless it and then cross the street on green," adds Captain Aleksandr Yatkevich, senior GAI officer of the oblast GAI. "If a priest preaches traffic rules in God's temple, it's really serious..."

It is a serious concern, because 169 people (out of which 15 were children) were killed in auto accidents last year in Khmel'nitskiy Oblast. It should be mentioned that the Khmel'nitskiy Region is among a handful of areas in the country that has seen no increase in road accidents in the past two years. Thank God, we may say, if the oblast eparchial department contributed its bit to these stable numbers (still tragic figures, as they are), along with the oblast GAI.

"The state taking a more humane attitude to the church is the brainchild of perestroika which changed the minds of both believers and nonbelievers a great deal," says Archbishop Antoniy. "It is the moral duty of every Soviet person to devote his or her energy and skills to creative participation in the ongoing changes."

It should be mentioned that in addition to the oblast GAI, the eparchial board maintains business contacts with city hospital No. 1. Following the sermons on charity and on help to the needy, the sick and the feeble, believers flocked daily to the hospital to work as nurses and sitters there. Those with a knack for masonry, carpentry, or fitter's work, take care of small repairs and construction of which any medical institution has always been in dire need. The eparchial board is planning to take custody of the elderly home too.

It is obvious that it will be easier and faster to solve the many problems facing mankind today if cooperation between the local authorities and religious associations continues along the informal lines in the same manner as it does in Khmel'nitskiy and if the old confrontation is replaced with a genuine dialogue on an equal footing.

And now let's look up the definition of a sermon as given by the Atheist dictionary (Political Publishers, Moscow, 1986). "Sermon is the propaganda of religious ideology through a public speech, laying out the most important principles of religious teaching and invoking a respective behavior." It looks like the atheist dictionaries have become very obsolete.

### **Latvian Council of Ministers Returns Church to Orthodox Believers**

18001250a Riga SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA in Russian  
17 May 89 p 4

[Article by LATINFORM correspondent V. Steshenko: "Return of the Cathedral"]

[Text] This decision had been expected: V.G. Bresis, chairman of the Latvian SSR Council of Ministers, has signed an order transferring ownership of the former Riga Khristorozhdestvenskiy [Birth-of-Christ] Orthodox Cathedral building to Latvia's Russian Orthodox Church. It may not be amiss to recall our Council of Ministers chairman's preelection platform, in which he talked about new relations with the church.

Public opinion in the republic appraises this decision as a restoration of justice. Indeed, as early as July 1988, the Balto-Slavic Society and, subsequently, the Latvian Cultural Fund, the People's and International Fronts, and other organizations advanced similar proposals.

However, the decision will have its effect, first of all, in the hearts of the believers. In January of this year, Riga and Latvia Metropolitan Leonid addressed a letter to the Council of Ministers, in which it was said, for example: "At present, the city authorities' serious attitude toward believers' rights, in the spirit of the times, is causing profound satisfaction in all Latvian believing people, including the Orthodox Church in Latvia's leadership, which has no doubt that the cathedral, along with the property that was left behind intact and removed from the church at some time in the past, will be returned to the Orthodox Church. Such decision of the issue undoubtedly would have historical significance."

And, lo, the decision has been made. Your Latvian Information Press Agency [LATINFORM] correspondent asked Metropolitan Leonid to comment on it:

[Metropolitan Leonid] We have awaited the cathedral's return, and it has finally come about, as a result of the changed attitude toward believers, the church in general, and the Orthodox Church in particular.

[Steshenko] Your Grace, by the Council of Ministers decision, the Society for Knowledge only has to vacate the cathedral by 1 January 1993. Does this schedule suit the church?

[Metropolitan Leonid] The schedule suits us. We do not have sufficient funds just now, and it will give us time to gather the resources. The believers will welcome this decision with great satisfaction and understanding.

Unfortunately, disinformation has appeared in the Western press. Supposedly, the planetarium has been torn down, the building is abandoned, and the Orthodox Church shows no interest in the cathedral. Needless to say, our conversation with you refutes this conjecture.

The demand to restore justice also met with the Society for Knowledge's understanding, but it has posed many problems for the Society. The Society's management feels that it will be impossible to find new accommodations for the House of Knowledge without assistance from the city executive committee and other agencies. [Metropolitan Leonid's comments end.]

Your LATINFORM correspondent telephoned A.P. Rubiks, chairman of the Riga City Executive Committee:

[Steshenko] Alfred Petrovich, in his letter to the Council of Ministers, Metropolitan Leonid speaks fondly of the city executive committee's leadership, which treats believers' needs with understanding. At the same time, by order of the Council of Ministers, the city executive committee, jointly with the Society for Knowledge, must prepare a proposal to relocate the planetarium, the lecture hall, and the society's other services. Do you already have an idea how to do this?

[Rubiks] Let us speak frankly, the problem that is posed is a difficult one. I think it may be possible to install the planetarium in the future Young Pioneers Palace. But, as for the other accommodations, I see potential in just one thing. As you know, a substantial staff reduction is in progress in the administrative apparatus. Vacated space, with which it is possible to meet obligations to culture, including enlightenment, must serve as the real evidence of this office reduction. [Rubiks' comments end.]

So, the long-awaited decision has been made. The cathedral, which was under Orthodox Church management prior to 1961, is being returned to the believers. They will not be alone in their efforts to restore it in pristine form. Already this month, the Balto-Slavic Society is staging a concert, the proceeds from which will go into the Birth-of-Christ Cathedral's restoration; and, in Moscow, an exhibition of S. Simakov's paintings, produced by the Society in Support of the Orthodox Church, is being readied for shipment to Riga for the same purpose.

### **Proceeds of Concert To Go to Restoration of Women's Monastery**

18001250b Minsk SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA in Russian 4 May 89 p 1

[BELTA report: "For Erecting a Monument"]

[Text] Gypsy ballads and camp songs, retained in their original form, resounded during the first days of May in the overfilled Belorussian State Musical Arts Institute's concert hall, at the "Alla Bayanova Invites You" benefit concerts. The Soviet Cultural Fund and the Minsk Russian Orthodox Church Eparchy, which invited Alla Bayanova, the Rumanian radio and television soloist, also known worldwide as a splendid proponent of Soviet

stage singing of the 1930's to 1950's, to the Soviet Union for guest performances, organized the concerts.

The funds obtained from Alla Bayanova's concerts will be credited to the account of the Soviet Cultural Fund's Belorussian Division, and will go into the erection of a monument to Frantsisko (Skorine) in Minsk, and restoration of the Polotsk Women's Monastery.

## Progress Tied to Advances in Culture

### Cultural Issues Ignored

18001292 Moscow SOVETSKAYA KULTURA in Russian 24 Jun 89 p 10

[Article by A.Kamenev: "Who Is Left Behind?"]

[Text] A sad but typical fact noted by Academician D.Likhachyov: at the Congress of the USSR People's Deputies the word culture was first uttered only on the third day, and that in passing. And most election programs and platforms, too, mentioned culture but rarely. To be sure, while campaigning to be elected by their professional unions some arts-related professionals voiced concern for the state of culture, but they did so in terms of their own shop interests, not in the broad meaning of the word.

None of them except D.Likhachyov, elected deputy by the Soviet Culture Fund, and R.Bykov—chosen, by the way, not by his own Cinematographers' Union but by the Soviet Children's Fund imeni V.I.Lenin—had a chance to speak at the congress. To be sure, on the next to last day it was announced that K.Lavrov (the USSR Theatrical Union) and B.Ugarov (the USSR Visual Arts Academy) will be given the floor, but the congress then voted to end the discussion.

Eighty two of the USSR people's deputies were artistic and cultural figures 20 of whom were not elected by their professional unions and among the 118 writers and journalists elected to the congress there were 67 such delegates. Most teachers and social scientists, too, won their seats having gone through the crucible of the election campaign at the electoral districts. I mention this only to stress one more time that the intelligentsia, including the artistic intelligentsia, is no longer content with the role of "intermediate social layer" to which it used to be relegated but constitutes an influential social group and is a powerful catalyst of perestroika processes. It is not an accident that on the election day voters cast their ballots for its representatives. And yet there was no serious discussion of cultural issues at the congress.

Could it be that the habit of thinking of culture on a leftover basis had become so deeply ingrained that no one was shocked by the sad, even tragic figures cited by deputy A.Konovalov, the president of the Kazan University? Think of it: our country is near the 50th place as far as the level of education of our young people is concerned and on a per capita basis we spend on education just one sixth of what the US does. Actually, in this area we lag behind all developed countries. As a result, many thousands of our higher education institutions and vocational schools graduate a discounted version of a specialist, or just a two-dimensional model. No wonder we are behind in so many areas and are plagued by various freak accidents and environmental disasters. Educators the world over are thinking about introducing

more liberal arts courses into the technical curriculum, while we are still trying to train a more or less decent "techie". And what happens tomorrow?

Life not just reminds us at every turn about culture's very close ties to the economy, politics and the environment and the moral aspects of various issues; it fairly shouts about it. But there is also a deeper layer of meaning here, one on which all human actions and interactions in society are based. I mean culture as the foundation of morality. We have more or less learned to calculate direct and indirect losses from mismanagement, stupid decisions, failure to fulfill the plan and natural disasters. But how to measure the losses suffered by society from lack of humanitarian conscience? Where would it come from, such conscience? I have already spoken of the shirking on education. According to specialists, the policy of serious investment into this area results in an increase of up to 50 percent in the rate of national income growth. We, however, still tend to see it as a burdensome waste that does not bring quick returns. This is why Academician Likhachyov's alarming speech did not have the proper effect on a great majority of deputies whose reaction displayed the usual attitude to culture as to something considered on a leftover basis. At yet, a society that cares about its culture cares about its own roots.

I recall how when permanent commissions and committees were being formed, culture was tossed like a ping-pong ball from one organization to the next until it ended up in two entities at once: in the Nationalities Council's Commission for the Development of Culture, Language and National and International Traditions and Preservation of Historical Heritage and in the Supreme Soviet's Committee on Science, Education, Culture and Upbringing. I must admit I had misgivings about the ability of a committee concerned with science, education, upbringing and culture all at once to fill the lacunae in our education and hence culture. Perhaps it would have been better to allot to culture a separate commission, but the deputies chose to combine it with related fields.

We heard about many things for the first time at the Congress: we were told about our military budget and its breakdown by expenditure category; we found out something about our space program and we now know about our hard currency debt. But we did not hear anything new about culture, namely how and in what direction it would develop in order to make our society truly cultured.

We need a radically new concept of cultural development. But what kind of a concept? Apparently it is up to the commission and the committee on cultural issues which have started their work; hopefully they will make the transition from stating the fact of our cultural backwardness to providing serious financing for the area of the spirit. It seems that drastic changes here are not expected in the near future. However, it will hinge on the

position of the deputies and their realization that nothing will be righted by exhortations and that the usual practice of funding cultural programs on a leftover basis has left all of us behind. Since only recently we were able to find enormous sums for grand long-term programs and various "construction projects of the century"—all of which have ultimately failed—is it conceivable that we would not properly fund the most profitable expenditure category, i.e., education and culture?

If this does not happen, I think that at the next congress of the USSR people's deputies, too, there will be no time left for representatives of the artistic intelligentsia to speak, even though they have much to say and to propose. It is not an accident that people increasingly turn to them for advice.

### Preservation of Cultural Legacy

18001292 Moscow SOVETSKAYA KULTURA in  
*Russian* 24 Jun 89 p 6

[Article by B. Pokrovskiy, USSR people's deputy, director of the Moscow Chamber Music Theater: "Respect for Culture Means Respect for the Human Being"]

[Text] It so happened that I was born six years ahead of the Soviet power. I felt on my own back and with my own stomach the entire range of experimentation of the socialist economy.

There were many experiments, all ending in failure. They failed not because they were stupid or ill-conceived but because they did not agree with society's culture and spiritual condition and the very quality of people's personal interests. Only in words have we ever been able to subjugate our personal interests to those of society.

The first economic experiment was war communism. Everything was to be shared equally. I recall how a labor collective tried to share a loaf of bread, a large fish, a piece of meat or a sugar loaf. Everyone wanted to be honest but even then it was clear that only unconscionable wheeler-dealers would survive. In overcrowded railway cars they went to Sukhinchy or Tashkent (the "Bread Town"), swapping dancing shoes, shawls, dinner trousseaus, lamp shades, Hisser riding boots or mirrors for a loaf of bread or even a handful of grain, only to survive.

One man saved us all. Just one. But it was Lenin. His New Economic Policy. Goods began to appear on the shelves. But to buy them, one needed money, which had to be **earned**. This, however, was difficult, especially for those who had already grown used to **expropriating**.

Stanislavskiy was chased from his own home, Blok's modest estate was torched, Shalyapin first had to put up with others moving into his apartment and then forced out of the country, Rakhmaninov's concert piano was

dropped from the second floor window, etc. All this was alien to the spirit of the proletarian revolution, but it was tolerated. The instinct of expropriation had already taken root.

Those who considered expropriation their birthright hated NEP. They hated it because the policy was forcing them to learn how to work. "Nepman" became a disdainful nickname. When disaster struck (I mean Lenin's death in January 1924), boycott became a political credo against those who had answered Lenin's call to rebuild the economy.

Then there was collectivization. To abolish small private commercial farms, the peasant's land, his cattle and even at times his life had to be taken, or expropriated.

Once again hunger struck.

The pandemic suffering unleashed by the war caused people to forget the expropriation mentality. A supreme morality bound the people. The fatherland was saved. But once the war was over, new ideas and plans began to appear one after the other: chemical industry development, land reclamation, the square principle vs. the nest principle, planting of maize and a whole set of food programs. All of them called for a sudden charge and meant to produce quick results; all of them failed, spun wheels, collapsed. While logical in and of themselves, those projects could not actively impact the country's fate without taking into account its culture and ability to work.

Seventy years is enough time to realize this.

I have known since childhood what is meant by base and superstructure in Marxist ideology. I have seen all attempts to build the base separately, without regard for the superstructure, end in failure. Seventy years of doomed attempts to build the base trampled culture into the mud. From that mud arose a two-headed monster; one of its heads is lies and the other larceny. Many people, from top (the very top) to bottom, have learned to worship that monster. The human being, his life, honor, psychological makeup, personal talents, interests, social condition and ideals were scornfully pushed into the superstructure category.

Culture is neither formal education nor erudition, neither science nor enlightenment; it is not even art. The preferred translation of the word's root is **respectmed**. **One can hold in great respect nature, gods, one individual or the golden calf. Our ideal is socialism, a fraternity of people, a community. This means respect for the human being and for his creative, useful labor—for what human being can live without labor?**

Culture is the spiritual structure of society. Can it be put on the back burner and mentioned only in passing?

Unfortunately, this is how it is being treated by our most respected politicians, economists, military jurists, scientists and even ideologists. I will be even more severe: we not only lack culture, we lack any need for it—this refers to all of us, to the last person. For that need is not legalized.

Lack of respect for the human being, attention for the human being, ability to listen to one another, conscience, care, respect, consideration and inner personal responsibility—"everything is gone, everything has perished," to quote M. Musorgskiy's "Khovanshchina".

It would be naive to think that a new, truly socialist culture can be created by some magic words or by empty, formalistic slogans. It can only arise and be fostered by **certain laws** of workplace, business, personal and social **interactions**. Hoping to create a law-based society, we must first define in the area of culture not only the rights of citizens but their **responsibilities**, as well. We have learned to blame somebody else for our ignorance: we forgive drunks ("they drink because their life is hard"), smokers and drug addicts ("they are under stress") and hooligans ("they have no clubs, no one cares about them") and are not ashamed of all this irresponsible rubbish.

Morality! Conscience is its main component. Conscience is stern and cruel. We should stop appealing to it and start teaching it to people and punishing them for its absence. There can be no collective responsibility, enough. Who needs a collective of irresponsible cogs? Society must forge individuals and make people **personally responsible** regardless of their position, circumstances and age.

Old laws did not promote the nation's culture; on the contrary, they were destroying it. This continues to this day. Out of ignorance—or is it on purpose?—cultural ties are being destroyed by laws regulating social interactions.

I could mention thousands of examples, all typical.

The fourth nuclear reactor will explode; in the gutter along bad roads brand-new agricultural machinery just received from abroad will lie idle; new equipment will rot behind factory fences; children will get infected because someone did not boil reusable hypodermic needles; the Aral, Baykal, Caspian and Black Seas will go on being destroyed and government laws will not be carried out if no one is responsible. We have learned that it is all the fault of the conductor: we increasingly blame the government and demand everything from it and nothing from our own conscience.

We say that the leak in the pipeline and the resultant loss of life was a technical malfunction, but in reality it was an explosion of cultural ignorance caused by lack of conscience and responsibility for one's work.

Did jurists, know-it-all economists and resolute politicians think of this as they, who had so energetically mobbed the podium of the Congress, fell into indifferent silence on the rare—too rare—occasions when the word culture was mentioned?

The word culture was uncomfortable at the congress, as it was at the Supreme Soviet meetings. When commissions and committees were being set up, they could not figure out where to shove that useless superstructure. Yet, it is what provides structure to all of us.

To create a culture of human relations we need laws cementing human societies, not destroying them.

The Supreme Soviet's activity, that of **both its chambers**, must be focused on the various aspects of forging the Soviet man and preserving what little there remains of our cultural heritage. The Soviet must protect the young shoots of spiritual life and test all new laws to see whether they promote the moral health of society. The laws must forge workplace, social and business relations that would make it **personally profitable** for every Soviet citizen to be honest and honorable, and to respect not only his mother and father but every member of society. Immorality should be banned.

Theoretically, culture ought to soar above society on the wings of education and arts. The condition of the latter two, however, is pitiful and people have a consumer-like attitude toward them. They expect rest, entertainment and relaxation from art, forgetting that it is primarily an extremely complex process of exploring the world and the human being by means of images of beauty. One must learn to understand it.

"I know nothing about music," favorably inclined superiors bearing the crown of nomenklatura have often told me. Those who work in the arts no longer expect the state, which has been ruined by the cost of this crown, to offer them any—however small—material support; we are only hoping for a measure of moral support, some prestige, respect and attention to our task of caring for the people's inner world. It is alarming that we have no use for art.

Today's majority—from day laborers at the freight station to Politburo members—are deaf to musical theater, even though it distills the essence of life's spiritual, ideological and meaningful conflicts. This is a reality and a sad example to all those who hold positions of authority locally and manage the press and educational institutions.

No wonder some delegates at the congress objected to the presence of delegates from various professional unions. "What are all these artists, musicians, architects, directors and actors doing here, in our midst, together with the nation's leaders (!)?" they asked. "Who needs all these representatives of the superstructure?"

This is a telling and sad fact. Dear deputies (please try not to take offense), if we are not enlightened by art, how can we rule the state or the country? Based on the example of the previous 70 years?

I have seen a robust man being interviewed on television before the start of the congress. He stated that the only thing he wanted from the congress was to be able to buy anything at the food store.

This is all he wanted! But forget him. I can not believe that the Supreme Soviet of a great country will dare to limit so the area of concern and aspirations of its people. I do not believe that perestroika can be won by economics alone. It would fail as similar policies have failed in the past 70 years. The poverty of the spirit will once again come into play.

Socialist civilization is a new form of workers' interaction. It will help people attain true, not false, happiness. In it, all these economic and legal ideas which have been so tender and problematic will flower at last.

#### **Rybakov Denies Role in Excluding Pasternak From Writers' Union**

18001271a Moscow OGONEK in Russian No 21  
May 89 p 7

[Letter to editor by Anatoliy Rybakov under "OGONEK Mailbag" rubric]

[Text] In October 1988 the newspaper SOVETSKAYA KULTURA printed a letter from V. Soloukhin titled "It Is Time to Explain".

In his letter, Soloukhin claims that I was present at the meeting of the Writers' Union at which Pasternak was expelled and was one of those who were silent.

I immediately called Soloukhin and told him that I did not participate in the purge of Pasternak. Soloukhin assured me that he would publicly retract his statement "at the first available opportunity." Over six months have passed since then but Soloukhin has not yet found such an opportunity.

I would not have attached so much importance to this had it not been for the fact that quotes from that letter mentioning my name have begun to appear in print, in OGONEK in particular.

This compels me to make the following statement:

I was not present at the October 31, 1958, meeting: between October 2 and November 5 I was treated in Czechoslovakia, at Karlovy Vary. I learned about the Writers' Union meeting only upon my return to Moscow from Czechoslovakia. This, however, does not make any difference. I have never, actively or passively, taken part in expelling any writer from the USSR Writers' Union.

[Signed] Anatoliy Rybakov

#### **Writer, Poet Shalamov Rehabilitated**

18001271b Moscow OGONEK in Russian No 22  
May 89 pp 13-15

[Article by Yevgeniy Sidorov: "Of Varlam Shalamov and His Prose"]

[Text] Varlam Tikhonovich Shalamov's Kolyma writings are shocking.

Why? I have thought about it a great deal. Surely it is not his subject matter. We have read "One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich" and "GULAG Archipelago", as well as many other works: memoirs, letters, novels and poems about Stalin's camps written by former Ivan Ivanovichs, as intellectuals were nicknamed in those murderous lands. There is even folklore about the Strange Planet in the form of oral history and songs; there have been condemnation and stubborn silence by witnesses. Why is it then that Shalamov's short stories turn the reader's soul inside out and strengthen his conviction that men have the right to be free and rational beings?

The answer lies, in my opinion, in the author's lofty ideals and in the freedom of his viewpoint and style which stem from an epic perception of life. "This world is more real than Homer's heaven," wrote Shalamov. It is not an emotional testimony from hell, which is impossible to write anyway, for whenever some writers attempted to write such a thing, untruth always unexpectedly tripped them.

As a narrator, Shalamov is wrapped in epic equanimity. He knows everything and remembers it all; he has no illusions whatsoever and his impartial voice affects our feelings and perceptions all the more powerfully. How can the depth of suffering of the millions who lived through it be measured? There is no such measure, but we can and must tell about it in the same way people tell about life in general (or anti-life in this case), with its established daily routine, slave labor, struggle for bread rations, tragedies and betrayals, discussions about the meaning of life, camp morality and laws, national and class hatred, the world of career criminals and outsiders, disease, death and executions. The writer spent 20 years in Soviet prisons, camps and internal exile and in him that archipelago found its chronicler, artist and creator of an immense tragic fresco which bears no open hostility or impotent accusations, only the powerful truth of that horrible routine that inspired and carried out the infernal experiment.

"The camps are a completely and utterly negative experience. No one has ever learned anything useful or edifying there, neither the inmates nor their overseers, guards and unwilling witnesses such as engineers, geologists and doctors—neither the chiefs nor the subordinates.



"Every minute of camp life is a poisoned minute.

"There are many things there that man must not know, and if he has seen them it would be better for him if he died."

Shalamov survived to write those pages and to leave them to us. His truth about man in the camp is cruel. Compared to it, Dostoyevskiy with his "Notes from the Dead House" seems a bucolic writer. The 20th century produced a daily life in Auschwitz and on the Kolyma such as the great Russian writer's characters could not imagine of in their most apocalyptic dreams.

"The inmate comes to hate work—there can be no other way.

"He learns to fawn, to lie and to commit villainies large and small; he becomes selfish.

"When he comes out, he discovers that he not only has not matured in the camps but that his interests have narrowed and become impoverished and crude.

"Moral taboos have become irrelevant.

"It turns out that one can be a villain and go on living.

"It turns out that a man does not die after committing a villainy.

"He is too engrossed in his own sufferings, forgetting that other people have misfortunes, too. He forgets compassion for other people's misfortunes; he simply does not understand them, does not want to understand.

"He comes to hate people."

I quoted these thoughts since it is rather unusual for Shalamov to speak in his own voice assessing his experiences in the camps. It is a very important passage. Without it, it is impossible to understand Shalamov's works. The meaning of the camps, as of any other form of organized state crime, is that they cynically reverse all moral and social values. The camps for political prisoners has no other meaning, even though inmates themselves may want to delude themselves on this subject. It was not an accident that common criminals were systematically encouraged by the administration to restrain and lord over those who were convicted under Article 58. Good and evil are rather naive concepts when one deals with a well-organized criminal system.

Still, there were those who remained human. Otherwise there would have been no stories such as these: they speak the profound truth of the innocent human being reduced to an almost cattle-like state. He would regain a measure of true morality after he is released, but his losses could never be fully restored. No one has gained moral purity after being tested by the GULAG. Only healthy moral standards and social and spiritual freedom

make man human. The rest is from the Devil. This includes heroic stoicism, which is good as an abstract idea or a philosophical concept but is tactless to mention, to say the least, in the context of the millions of slaves and their camp life. Shalamov makes a special note that he writes about people (himself included) who "did not, could not and would not be heroes." This is why his camp those is truly folk in nature, even if in this case the term is horribly distorted and turned on its head.

Varlam Tikhonovich Shalamov was born in 1907 into the family of a Vologda priest. In his early youth he began to write poetry and prose. In 1929, while attending the Moscow State University, he was arrested for the first time, for disseminating V.I. Lenin's allegedly false political testament. It was the famous letter to the 12th party congress. The young writer spent approximately three years at the Vishera, in the camps of the Western Urals. In 1937, he was arrested again and sent to the Kolyma. He was fully rehabilitated soon after the CPSU's 20th congress.

Shalamov began to write his Kolyma stories in exile, having been released from the camps in the early 1950s. All attempts to publish them in this country failed. The stories were published abroad, in the West, but Shalamov never participated in their publication there and never gave his consent. His poems were published in Soviet journals and five collections came out during his lifetime, but readers still know Shalamov's poetry poorly, as much of it remains unpublished. He was an extraordinarily good poet; Boris Pasternak highly praised his poems when Shalamov sent him his manuscripts from exile. Several years later they met and became friends.

Shalamov admitted that his poetry saved him: "Alien to everyone around me, lost in a winter which cares not for those who carved small corners with their stoves and little huts in the boundless stone and woods; among the alien drunken people caring not for life or death, I tried—now timidly, now desperately—to shield myself with my poetry from the depressing and depraving force of this world, which I have been unable to get used to in these 17 years." (A letter to Pasternak.)

Shalamov found salvation in poetry and in free thought. His Kolyma works stand apart from countless other camp writings thanks to their high artistic level. The poet, the artist comes through here as well: the reader not only shudders with horror, anger or compassion but gets an enormous charge of aesthetic emotions which cleanse the soul—which often occurs when one encounters truly tragic art. The soul is awakened for goodness and meaning like the branch of the Kolyma larch which the writer described so vividly.

In his autobiographical novel "The Fourth Vologda" Shalamov wrote: "The line between poetry and prose, especially in my own soul, is very vague. Prose becomes

poetry and vice versa very often." A highly polished style both in prose and in poetry is characteristic of Shalamov's works. He is a major writer, one of the few true heirs to the classical Russian tradition of the 19th century, an artist who, having come face to face with the tragedies of the Soviet period, remained faithful to the Word, subordinating to it an utterly new, resistant subject matter.

But at the same time he rebelled against the literary lessons of humanism. "Russian humanist writers of the second half of the 19th century bear on their souls the cardinal sin of human blood spilled in the 20th century under their banners. All terrorists were Tolstoy followers and vegetarians and all fanatics were disciples of the Russian humanists. They could never be forgiven for this sin..." This is the root of Shalamov's intolerance for preaching, the pointing finger and the illusion that art ennobles and could teach man to be good and happy. This is why he seeks brevity, strives to eliminate everything superfluous and rebels against all canons of literary style.

In some of his stories Shalamov implacably sets the romantic intellectual search for the good and freedom against the world of career criminals. The protagonist of one novella is a direct descendent of revolutionary Land and Freedom Society members; he refuses to accept that the 19th century deceived him. He places his hopes on thieves, whom he sees as bravely standing up to the state. What a pitiful illusion, and how horrible his end!

The 19th century betrayed and deceived this person and hundreds of thousands of other Russian intellectuals, both party members and not, for whom democracy was inseparable from socialism, conscience from social duty and belief in their fathers' ideals from practical deeds. But the Russian intelligentsia also shares at least part of the blame for what happened to it and to the Russian people. The Kolyma was hell on earth built not by a single villain or a well-organized gang of state criminals but, actually, by the collective will and the iron logic of historical madness. Only now does our society begin to see it clearly; this sober knowledge is our best hope for rebirth and actualization of the immortal idea of true people's power, which is impossible without the gradual restoration and development of the great Russian culture which was so cruelly destroyed by the descendents of Shigayev and Pyotr Verkhovenskiy.

These are the thoughts that come to mind when one reads the Kolyma stories. Implanting these brave ideas is Varlam Shalamov's main victory and his legacy as a writer. These are the thoughts which go all the way, stopping not before the precipice and thus giving a liberating strength to us who live today and painfully ponder the meaning of our country's history.

These short stories must be read together, in sequence, as a single thick book. Separate stories appearing in a magazine could give only a general idea of Shalamov's art.

In the final years of his life Shalamov was ailing and alone; he was getting a state pension amounting to R72 per month. The short-lived thaw had not led to a summer, and the spring had taken a sharp turn backwards, to a frost. As though locked in that winter, the writer, who had by then lost hearing and sight, was slowly expiring at a nursing home where he died in 1982.

In 1964, A.I.Solzhenitsyn wrote to Shalamov: "And I firmly believe that we will see the day when 'Kolyma Notebooks' and 'Kolyma Stories' are also published. I do firmly believe it! Then they will know what Varlam Shalamov really is."

The prediction came true only by half. The author of "Kolyma Stories" did not live to see this day. This year, Shalamov's works will be finally published by two publishing houses, "Khudozhestvennaya Literatura" and "Sovremennik".

Personalities and artists of Varlam Shalamov's stature are born very rarely and exert a very strong influence on society's spiritual and literary climate. His posthumous life—his true life—in our literature is just beginning. Even though he had nothing but scorn for all forms of didactics, the moral lesson of his own literary career is great and unambiguous.

Copyright: Izdatelstvo TsK KPSS "Pravda", "Ogonek", 1989.

**Murmansk Celebrates Day of Slavonic Culture**  
*18001240a Moscow SELSKAYA ZHIZN in Russian*  
24 May 89 p 3

[Article by Vladimir Krupin: "A Holiday for All Time"]

[Excerpts] **Our whole country is observing Slavonic Orthography and Culture Day. The origin of this holiday has its source in the Bulgarian national celebration of 24 May—Day of the Slavonic Enlighteners Cyril and Methodius, who created the Slavonic alphabet in the latter half of the 9th century.**

A good deed, especially one done without profit of any kind, invariably is answered in other good deeds of some sort. In the last century, we saved Bulgaria from the Ottoman yoke, and it was far more terrible than the one we bore in Russia.

And, lo, after a time, Bulgaria made us the gift of this holiday. The deed of Cyril and Methodius has always meant a great deal to all Slavs, whether they were in Australia, Canada, South America, or anywhere else. But the Bulgarians, who have said that the word saved them, are the founders of the orthography holiday. And this is indisputable. Moreover, the orthography holiday, in application to our multinational country, is important to every nationality. A language perishes, and the direct

consequence of this—a culture perishes. But world culture is not something dependent upon nationality—it is a union of national cultures, and it lives only through this union.

Nowadays it is not surprising that Cyril and Methodius Days have been adopted in dozens of cities. But this once had to be started. And it was started in Murmansk in 1986. But why in Murmansk? There is a naturalness about this: The Russian North attracted pioneers from all over the country. Their ordeal by severe conditions, often entailing danger to their very lives, united the seacoast inhabitants and produced, in linguistic respects, a speech rich with a mixture of the linguistic traditions in many Russian dialects. The North's significance in the development of Russian literature, Russian orthography, and the Great Russian language remains very little studied. Murmansk mainly attracted people from northern RSFSR oblasts, and those from rural areas.

At the "Slavonic Orthography in the Russian North of the RSFSR [Rossiya]" scientific and practical conference, there were about 20 speeches, and not one among them was optional. Vladimir Sangi spoke about the worldwide significance of Slavonic orthography, and about his experience in creating an orthography for the Nivkhi [Gilyaks]: "The orthography does not simply enrich a language, it extends the horizons of thought and heightens morality." Gennadiy Yushkov, a Komi writer, gave a speech about Stefan Permskiy. The enlightenment of Finno-Ugric Group Northerners was not significant for their languages alone; here a remarkable naturalness of the languages' association has operated, and the languages are being mutually enriched. G. Yushkov showed, in specific examples, how the peoples of the North, excellent hunters, fishermen, and foresters, have enriched the Russian language with nouns and verbs of their everyday life and work while, in turn, including themselves among the Slavonic literatures' orthography sources.

I.S. Merkuryev, docent of the Leningrad Pedagogical Institute imeni Gertsen, and author of a dictionary of the Kola Peninsula seacoast inhabitants' language, spoke about this living language. It will not be possible to republish this dictionary, and the situation is alarming just now: The old people—the living language's repositories—are dying off, and the young people's language, under invasion by television, radio, and the movies, is becoming impoverished.

It might be all right if just the language were becoming impoverished, but its impoverishment signifies a degradation of human relations, a flattening of emotions, and a decline in morality. What is more, impoverishment of the word supply in our communication lowers the thought level, hence there is a retardation of progress. The larger a person's vocabulary, the greater his or her conceptual abilities.

[Passages omitted]

And little did we think, assembled in Murmansk 3 years ago during rain and snow, little did we think that many people soon would meet in a huge, glittering hall, and the Fund for Slavonic Orthography and Culture would be formed. At that time, we sat in one of the oblast scientific library's rooms, without any sort of auditorium, and spoke to each other about the need for such a holiday. The magnetic tape with the transcript later disappeared, and there might have been a feeling that our words had perished, but no, the word does not die. There is a sacred mystery in the word, and this holiday, which now we shall no longer stop: it is stimulating and attractive in its own right, and it is spreading throughout the country and the whole world.

There is, in this holiday, the sought-after essence of the national culture—the uniting of times, the lofty spirituality of an awareness of history and what is current. A person who has thoroughly understood the national culture is free of nationalism. We still must remember that nationalism nothing other than a reaction to cosmopolitanism. In turning to the national culture, we free ourselves of both the one and the other. The revival of regional lore, dress, cuisine, ethnography, and folk crafts, the arousal of interest in Russian heroic folk songs, legends, and chronicles, and, in general, remembering where we came from, who we are, and why we are in this world, produce an extraordinarily beneficial and remarkable effect.

"You read this 'Word.'" said N. Zabolotskiy, "and you think, 'My God, what good fortune to be a Russian!'" He made this exclamation at one of the most difficult moments of his life, and now we know his life. Gogol writes in a letter: "Thank God, first of all, for your being a Russian." And this, too, in difficult times. Why is this so? These words stem from direct involvement in the nation's spirituality, and from the fact that the spirituality's self-sacrificing nature and religious content (according to Dostoyevskiy) set the Russian person apart, and impose upon him or her a special responsibility for entry into this world. Our self-sacrificing nature—this is not a suicidal feeling—this self-sacrificing nature is an extension of the spirituality that was given to us primevally. The celebration of the 1,000th anniversary of Russia's [Rus'] Christianization showed this. But here we see—sad tendencies also occur among us, dissension for example, our favorite pastime. Take the nature protection movement: One socioecological society is formed, then another, and a third, and what do they start to do? They start talking about each other's incompetence, and, during this time, nature is being destroyed at an accelerated rate. This must not happen in our Slavonic culture movement. We must not fall prey to either the Scylla of bureaucratization or the Charybdis of disunion.

[Passages omitted] And, of course, we have temptations and doubts from the right, the left, and in between. Sometimes we even start to drift without a reference

point, and here I should like to call to mind our ancestors' time-honored practice. In order not to get off a trail, they lighted a bonfire and went on, checking their path's correctness by the bonfire's flaming light. The culture of the past is this bonfire for us.

The title, people's conscience, that Russian and Slavonic writers once earned—this title is rapidly slipping off somewhere, through our own fault, and sinking in petty squabbles and controversies. You visit Siberia, the Urals, or Novgorod, (Vyatskiye), or city of Arkhangelsk rural areas, and there people ask: What do you do? And it becomes embarrassing that you eat the people's bread.... Life convinces us, again and again, that full understanding of the national culture rules out nationalism.

I shall conclude on a happy note: The deed of Cyril and Methodius was not in vain; united with us are Slavs around the globe, who, to our discredit, have preserved themselves better than we. For example, there have been published reports about Bolivian, Canadian, and Australian Slavs, and uniting with them—this is also an attempt to preserve morals and morality through those people, who have preserved these better. The horror of the years we have lived through may exonerate us, and yet, decent people blame, not circumstances, but themselves.

The Slavonic orthography and culture cause—an immense undertaking—is lively, joyful, and self-sacrificing, and one's entire life may be spent in it without regret.

And, finally, I can hardly wait to tell you about a mystical occurrence: When the Slavonic Orthography and Culture Fund's constituent assembly session convened, a white dove, illuminated by the glow of the chandeliers and searchlights, was flying tirelessly above the meeting hall.

It is essential that the holiday's happily chosen symbol—the alphabet letters "abc" [abv], positioned within a circle—become the universal symbol of Orthography Day and days of the word's uniting people. Is it really not alarming to us that the Russian heroic songs have stopped being recited, that the legends, folk tales, and fairy tales are being forgotten, and that folk songs are not being sung—these are sad symptoms of a breakdown in communication between generations, and we, the word's servants, must serve the word in such a way that it will be eternal, and that Slavonic Orthography and Culture Day will become a holiday of the peoples inhabiting our country for all time.

### **Play 'Golgotha' a Reworking of Aytmatov's 'Executioner's Block'**

*18001240b Moscow SOVETSKAYA KULTURA in Russian 15 Jun 89 p 5*

[Article by Elona Bundzayte: "Two Against All"]

[Text] Because of the theaters' simultaneous rush for the modern and abstract from sources of the prose that has literally flooded the pages of magazines, there is not

always a strong inclination to maintain faithfulness to the spirit of great literature, let alone its letter; and often there is, in what is done, a trifling desire to lure spectators at all costs. In this regard, the selection of Chingiz Aytmatov's novel "Executioner's Block" by Director Yonas Vaytkus, for a play in the Kaunas Dramatic Theater, can appear "opportunistic" only to the uninitiate. Vaytkus is too proud to attract attention to himself by using a literary celebrity, and he has too little time to waste his efforts on trivia. This does not at all mean that he is insured against failure. Vaytkus has staged all sorts of plays, successful and unsuccessful, but they have almost all become theatrical life events.

For over 10 years, Vaytkus has never ceased to amaze his spectators by the extremes of his directorial individuality displays: from Maksim Gorky's psychologically convincing "The Last Plays," staged as "The Death Throes of the House of Kolomiyshev," to the bloody play "Emperor Caligula," based on the Albert Camus play of the same name and replete with directorial "finds"; from the choreographic sketch of the mise-en-scènes and heroes' ballet movements in A. (Zharri's) "King (Ubyu)," to the ritualistic play in Shakespeare's "Richard II...."

In this inconstancy of genre predilection, Vaytkus is true to something most important—his habit of restoring the integrity lost in the material's interpretation.

"Golgotha"—so the director has renamed Aytmatov's "Executioner's Block"—has gradually taken up the full casting potential of Vaytkus' theater.

The task of consistently presenting the novel's plot, foredoomed from the beginning, was rejected at the Kaunas theater. In his "conspectus," dramatizer Vaytkus has departed from the source's text to such an extent as to confer upon himself the right to be called the play's author. However, in leaving out chapters and certain lines, and in changing the episodes' connection logic, the director has retained the most important thing—the "multilayered nature" of the author's narrative. True, there is notable divergence from the novel here.

Aytmatov sees existence as hopeless in "Executioner's Block," so he equates a tragic wolf pack story with an argument of Christ and Pontius Pilate about the future. Avdiy Kallistratov, a religious seminary dropout, ties these independent Aytmatov lines together.

In the Vaytkus play, connection of the novel's various times and spatial layers becomes, in the final analysis, the basic structural and conceptual element.

There is an almost empty stage. The earth, cracked from the heat, seems to breathe expanse. Only a plank near the forestage—a dead end, a path leading nowhere—crosses over a railroad track laid along the wings (artist Yonas Archikauskas).

"Golgotha" evokes association with some geologic coring hole, drilled deep into the soil of mankind's millennial religious experience. Rajas and a medieval knight attend Pontius Pilate (Viktoras Shinkaryukas). The Procurator of Judaea himself, dressed in a flaring chiton, resembles...a temple cupola, a true plenipotentiary of God on earth, or, more specifically, God Himself. He can, indeed, select his attendants from any age. Next to such a Pilate, Avdiy Kallistratov (Povilas Budris) looks like a helpless boy. Controversy between them is impossible. The struggle's outcome has long since been decided to the disadvantage of Christ's advocate.

The candle of Pontius' "lost" miter warms seven Georgians at their death. The legend of state security agent [chekist] Sandro, who shot and killed his coworkers in the line of duty, and killed himself by order of his heart, is performed by marionettes. The allegory is perceived as a "layer" of historical experience.

And another detail—the Pilates' golden handrail goes down into the forestage pit, as if into hell. Here Avdiy suffers his first defeat, having clashed with the Antichrist Grishan (Valentinas Masalskis), who deals in drug addicts' souls. Later, in the same place, Stalinist Ober Kandalov (Algis Matulenis) rages and scoffs at Avdiy. Kochkorbayev (Viktoras Valashinas) "passes judgment" on the shepherd Boston (Yuožas Budraitis) in this pit.

The theater shifts the fervor of certain excessively vulgarized language styles, appearing in "Executioner's Block," into the range of the grotesque. It is comical and outrageous when, facing a meeting, a party organizer cleans the tablecloth, actually sharpens a scythe, and leaves importantly with the pompous stride of a local bigwig, his cloak on his shoulders. However, Pilate's most loathsome descendant is Bazarbay—a minor demon with the Procurator's necklace on his neck (Viktoras Shinkaryukas plays both roles superbly).

Pontius Pilate's spirit, multiplied by all of these Grishans, Kochkorbayevs, Ober Kandalovs, and Bazarbays, creates a powerful negative charge. And, at the opposite pole—just the two: Avdiy and Boston. Theirs—the notions of goodness and charity, and the world of everyday labor.

Out of this theatrical collage of images, ideas, and motives, out of this Tower of Babel of directorial expressiveness (from documentary motion-picture scenes of the slaughter of saiga antelopes to liturgical theater), Vaytkus creates his countermyth, his apocalyptic picture of the 20th century's end. Enormous, winged, giant creatures preserve eternal order, and torment the human race whenever a person disturbs their lair. The wailing of the angels—the mythical wolves—seemingly heralds Judgment Day. Avdiy, crucified up above, at the railroad track, does not pray for salvation for himself. Indeed, the human race has gone astray. Woe to the society in which the best of the best perish. The punishment—it will come soon—and the punishment is inevitable.

The Kaunas Dramatic Theater's play is presented for the sake of this final revelation.

**Lithuanian Writers' Union Adopts New Statutes**  
*18001260a Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA in Russian 14 Jun 89 p 5*

[Article by LITERATURNAYA GAZETA correspondent: "Congress of Lithuanian Writers"]

[Text] Vilnius—The resolution adopted by the 9th Extraordinary Congress of the republic's writers states that the Lithuania Writers' Union is a voluntary, independent professional organization functioning in accordance with its statutes. The Lithuania Writers' Union will maintain professional, publishing, cultural and economic ties with the USSR Writers' Union and with writers' and other professional organizations of other union republics and foreign countries.

The resolution is based on the new statutes of the Lithuania Writers' Union approved by the congress.

The statutes state that the Lithuania Writers' Union is an association of prose writers, poets, playwrights, translators, literary critics and scholars writing in Lithuanian, as well as writers residing in Lithuania and writing in languages other than Lithuanian. The new statutes will come into effect once they are approved by the Lithuanian SSR Council of Ministers.

**Film on Komsomol Denied to Republic Viewer**  
*18001260b Frunze SOVETSKAYA KIRGIZIYA in Russian 6 Jun 89 p 3*

[Article by Yu.Zylyuk: "A Directive on 'Incident': Notes on an Issue"]

[Text] "This is complete, bitter truth: it shows where we have ended up after starting in 1919 with Korchagin and with people who held keys to happiness—and how we did it." (A.German, Director)

"The Komsomol Central Committee lent support to this film, which ranged from taking part in its creation as a consultant to providing financial assistance." (M.Sh-moylov, chairman of the VLKSM Central Committee's Department of Culture and Sports)(Quoted from SOVETSKIY EKRAN, No.8, 1989)

Strictly speaking, this issue could have been raised much earlier by the newspaper itself. Unlike the poorly informed moviegoers, reporters knew that the film "Local-Level Incident" had been delivered to the Kirgizkino distribution association in late April. But who could have envisioned that a film made in our time at our Soviet film studios, with copies made for mass distribution, would be shelved for such a long time by the republic's distribution network?

As it often happens nowadays, the spotlight was cast on the problem by the popular voice. Readers began to call the newspaper wondering why the film "Local-Level Incident" was not being shown at the republic's theaters.

Why indeed? The film was advertised, in Frunze among other places. Perhaps the snag was in the distribution schedule? After all, any local distribution entity, depending on its needs, can hold up the release of a domestic film for three months and of a foreign film for up to a year.

"'Local-Level Incident' is a money-making film and we would have released it to the theaters right away," said Ye.P.Kobzeva, deputy director of the republic's film distribution agency. "If only because the republic's cinema network has failed to fulfill the plan for the past two months. Yet,..."

I put the same question to Sh.U.Usubaliyev, director general of the "Kirgizkino" cinematography association. He also professed readiness to show the famous film. Moreover, Shershenaly Usubaliyevich said that the republic's leadership had viewed the film at a House of Cinema showing and had no objections to its mass release. On the other hand, the director general admitted that his organization and the Kirghiz SSR Komsomol Central Committee—and its first secretary T.Tabyldiyev in particular—decided to gather komsomol officials, journalists and representatives of the public to view and discuss the film at a large auditorium, such as at the House of Political Education.

"Indeed, we wanted to organize such a viewing," admitted Tabyldiyev. "But this does not mean that the film should not be shown at the theaters in the meantime. Plus, the Central Committee of the republic's komsomol has no right to ban the release of a film approved by the USSR State Committee on Cinematography."

Indeed, a film sanctioned by the State Committee on Cinematography's commission and given the so-called clearance pass should be able reach mass audiences without difficulty. Kirgizkino has such a pass for "Local-Level Incident". What is not banned is allowed—is it not so? This would seem correct, but in reality we have a paradox: no one has banned anything, but a film delivered to the republic's cinema agency on April 25 has yet to reach the general viewer. It is strange, is it not?

I will venture my own assessment of the film. In my opinion, it has its excesses, especially as far as erotic scenes are concerned. But most important, it truthfully shows the true face of the so-called komsomol leaders of the late 1970s and early 1980s and the double standard they employed. They were leaders in name only, and unfortunately there were many of them at the time. They are certainly easy to recognize in the film. To prevent people from seeing them as they really were—especially now, as they are being replaced with komsomol leaders

of a new type—is like keeping people from attending a class taught by life itself. As with any ban slapped on today's young people, this can only be counterproductive.

The protagonist of "Local-Level Incident", a komsomol raykom first secretary, is fond of repeating, as he automatically makes decisions, a phrase that was like a motto of those who were at the helm during the period of stagnation: "An opinion exists..." Whose opinion it was, where it came from and why it had to be accepted as gospel truth was immaterial. The opinion existed and had to be obeyed. The situation under discussion is in some ways similar: an unnamed opinion of unknown origin stands in the way of something that should be open to the mass viewer's judgement. The film was made for the viewer.

I do not doubt that ultimately everyone who wants to see the film will be able to do so. Yet, there is a danger that it would fall into the hands of some cooperative, as it has already happened to "Organized Crime", and seeing the film would acquire a certain aura of exclusivity while also becoming much more costly. Is it worth inflaming passions and taxing the viewer's thin wallet on the account of a work that is, frankly, very ordinary by the standard of our times?

#### **YUNOST, OGONEK Criticized for Printing Voynovich's 'Chonkin'**

*18001260c Kiev PRAVDA UKRAINY in Russian  
5 May 89 p 3*

[Open letter by members of Odessa Military District's Gold Star Club to YUNOST editor A. Dementyev and OGONEK editor V. Korotich: "Sacrilege"; reprinted from VETERAN No.18, 1989]

[Text] Former Soviet writer V. Voynovich, who currently lives in the FRG, has written a defamatory and sacrilegious work titled "Life and Extraordinary Adventures of Private Ivan Chonkin"; YUNOST and OGONEK printed it, with the kind permission of the West German Ardis Publishing House.

What was it in this work that attracted our editors?

What does Mr. Voynovich laugh at? What is the subject of his ridicule?

First of all, it is the first day of the Great Patriotic War. It is the officer corps, political officers and soldiers of the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army, as well as men and women on collective farms.

We are war veterans, Heroes of the Soviet Union and full bearers of the Order of Glory, belonging to the Gold Star Club at the Odessa Military District's Officers' Club; we began our careers in the Red Army before the war. We are deeply outraged by the publication of this work.

In our memory, and in the memory of the entire Soviet people, the first day of the Great Patriotic War will always remain the most tragic day of our 70-year history. On that day our cities were bombed; on that day our front-line units engaged the enemy; on that day the first thousands of our soldiers fell under fascist fire. We, the witnesses of those times, remember the tears of the mothers, the wives, the sisters, the brides and the children sending off to war their sons, husbands, brothers, fathers and fiancées. We can still see the long lines of volunteers stretching in front of military commissariats.

It is this day of national mourning that Voynovich chose to mock.

Could any of us, soldiers on the front lines, imagine during the war that this tragedy would become the butt of a series of jokes? Truly, cynicism and ridicule know no bounds.

Could it be that our editors failed to understand this? Could they fail to see what they, along with the author, were mocking?

They are mocking the dead and those who engaged the fascists in the first days of the war, of whom only three percent were still alive in May 1945. Those were the officers and political commissars who would lead the charge and would be the first to die; they took their last stand at the walls of Moscow, Leningrad, Stalingrad, Odessa and Sevastopol. They stopped the brown flood of fascist plague. They freed the peoples of Europe.

Can we allow the fallen heroes to be ridiculed? The Motherland's defenders to be ridiculed? To be made the subject of angry satire?

Comrades Dementyev and Korotich, do you not understand that this is a sacrilege?

According to a Turkmen proverb, if a friend cries a foe laughs.

And what about Voynovich's portrayal of country women and other residents of the village of Krasnoye? He endowed them with primitive minds and actions, bestial feelings, profanity and mental retardation. All is imbued with hatred for everything Soviet and Russian. The taunting and the contempt on the part of a supercilious gentleman for the darker masses show the author's lack of common decency.

But what about you, comrade editors?

Where is your civic conscience? Your pride?

You have given your editorial blessing to the insult to the memory of the people and the heroes.

We, the survivors, protest in the name of those who fell the profanation of the most sacred memory of the people.

*In the name of the members of the Gold Star Club, which includes 72 Heroes of the Soviet Union and 16 full bearers of the Order of Glory, this letter was signed by club chairman Colonel (Retired) V.Zavertyayev, Hero of the Soviet Union; Lieutenant General (Retired), Air Force, V.Aleksenko, twice Hero of the Soviet Union; Major General (Retired), Air Force, P.Gnido, Hero of the Soviet Union; Major General (Retired), Air Force, G.Shadrin, Hero of the Soviet Union; L.Buzhak, full bearer of the Order of Glory; and club secretary Lieutenant Colonel (Retired) G.Kargopol'tsev)*

### Public Polled on Results of People's Deputies Congress

18300724 Moscow ARGUMENTY I FAKTY in Russian  
No 26, 1-7 Jul 89 p 1

[Article by T. Zaslavskaya, director of the All-Union Center for Public Opinion Study, and department head Ya. Kapelyush: "Public Opinion on the Results of the Congress"]

[Text] A public opinion poll was conducted 11-14 June in 47 settled points, using 2,100 randomly selected city and village dwellers who represent, in the eyes of sociologists, the country's adult population. There were 18 republic, kray, and oblast centers in the sample (Vilnius, Gorkiy, Dnepropetrovsk, Dushanbe, Yerevan, Kiev, Krasnoyarsk, Leningrad, Lvov, Magadan, Minsk, Moscow, Novosibirsk, Riga, Saratov, Tallinn, Tbilisi, and Frunze), 13 provincial cities (Abakan, Volzhskiy, Gorodets of Gorkiy Oblast, Gorodok of Gorkiy Oblast, Gorodok of Lvov Oblast, Klin, Kudymkar, Navoi, Nevinomyssk, Nezhin, Novomoskovsk of Dnepropetrovsk Oblast, Novopolotsk, Nurek, and Khromtau), 16 villages (of the Armenian, Georgian, Latvian, Lithuanian, Moldavian, and Estonian SSRs [Soviet Socialist Republics], Stavropolskiy Kray, Alma-Ata, Bukhara, Gorkiy, Dnepropetrovsk, Kiev, Leningrad, Magadan, Moscow, and Perm Oblasts).

Sociologists ascertained that 93 percent of those polled were familiar with the materials of the congress to one degree or another.

**The Election of the USSR Supreme Soviet.** This was evaluated from two sides. In the procedures of the elections—nomination, discussion of candidates, and voting—60 percent of those polled were satisfied; 26 percent were dissatisfied; 14 percent had difficulty giving a straightforward response.

The composition of the Supreme Soviet was evaluated positively by 53 percent and negatively by 22 percent; 25 percent of those polled had difficulty giving a straightforward response. (Evaluating 500 parliamentarians, among whom are many unfamiliar figures, is not an easy thing for the average citizen to do.)

Forming a opinion on the election procedures proved simpler; the live television broadcast of the congress sessions was conducive to this.

The evaluations of the election procedure and the composition of the Supreme Soviet are closely interrelated: As a rule, those who evaluated the procedure positively were satisfied with the composition, and vice versa. The election of the USSR Supreme Soviet was evaluated positively on the whole by 58 percent and negatively by 24 percent, with 18 percent of those polled experiencing difficulty in its evaluation.

As we see, positive evaluations outnumber negative ones by a factor of 2.5. But this is an average. Behind these average figures, which not infrequently represent the general picture incompletely and imprecisely, many distinctions can be detected. Thus, with movement from the village "outback" toward the capital cities, the share of positive evaluations decreases, and that of negative evaluations increases. **While in a village locality, 63 percent of those polled approve of the election of the USSR Supreme Soviet and 18 percent disapprove, in the republic, kray, and oblast centers, the evaluations are drawn noticeably closer: 45 percent and 37 percent.**

The election of the chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet. Fifty-two percent of those polled unconditionally support the election of M.S. Gorbachev; 31 percent support it with reservations; 10 percent do not support his election; and 7 percent of those polled had difficulty answering.

Poll participants who do not support the election of M.S. Gorbachev to any degree were requested to name another person who, from their point of view, could be chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet. The figure most frequently mentioned as an alternative was B.N. Yeltsin, mentioned by 46 percent of those who do not support M.S. Gorbachev; then N.I. Ryzhkov, 19 percent; and A.M. Obolenskiy, 4 percent.

Twenty other popular deputies were named in 6 percent of the questionnaires: L.I. Abalkin, Ch.T. Aytmatov, Yu.N. Afanasyev, A.M.K. Brazauskas, R.A. Bykov, Yu.P. Vlasov, A.V. Gorbunov, Ye. A. Yevtushenko, A.M. Yemelyanov, A.I. Kazannik, G.V. Kolbin, Ye.K. Ligachev, B.I. Oleynik, G.Kh. Popov, Ye.M. Primakov, A.D. Sakharov, A.A. Sobchak, S.N. Fedorov, A.A. Shchelnakov, A.N. Yakovlev. Three-fourths of those opposed to the election of M.S. Gorbachev cited a fairly long list of names, which, independent of its qualitative evaluation, speaks for itself of the opportunity of free elections in principle.

**How are the decisions of the congress evaluated?** The question was formulated thus: "Would you agree that the decisions of the Congress of USSR People's Deputies have created a firm basis for genuine and rapid changes for the betterment of life of our country's people?" Forty-seven percent of those polled agreed with this opinion; 29 percent disagreed, and 24 percent had difficulty answering. Despite the fact that positive evaluations of the decisions of the congress outnumbered negative ones, their share did not reach one-half. Again, this is on the average. Among individual groups, the correlation of evaluations is different, sometimes the sign is even reversed. An almost four-fold numerical superiority of positive responses over negative responses is characteristic among pensioners (63 percent versus 17 percent); among workers it is two-fold (51 percent versus 25



percent); but among managers of enterprises, institutes, and their subdivisions, there were fewer positive responses than negative ones (36 percent versus 41 percent).

The higher the level of education, the more criticism there is: The decisions of the congress were judged negatively by 18 percent of those polled who did not complete secondary education, 21-26 percent with secondary education, 35 percent who did not complete higher education, and 42 percent with higher education. The following is an interesting observation. Among the supporters of M.S. Gorbachev who unconditionally support his election as chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet, 63 percent evaluate the decisions of the congress positively, and only 15 percent negatively; among those who do not support the election of M.S. Gorbachev, the correlation of evaluations is almost reversed: 25 percent and 55 percent.

The decisions of the congress are evaluated lower than the election of the USSR Supreme Soviet and its chairman.

The population's attitude toward the preparations for the congress became clear during the investigation: "How did you evaluate the organization of the work of the first Congress of USSR People's Deputies—the timeliness of the preparation of the necessary materials and documents, the technical equipment of the hall, etc.?" The responses were distributed as follows: "positively"—17 percent; "mostly positively"—33 percent; "mostly negatively"—19 percent; "negatively"—21 percent; "difficult to answer"—10 percent. People in republic, kray, and oblast centers, where more than one-third of the population lives, were the most critical: Their negative evaluations (58 percent) exceeded positive ones (35 percent) by a factor of 1.5.

#### **What influence did the apparatus have on the congress?**

A total of 63 percent of the respondents feel that the party and government apparatus had great influence over the congress; 21 percent, little influence; 16 percent of those polled had difficulty responding. It is noteworthy that the respondents who feel that the influence of the apparatus was very great more frequently evaluated the decisions of the congress to be negative (46 percent) than positive (36 percent). These data allow the opportunity to draw the conclusion that public opinion not infrequently links the many shortcomings in the work of the congress with the activity of the apparatus.

At the congress, a hole was punched in the years-old facade of unity. Some deputies voted "for" and others "against." Those left in the minority attempted if not to convince others of their correctness, to at least explain their position. Sometimes they managed to do so, sometimes they did not. What do people think about this? "In what cases could the decisions be the optimal ones?" "When they coincide with the position of the majority of

deputies," 54 percent of those polled responded to the sociologists' question; 32 percent feel that it is "when the decisions made take into consideration the minority of the deputies," and 14 percent had difficulty responding. As we see, there is no unanimity here, either. The situation at the congress reflects the mass consciousness of society in general. Symptomatic of elevated education is increased tolerance of and attention to the position of the minority: 21 percent of those polled who had less than a secondary education feel that the opinions of deputies in the minority should be taken into consideration. This point of view is held by 26 percent of the respondents with secondary education, 39 percent of those with incomplete higher education, and 49 percent of those with higher education.

Public opinion on the results of the Congress of USSR People's Deputies cannot be called purely positive. Even though the positive utterances and evaluations, as a rule, predominate over the negative ones, there are more than a few of the latter as well. It seems that this circumstance, which reflects the corresponding social differentiation, must be taken into consideration by the parliamentarians. The more frequently they glance in the mirror of public opinion, the more successful their activity will be.

#### **Emigration Issue Hotly Debated**

**Refusniks Criticize OVIR; Paper Responds**  
*18001185 Moscow SOVETSKAYA KULTURA in*  
*Russian 13 May 89 p 6*

[Open letter signed by group of refusniks; editorial response: "Passions Surrounding OVIR"]

[Text]

#### **Letter to Editors**

Dear Editors:

Recently, many important and pressing issues have been raised by the Soviet press. But the activities of the OVIR have been covered rather poorly and certainly without attaching proper importance to the issue. Rare interviews granted by OVIR officials to VECHERNYAYA MOSKVA, MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA and IZVESTIYA correspondents describe its activities without any mention of substantial shortcomings. To be sure, in his latest interview to IZVESTIYA, the head of the All-Union OVIR R.A.Kuznetsov made a number of critical remarks about that organization, but he quickly noted that various OVIR branches "are doing a great deal to improve service to the population." We cannot agree with this statement. In our opinion, the OVIR is still mired in its pre-perestroika condition. The main traits of the agency known as the OVIR are bureaucratic style, decisions made behind closed doors, fear of openness and bureaucratic command methods.

On October 27, 1988, a number of Moscovites met in the auditorium provided by the Kalininskiy rayon ispolkom. The goal of the meeting was to improve the OVIR's work. Deputy directors of the Moscow OVIR branch, comrades I.A.Karakulko and A.M.Zinchenko attended the meeting. The meeting discussed the main complaints about the OVIR's work as well as the legal status of various OVIR branches. The following questions were put to the OVIR representatives:

1. Based on what USSR law, the decisive role in issuing exit visas either for temporary sojourn or permanent residence abroad belongs to the ministries and agencies at whose enterprises the applicants were at one time employed?
2. What is the mysterious PVS [USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium] commission which makes the final decision in cases when the application is turned down by the OVIR? What is the commission's legal status and what administrative act defined that status? Who is its chairman or its members?
3. Why are Soviet citizens departing for permanent residence in Israel stripped of Soviet citizenship without ever requesting it, and why is the decision to strip them of their citizenship not published anywhere, despite the fact that the law requires it to be published in the USSR Supreme Soviet Record?
4. Why is the revocation of Soviet citizenship accompanied by an illegal R500 fee for each departing individual?

Comrades Karakulko and Zinchenko did not provide answers to any of these questions. As a result, the meeting elected a Public Council to Assist the OVIR's Work whose aim is to help improve the work of the OVIR and to monitor its activities. Zinchenko was invited to join the council but declined. Moreover, S.I.Alpatov, at a meeting on November 11, 1988, declared that he did not recognize the council and refused to work with it. *(Lack of space precludes printing the lengthy account of all the details surrounding the argument about picketing the OVIR waiting room. Editors' Note.)*

We feel that the reluctance on the part of OVIR officials to face the public, the fear of glasnost and the desire to hide its unacceptable practices, which include violations of civil rights and dignity of citizens, show that the agency's activities should become the object of attention of the entire Soviet public.

*[Signed] D.Mikhalev, L.Gonorovskiy, L.Stonov, S.Dikiy, K.Gorovaya and S.Stishchev.*

#### Editorial Reply.

The public is, of course, a powerful force. But whenever a new public entity comes into being, before joyously exclaiming "Look who has come!" we must carefully analyze **who** has come and **why**.

And one more thing. It is time to define what exactly is meant by the public: if a group has 2 or 3 members is it enough to qualify it as the public? And what about 10 or 12 members? Where is the line between a group of individuals and the public?

The letter that we printed almost in its entirety, leaving out only some minor details, displays quite a few pretensions. It would suffice to mention only the statement on the Soviet press, which the authors most likely do not read. For if they did, how could they have missed a series of extremely topical articles in this newspaper titled "Under Ten Seals" or numerous pieces in LITERATURNAYA GAZETA, MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI, IZVESTIYA, KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA and other newspapers. In a large measure, those articles were the impetus for the restructuring at the OVIR which began last year and continues to this day. Much remains to be done, of course, but early results have already been achieved. This shows that state entities, carrying out the party's directives, have begun to clear up the backlog accumulated in the past and to take practical steps to carry out our international obligations. This has been recognized even by our political opponents abroad.

But those questions—the carbon copies of which were sent around, not just to our editorial office—should not have been put to the OVIR. It like going to a fruit stand and asking for a vacuum cleaner. "What? You don't have it? I want to register a complaint." This seems to be the kind of public council we have here. Apparently, this is just another one of those phenomena that are being thrown up by the positive wave of the democratization process. We must react calmly to such phenomena. Moreover, we must get used to the fact that freedom of opinion raises all sorts of things to the surface.

It is, of course, up to the administration of the Moscow OVIR branch to decide whether or not to provide space for such noisy activities. The so-called council is not registered anywhere and consists of persons whose aim is to leave the country as soon as possible, even though they know full well that they have been exposed to state secrets. Yet, they carry on under the loud slogan of helping the people.

Quite unfortunately, our very laws defining the norms for such groups' activities are being developed and are therefore in a flux—the fact, incidentally, which the supporters of this so-called movement exploit rather skillfully.

We will try to respond to those questions, posed though they were long before the letter by life itself; they are being worked on—without any help from this council, naturally. But first, let us hear from the head of the Moscow OVIR branch Sergey Ivanovich Alpatov, at whom the authors' arrows are directed—or rather misdirected:

"Since the time the so-called public council was formed—it consists of the six individuals who signed the letter which was, incidentally, sent to an entire mailing list which included us as well—only Stonov and Mikhailov have not yet received permission to emigrate. There is nothing surprising about this: they are bearers of state secrets and the decision is legitimate. Once the term of their clearance expires they will be free to leave. What is interesting is that the moment such people get their exit visas they quickly grab their bags, which they have packed in advance, and leave the ranks of ardent protesters.

"For reasons that do not depend on us, decisions regarding exposure to classified information are currently made by ministries and agencies. These are the regulations. But since Stonov and Mikhailov have not gotten their permissions, they are the inspiration for this small, constantly changing faction."

This is what is behind this letter and the stink raised around it.

#### **Jurist Concedes Need for Emigration Law**

18001185 Moscow SOVETSKAYA KULTURA in  
Russian 13 May 89 p 6

[Commentary by A. Gorkovlyuk: "Passions Surrounding OVIR"]

[Text] At our request, the circumstances surrounding the actions of the above-mentioned group of individuals are discussed by A. Gorkovlyuk, candidate of legal sciences.

The actions of such people display a familiar pattern: real defects, or rather gaps, in our legal code are quickly exploited by often unscrupulous "defenders of the truth" acting under the most florid of slogans but in reality seeking only their own self-interest.

To understand the methods used by this group to pressure the authorities and the media, we must examine very closely the issues raised by the so-called manifesto which was apparently copied and mailed to various organizations, including the editors of the newspaper SOVETSKAYA KULTURA.

**Question number one:** Based on what USSR law, the decisive role in issuing exit visas either for temporary sojourn or permanent residence abroad belongs to the ministries and agencies at whose enterprises the applicants were at one time employed?

Individuals with a pronounced speculative turn of mind often raise artificial problems by mentioning part of the issue legitimately. This is not a new trick. But the problem is that those issues have been raised before them. The questions are being seriously considered by specialists, whereas attempts to take part in the restructuring of the legal code create in the minds of the poorly informed the impression that these individuals actively influence something that is already being done rather well without them.

It is true, a problem that has not yet been addressed from the legal standpoint is lack of a single union-wide set of regulations defining the relationship between the state and the citizen, or citizens, who possess state secrets—or bearers of secrets as they are sometimes called—if they want to travel abroad or emigrate. Incidentally, SOVETSKAYA KULTURA has raised this issue on a number of occasions, including the article "Closed Persons" published last February.

The directive to resolve this problem had been issued long before the group was formed. Imminently, most issues related to the various aspects of the problem of leaving the country will be addressed in the new regulatory act. Experts have finished drafting the law, which contains no mysterious or secret articles. On the contrary, the draft calls for the broad dissemination of departmental rules to citizens.

"What, another set of departmental rules?" today's experienced public may well cry out. Yes, experts are divided on the issue whether there should be departmental rules in addition to the regulatory act or not. It seems that it would be better without them. Supporters of the traditional approach, however, believe that given a rational measure of control on the part of government entities, this does not make a great deal of difference. It is important that criteria for applying the standards were not only disseminated but open to criticism as well. I would add my own opinion that the criticism should be taken into account even while the rules are being drafted. Or better yet, we need a well-defined system of drafting laws which would preclude the possibility of arbitrary interpretation and application of the spirit and the letter of the law by government entities. To do differently would be a violation of the principle of the law's supremacy.

We admit that lack of unified union-wide regulations on the so-called secrecy issue is a defect which will certainly be eliminated by the time political reform is completed.

**Question number two:** What is the mysterious PVS (which is what the missive's authors call the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium. Editors' Note) commission which makes the final decision in cases when the application is turned down by the OVIR? What is the commission's legal status and what administrative act defined that status? Who is its chairman or its members?

Once again, there is no mystery either in the title or the substance of the commission's work. It is the supreme state body which arbitrates disputes between citizens wishing to go abroad and the agency. As far as I know, American Congressmen, parliamentary representatives from other countries and members of human rights organizations who have been visiting our country often lately to study professionally perestroika processes consider this entity quite constitutional and its method legal. It would have been better, of course, if these issues were decided by the courts—openly, clearly and competitively. This is the reason why we are implementing legal reform. Until then, however, only a portion of such disputes, in particular the problem of so-called poor relations, will be decided in court. As to allowing the courts to arbitrate disputes involving state secrets, it is an extremely sensitive issue requiring a case-by-case approach: it is extremely difficult to find a comprehensive solution since here we must choose between the rights of individuals and the interests of society. At the same time, improvements in the work of the commission and enhancement of its authority will depend on the level of glasnost in its work, the existence of a clearly defined system to double-checking documents submitted by government agencies in support of their claims and the sensitivity on the part of local executive authorities to the often complex lives of those who appeal to the commission.

As to the makeup of the commission, it is no secret either. Procedural rules for the activities of the Supreme Soviet's bodies are available to the public and are regularly published in open publications. In this case, the presidency of the commission rotates among the Deputy Presidents of the USSR Supreme Soviet's Presidium, including the First Deputy President.

**Question number three:** Why are Soviet citizens departing for permanent residence in Israel stripped of Soviet citizenship without ever requesting it, and why is the decision to strip them of their citizenship not published anywhere, despite the fact that the law requires it to be published in the USSR Supreme Soviet Record?

While responding to this, equally old, question, one should not oversimplify the issue. The problem is that there are three broad trends in the public opinion impacting this issue. The first one is held by experts who look at the problem from the point of view of international law and accepted practices in other countries, and who take into account the world opinion. This group of experts does not share the obsolete approach to this problem. The practice of addressing this problem by restoring USSR citizenship to former Soviet citizens who have, often voluntarily, found themselves abroad, lend support to this point of view.

But advocates of the second point of view are rather numerous, their convictions having been formed over a number of decades. In their mind, all those who leave the

country (the entire group, without any distinctions whatsoever) belong to the category of traitors of the Motherland. However questionable and complex, this tendency is—unfortunately, I repeat—an objective reality of our life.

Since I am rather well informed about the actual circumstances of the departure of some citizens—whose names in recent years have been repeatedly mentioned by the media, at international conferences and official meetings at the highest level—I can state that by no means all of those who left our country have joined the enemy's camp, so to speak. Nevertheless, legislators must take this part of the public opinion into account as well. Glasnost and new ways of regarding so-called former Soviet citizens, especially as far as their attitude to the Motherland before and after their departure from the Soviet Union is concerned, allow many of us to reassess such concepts as patriotism, civic spirit, conscience and other philosophical and political ideas stemming from the new way of thinking. Yet, the old approaches weigh heavily upon us and they can not be willed away or shaken off by some other means so easily. I am afraid that the authors of the letter to SOVETSKAYA KULTURA do not help eliminate, but on the contrary, provocatively work to strengthen this stereotype.

And finally, there is a third point of view: "I don't give a damn." As any other part of the public opinion, it also influences the apparently unhurried experts, those who draft regulatory acts. The above-mentioned factors certainly impact the task of finding the solution for the problem as a whole. Being an optimist, I feel that the existing practice of automatically stripping applicants of their citizenship will not survive long. It is irrational and it can easily be replaced by a rational system of selectively and locally influencing those citizens whose activities violate certain Soviet laws.

As to publishing such decisions openly, this demand is legitimate. On the other hand, I recall that in the case of certain individuals who were persecuted by the media, publications about them were not only plentiful but superabundant. As to ordinary cases, I expect that in the course of reforming the Law on Citizenship the legislation will specify the exact order and venue for such announcements.

I must note that the practice of stripping people of their citizenship allows our political opponents to present them as some kind of political martyrs. Yet, under the influence of our openness and more humanitarian approach, which affects emigration issues as well, international public opinion has been increasingly disabused on this account as well. This is reflected primarily in the actions of officials in Israel, the FRG, the US, Austria and many other countries.

And, finally, **question number four:** Why is the revocation of Soviet citizenship accompanied by an illegal R500 fee for each departing individual?

As to the "illegal R500 fee", I must admit that indeed, I have not been able to find any legal basis for this. Apparently it is another one of those bureaucratic excesses of the sad period of stagnation. Yet, this problem, too, is being addressed. Without dwelling on the nuances of various experts' positions on the issue, I want to note that the OVIR, which the authors of the letter present as an odious institution and at which they direct their arrows, actively advocates, together with a number of other agencies, removing inexplicable taxes and other fees paid for processing applications to enter and exit the country. Their proposals are rooted in the following basic principle. Instead of discriminating based on nationality or country of intended visit, there will be another principle which is no less important under the conditions of new thinking and economic accounting: the more services, the higher the fees. For instance, the fee for a one-time exit visa will be relatively small; if on the other hand the applicant does not want to come back and pay the fee another time, he will be able to pay a higher one-time fee and get an external passport for a longer period of time.

As to those who leave permanently, I think that they should not pay any more than other citizens, but on the other hand they should not get the hard currency the state now exchanges to them. The would-be emigrants should be offended if those sums, however minor, were spent to cover the acute hard-currency needs of the country. The new laws will be based on the expectation that those who invited the applicants would be willing to support them not only politically but materially as well.

And finally, let me say a few words about the position of the editors, who were drawn into a debate with the authors of the letter, who are, I hope, honestly mistaken even though their letter contains elements of provocation. In my opinion, the editors generally correctly assessed the true intentions of these false protectors of Soviet citizens' right to travel abroad. The position of the Soviet delegation in Vienna, which is in line with the decision of the CPSU Central Committee's Politburo on the order of implementation of the final resolution approved there, completely take the legs from under those who want to score cheap political points for themselves while in reality distracting state entities and the media who are already addressing these issues in any event.

Naturally, the social impact of the law on entry to and exit from the USSR will depend on how quickly it is adopted and put into effect by the USSR Supreme Soviet and the extent the defects of existing regulations are taken into account as the new law is being debated and approved.

**KGB Staffers Meet with University Students**  
*18001199 Tashkent PRAVDA VOSTOKA in Russian*  
*25 May 89 p 4*

[Report by B. Khasanov, UzTAG correspondent: "Dialogue Without Secrets: Meeting of KGB Workers with Students and Teachers of Tashkent University"]

[Text] These guests were awaited at TashGU [Tashkent State University] with understandable interest: There have never been meetings like this one before. Zh.

Murtazayev, head of the Uzbek SSR Committee on State Security Administration, G. Bindasov, head of the investigative department, B. Bazarov and A. Ishankulov, leaders of KGB subdivisions, and other employees arrived at the university.

B. Bazarov acquainted those gathered with the main thrusts of the work of state security agencies in present conditions.

"Lately, it has frequently been stated that we are allegedly intimidated by the West's special services and "by mythical foreign agents," he said. "But reality is such that these services have not done away with anyone. They are increasing their hostile activities and are attempting to use the warming in international relations to impede perestroika.

"The number of foreign citizens, tourists, scientists, experts, and students visiting the republic, will increase. The overwhelming majority of them have a friendly attitude toward the Soviet Union. But there are also those whose activities go beyond the limits of what is legal. Provocations toward Soviet citizens living abroad are becoming more frequent.

Special services, the subversive ideological centers of a number of Western countries, will go to any extreme to stimulate the organization of illegal, quasi-legal, and legal formations in our country, which at times are not suspected of acting under their instructions. And individual demagogues, playing on national feelings, create, by their extremist activities, real conditions for special services' active work on destabilizing the political situation in our country.

"One such group is the 'Democratic Union,' headed by a person who was previously convicted of anti-state activities and who supports ties with anti-Soviet centers. Attempting to use the democratization process for purposes which are hostile to the Soviet state and social order, they provoke people to clash with the authorities, appeal for violence against communists, and strive to entice young people into their sphere of influence.

"Lately, leaflets with anti-socialist appeals of a nationalistic nature and threats against young Uzbek girls and women who do not adhere to the most archaic Islamic laws were distributed by a number of irresponsible people in certain rayons even in our republic.

"And really all of this is essentially a repeat of the program of activity of foreign ideological subversive centers against the USSR. A subdivision of the notorious Radio 'Liberty' ('Ozodlik'), which broadcasts from Munich in Uzbek, is ever more actively attempting to push the idea of establishing an Islamic state, arousing nationalist sentiments, and spreading provocative rumors."

In his speech, A. Ishankulov discussed the history of the formation of the security agencies in the kray, the glorious combat traditions of the security officers [chekisty] accumulated during the years of Soviet rule and, that even in our times, republic KGB workers remain true to them.

State security agencies, protecting our socio-political system from any hostile encroachments both from without and from within the nation, are on the track of criminals. And provocateurs, understanding that the KGB's strength is in ties to the masses, are doing everything to break these ties.

The meeting transitioned into a dialogue after these speeches. Students and teachers asked the KGB workers about today's burning issues. They obtained mostly objective explanations in answer. The state security workers demonstrated which ruses foreign special services employ to smuggle provocative materials into our country: Anonymous books with leaflets, items of clothing with hiding places, and letters which look like office correspondence...

"Does the KGB read Soviet peoples' correspondence with foreign citizens?" asked one of the students.

"No and it does not have any right to do that," answered G. Bindasov. "This is only possible with the prosecutor's permission in the interests of an investigation and in exceptional cases."

"Why are people afraid of you?" was one of the questions which was passed to them in note form.

"Honest people do not fear us," stated Zh. Murtazayev categorically, "because we are guarding their interests. And they boldly come to us for help when necessary."

This meeting continued for a long time. And a suggestion was made at the conclusion that security agency workers should meet with society more often to inform them about KGB activities. The KGB workers agreed to do this.

**Concern for Constitutional Foundations of RSFSR**  
*18001311 Moscow SOTSIALISTICHESKAYA*  
*INDUSTRIYA in Russian 30 Jun 89 p 2*

[Article by A. Muravyev, doctor of economic sciences:  
"Russia's Status"]

[Text] All of us citizens of the USSR, after the Congress of People's Deputies and on the eve of the CPSU Central Committee Plenum on inter-ethnic relations, are attempting with a particular predilection to figure out just what is so stirring up the republics nowadays. What is the reason for the present-day complications in inter-ethnic relations? And what path shall we take to go further? These questions are doubly urgent for the RSFSR—a federative state which comprises a unique union of republics and peoples.

In the republic-level and All-Union press issues of national sovereignty and development are raised very widely and radically, including the preservation of language and culture, curtailing migration, and ecological independence. March 1989, as you know, witnessed the publication of the draft "Basic Principles of Restructuring the Economy and the Social Sphere in the Union Republics, Based on Broadening Their Sovereign Rights, Self-Government, and Self-Financing." This document, of course, directly pertains to the RSFSR as well. However, the Russian opinion in this discussion and on the legislative process has not yet sounded forth or is being expressed with extreme vagueness. And this has created the impression that there are no problems with regard to the RSFSR, and that all we have to struggle against is the ubiquitous forced encroachment of the Russian language everywhere, migrants from Russia who do not wish to study the languages of the local populations.

Therefore, I want to state my own opinion and propose certain answers to the questions which are being brought up.

No matter how lamentable and even paradoxical it may be, I must begin with the fact that the RSFSR has turned out to be an undeveloped republic with regard to political and administrative factors. Even for preparing and conducting the process of improving inter-ethnic relations, Russia is lacking in many necessary institutions, without which it is impossible for it to be confident of retaining its rights as a union republic. We have no Russian Communist Party—though we do remember the Leninist RSDRP (b), no Russian organization of communist youth, no RSFSR Academy of Sciences, no RSFSR State Committee for Science and Technology. There are no Russian trade unions or many other things—such a list would be quite long. Inasmuch as it is impossible to eliminate these "negative quantities" in an hour, let me at least formulate them. And, when preparing for the elections of RSFSR people's deputies, let's try to provide the conditions for solving them.

The draft "General Principles for Restructuring Economic Management..." in the union republics proposes to substantially increase the proportion of products turned out by enterprises situated under republic-level administration. Moreover, in the RSFSR this would reach 27 percent, which is several times less than in other republics. Let's probe more deeply into this gap: it means that in Russia more than 70 percent of industry should operate outside of the administration of the RSFSR, whereas in other republics this figure would range from 25 to 50 percent. Is that right? It means that in the RSFSR, on its territory, the distribution of industry, comprising general state property, and hence is also "owned" by the other republics, moreover, in much greater amounts. It follows, therefore, that Russia's natural and labor resources, its de facto scientific and technical potential in its mass is working for the Union. And, at best, this process is only "coordinated" with the government of the RSFSR.

In my opinion, the Russian stance should be that all industry and transport situated on its territory should be under its department, thus ensuring the solution of Union-level problems based on state orders. This, of course, could not be considered as a factor in cutting the Union budget.

And, of course, we can hardly justify, from economic or social viewpoints, the striving to preserve Union subordination in a considerable portion of the national economy. Subordination is a concept from the sphere of administrative-command methods. Economic necessity is a much stronger instrument. To my way of thinking, one of the chief functions in the republics and at the center is to improve such instruments. What I have in mind are the norms of deductions from and contributions to the budget, rates of payments and taxes, as well as the formulation and implementation of various forms of targeted programs, state orders, and so forth.

Enterprises built on the territory of Union republics could be transferred for disposition, utilization, and deadline-free leasing to republics as economic "persons", or collective enterprises with the appropriate contract agreement.

In discussing the draft "General Principles..." we must not fail to pay attention to the divergence of several of these principles from the presently existing RSFSR Constitution. The Fundamental Law of Soviet Russia clearly needs amendments which reflect the spirit and essence of perestroika in the political, administrative, economic, and social spheres of life. This pertains primarily to Parts I (in toto), III, VII, VIII, and other parts. Amendments are necessary to bring this document into line with present-day life in this country. Time waits for no man, and, obviously, the president of the RSFSR should already be making the decision to set up a commission to prepare the amendments, which could be proposed to

the RSFSR people's deputies at their First Congress. Moreover, this commission should be formed in Russia, taking advantage of its sociopolitical potential, rather than importing ideas.

Within the Union, the RSFSR should not allow itself to be drawn into the process of erecting inter-republican barriers. Historically speaking, Russia facilitated the development and consolidation among the various peoples which settled there. We must not lose our way and drift into great-power chauvinism, but some such tendencies are to be seen among certain of the "informals." I assume that the development of mutually advantageous contract agreements and direct ties between republics under the conditions of expanding their rights, based on self-government and self-financing, will be more strongly effective than customs barriers.

And one more thing: until such time as equality of prosperity comes about on the territory of this Union's republics, we must seek out the technical means to safeguard it with minimal social and psychological expenditures. One of the means is to make the transition to cashless accounts with purchases based on consumer credit and with a territorial limitation on the validity of the credit cards. We need to regulate the incoming and outgoing cash payment of funds, a declaration of incomes plus measures to combat speculation. To be sure, it is ridiculous to count on feeding the Non-Chernozem Zone with meat passing through Moscow, when the lands and pastures are empty there.

The inhabitants of the RSFSR are internationalists from birth. Soviet Russia must actively participate in the process of improving inter-ethnic relations. It is, obviously high time that we created a Soviet of Nationalities withing the RSFSR Supreme Soviet. Possibly, this should be done independently of the presence of autonomous formations. Such a step would enhance the authority of the RSFSR and would facilitate the development of all peoples inhabiting the republic.

#### **LPF Appeal Outlining Revised Political Aims Criticized**

18001319 Riga SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA in Russian  
27 Jun 89 p 4

[Article by Ya. Dzenitis, deputy of the Latvian SSR Supreme Soviet and procurator of the republic: "The Foundation of a Legal State: An Urgent Matter"]

[Text] As our readers know, on 31 May the Board of the LPF [Latvian People's Front] Duma [Council] adopted an appeal directed to all members of the People's Front. It proclaimed radical changes in this organization's goals and methods of attaining them. The LPF Duma agreed with this appeal.

The essence of the changes in the LPF's activity may be expressed as follows: if its program speaks about the sovereignty of the Latvian SSR, based on the "Leninist

principles of federalism" (Par. 3, Section II), the appeal proclaims that the organization's goal is to achieve full state sovereignty, "the state independence of Latvia," and "free political development," not within the body of the federation, but "outside the state framework of the USSR."

The methods for attaining the designated goals have also been promulgated. The first of these is the "parliamentary struggle," to be carried out gradually, in stages. In connection with this, the urgent task has been proposed of adopting at the next session of this republic's Supreme Soviet a Declaration of Latvia's State Sovereignty, amendments to the Constitution of the Latvian SSR concerning the property rights of this republic and ratification of the laws of the USSR, as well as adopting the Law on Latvia's Economic Independence. Then they will strive to attain a "favorable outcome of the elections," i.e., to win a majority of seats for LPF members at this republic's Congress, and, by utilizing the "present-day structure of power in the Latvian SSR," press hard to achieve the goal mentioned above.

The second method of struggle should be applied if the "parliamentary method" does not succeed in attaining "full state sovereignty." Here is where "civilian committees" would go into action. The appeal points out that the Duma Board "has an understanding attitude toward the idea of creating civilian committees," "whose activity would have to be broadly expanded if the problem of Latvia's state independence and the nation's right to self-determination cannot be solved by the parliamentary method."

But just what kind of structural subdivision would such civilian committees comprise? Information about them is contained in the materials from the Second Congress of the Movement for the National Independence of Latvia (DNNL). It adopted a resolution entitled "On a Congress of the Latvian Republic's Citizens," wherein it points out that the DNNL fully supports the initiative with regard to civilian committees "for the purpose of convoking a congress of Latvia's citizens as the lawful representative of the Latvian Republic." In one of the speeches the attending participants were informed that, in order to coordinate the activity of forming the civilian committees, a temporary center had been set up, to which representatives of the following organizations have been delegated: the DNNL, the Environmental Protection Club, the Helsinki-86 Group, and representatives of the radical LPF organizations. It was also stated that representation of Latvians living abroad in emigration should be provided at the Congress of Latvia's Citizens.

Thus, in contrast to the republic's Congress of People's Deputies, which will be elected by nationwide voting, it is proposed that we convoke a congress of "Latvia's citizens" from among representatives selected by civilian committees and by emigrants. It is also supposed to



solve the problem of leaving the body of the USSR, and then determining our political and economic arrangement "outside the framework of USSR statehood."

These intentions are not only anti-democratic; they are also anti-constitutional. According to Article 72 of the USSR Constitution and Article 69 of the Latvian SSR Constitution, the right to freely leave the USSR is retained by the Latvian Soviet Socialist Republic. But this means that such an important question can be decided only by the legislative organ of the Latvian SSR, which was founded in accordance with its Constitution, and no other organs are empowered to make such a decision. Their other activity in avoidance of the legislative organs democratically elected by the people is likewise anti-constitutional.

But let's return to the LPF Appeal. It sets forth the following ultimatum: if the deputies of the Latvian SSR Supreme Soviet fail to adopt the above-mentioned legislative acts, and the voters at the upcoming elections do not ensure that the People's Front will receive a majority of the deputies seats, it will begin to "wage a struggle for Latvia's full political and economic independence," i.e., to leave the USSR, but it will do so no longer by the "parliamentary method." In fighting for a legal state, it is, in fact, calling for a direct violation of our republic's Constitution.

The political nearsightedness, irresponsibility, and adventurism of this Appeal are indisputable. And its consequences are unpredictable, inasmuch as the implementation of the actions outlined here could lead to violent clashes between various groups of the population.

A multi-faceted evaluation of the LPF Duma's Appeal has been provided by the Latvian Communist Party Central Committee. Labor collectives and public organizations will also have their words to say as workers. But inasmuch as the Appeal to all members of the People's Front also speaks about the "legal independence" of the republic and about changes in and amendments to the Constitution of the USSR, it becomes necessary for me to dwell on these problems in greater detail.

Over the course of many months several LPF leaders have been "preaching" legal nihilism, that is, a rejection or non-recognition of many statutes of the Constitution and Laws of the USSR. They have been trying to implant in the consciousness of LPF members and other citizens the thought that the USSR Constitution "has become obsolete," that it is a "heritage of Brezhnevism," and that, therefore, it not not be taken into account, and, furthermore, that the republic has the right to adopt laws which contradict the existing Law of the Land. Thus, citing the slogan of "legal independence," the LPF rejects the fundamental maxim (principle) of a legal state: "while a Law is in effect, it should be unconditionally observed and followed." In this way, they ignore the paramount requirement of the Law.

The Charter of the LPF states that introducing changes in the Program of the LPF is the prerogative of the congress, i.e., neither the Duma Board nor the Duma itself are empowered to make such decisions. However, the assertion by the Duma Board of an Appeal which introduces radical changes in the LPF Program attests to the disrespectful attitude which this organization has not only to the existing Constitution, but also to the decisions made by its own highest organ—the LPF Congress. After this, can we believe the assurances of the People's Front about its struggle for a legal state?

Here the following question is also inevitable: with what purpose is this being done?

In accordance with Article 76 of the USSR Constitution, the Constitution of a Union-level republic should correspond to the Fundamental Law of the USSR, while taking into consideration the particular features of the republic in question. Article 74 of the USSR Constitution has established that the country's laws have an equal force on the territory of all the Union republics, and, in case of a divergence between a the law of a Union Republic and the All-Union law, the USSR Law is valid.

In order to attain Latvia's state independence, the Appeal of the LPF Duma Board emphasizes the necessity of providing juridical guarantees which would enable us to choose the form and mechanism of political power. Speaking in more intelligible terms—the necessity of creating the juridical (legal) foundations for changing within this republic the presently existing political, economic, and electoral systems. But to do this, naturally, it would be necessary to make changes in the republic-level Constitution, changes which would not be in accordance with the USSR Constitution. That is why such a furious campaign is being waged against many statutes of the country's existing Constitution, and for the right of the Union republic not to be counted within it. In this connection, one very essential circumstance has not been paid enough attention; and that is that the formulation of the concordance of the Union republic-constitutions to the USSR Constitution was not engendered by Stalinism or Brezhnevism; it is a Leninist thesis.

In the Agreement concerning the formation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, as concluded on 30 December 1922, upon the initiative and with the direct participation of V.I. Lenin, and included in the form of the second section of the first USSR Constitution (1924), the following statement is made: "The Union republics shall introduce changes in their own Constitutions in accordance with the present Constitution" (Article 5). It follows from this that the present-day statements to the effect that, at first, we must adopt constitutions for the Union republics, and then the USSR Constitution are patently not well thought-out, for, in that case, a situation could arise where it would be necessary to make changes and amendments stemming from the USSR Constitution to the constitutions of the Union republics.

The above-mentioned agreement (Article 1, Par. 4) also established and provided that all the USSR Constitutions would refer to the jurisdiction of the USSR, in the person of its highest organs, the abrogation of all decrees of Congresses of the Soviets of Union Republics (Supreme Soviet) which violate the USSR Constitution.

The draft law of the Latvian SSR, entitled "On Changes and Amendments to the Constitution (Fundamental Law) of the Latvian SSR," which has been published for nationwide discussion, and the unconditional adoption of which in its present version is advocated in the Appeal of the LPF Duma, was worked out with the most active participation of juridical scholars who are members of the People's Front or who sympathetic to it. The legal nihilism which was mentioned above can be precisely traced in this document.

Many fundamental changes and additions which are proposed for introduction into the Latvian SSR Constitution contradict the Fundamental Law of the USSR and, therefore, are unacceptable and inadmissible. The Leninist doctrine of socialist legality requires that until such time as the USSR Constitution is amended, a Union-level republic is obligated to observe it. If there is sufficient grounds, a proposal may be introduced to the USSR Congress of People's Deputies concerning amendments to be made to the country's Constitution, and only after an affirmative decision by the Congress can the appropriate amendments also be made to the Constitution of the Union republic in question.

What are the basic positions in the draft amendments and additions to the Latvian SSR Constitution which are not in accordance with the USSR Constitution?

Article 97 of the republic's draft Fundamental Law provides that the Latvian SSR Congress of People's Deputies had exclusive jurisdiction over ratification of a Union-level agreement or the USSR Constitution. But the country's existing Constitution does not provide for the conclusion of such an agreement or its ratification.

Concluding agreements on accepting new republics into the Union was provided for in the 1924 USSR Constitution (Article 1, Par. c). But in the 1936 Constitution concluding agreements was excluded (Article 14, Par. b). Therefore, in 1940 Latvia was admitted into the Soviet Union in full accordance with the USSR Constitution in force at that time. Article 71 of the presently valid 1977 USSR Constitution established that the Latvian SSR, together with other republics, were united withing the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. The following question arises: at the present time, after almost 50 years have elapsed since the Latvian SSR was received into the USSR, what kind of talk can there be about a Union level agreement, and why has this problem been raised?

It is simply opening a box: this is one of the variants of leaving the USSR by means of refusing to conclude an agreement or to ratify it. The roots of the proposed

addition to the Latvian SSR Conclusion hark back to the LPF Program, which asserts that what took place was not an acceptance into the USSR but an "inclusion." Moreover, it was, supposedly, "with the use of force and without eliciting the opinion of the Latvian people."

But, of course, the Latvian SSR was accepted into the USSR at the request of Latvia's seym, which had been elected by democratic means. We cannot ignore or distort this historical fact. What kind of use of force can be taken seriously if the population welcomed the Red Army with flowers and greetings, and the only persons who fled from Latvia were those who had been revealed as traitors to the people?

In accordance with Article 95 of the USSR Constitution (in the edition of 1 December 1988), within the Union republics one-third of the people's deputies are elected from the public organizations having All-Union or republic-level organs. But Article 84 of the Latvian SSR Draft Constitution does not provide for the election of deputies from public organizations. Proceeding from this, Article 98 of the draft provides that the Latvian SSR Congress of People's Deputies shall consist of deputies elected only from territorial districts. Moreover, this article proposes not to include the provision of the USSR Constitution for electing 12 deputies from units of the Armed Forces stationed on Latvia's territory, and this omission does not facilitate unity and integration between the army and the people. Moreover, the quantitative make-up of the Armed Forces can change in one direction or another, and this is capable of bringing about a violation of the following constitutional principle: the equality of election districts with regard to the number of voters.

Proceeding from Article 84 of the draft Latvian SSR Constitution, the Latvian Communist Party, the trade unions—as an organization of the working class, the Komsomol, associations of war and labor veterans, and other public organizations created in a procedure established by Law, are deprived of the right to elect people's deputies representing their interests in the republic's parliament. Furthermore, Article 89 of the draft expands, as compared to Article 100 of the USSR Constitution, the list of collectives having the right to nominate candidates to the office of people's deputy, specifically as follows: such a right is granted to collectives of pupils and students.

In violation of Article 101 of the USSR Constitution, Article 90 of the draft Latvian SSR Constitution provides for the inclusion within the election commissions of collectives comprising pupils and students. They are also guaranteed the possibility of discussing the candidates for the post of people's deputy, as well as the right to agitate for or against a candidate. If we take into account the fact that the LPF already has a considerable influence among students and pupils, then it will become clear to everyone that the goal of these changes is to ensure that the People's Front has access to power by the

"parliamentary method." And hence it becomes clear why salt is constantly being poured into the wounds of the Latvian people—they are being reminded every day about repressions, and they keep demonstrating that the Communist Party has lost the capability and the right to be the leadership force of society; they are also overpraising the living standards during the period of bourgeois rule in Latvia, etc.

And again the question arises: why and for whom are such deviations from the USSR Constitution necessary? The answer is furnished in the Appeal of the LPF Duma Board: for the purpose of ensuring favorable election results for the People's Front.

The draft legislation provide that the Latvian SSR people's deputies can unite together in deputy groups. These deputy groups would be granted the right to introduce proposals with regard to the composition of the Latvian SSR Supreme Soviet. In my opinion, this thesis should be rejected, since the creation of such groups could lead to a schism of deputies in accordance with the nationality principle or membership in various public organizations. It could harm consolidation in the republic's highest organ of power.

Article III [sic] of the draft changes in the republic's Constitution provides that a Latvian SSR people's deputy cannot be detained or subjected to a search. This is not in accordance with Article 38 of the USSR Law dated 30 September 1972 and entitled "On the Status of People's Deputies in the USSR," which does not provide such guarantees of inviolability and which establishes that a people's deputy cannot, merely without the consent of the appropriate Soviet, be held criminally liable, be arrested, and subjected to measures of administrative penalties which are not set forth in court procedures.

Article 165 of the draft Latvian SSR Constitution established that the republic's procurator shall be appointed by the USSR Procurator General and confirmed by the republic's Congress of People's Deputies, whereas he shall be relieved of his duties, upon the proposal of the Congress, and then by the USSR Procurator General. No provision is made for confirmation of city- or rayon-level procurators of the Latvian SSR. This version contradicts Article 166 of the USSR Constitution, according to which confirmation of republic-level procurators by Congresses of Union-Republic people's deputies is not provided for.

The matter of depriving a procurator of his deputy's seat has already been considered during the discussion of the USSR draft Law on additions and changes in the USSR Constitution. Attention was accorded to the fact that, in accordance with the Law on the USSR Procuracy, procuratorial supervision has no administrative power whatsoever, and procurators do not belong to any one of the three "branches of power"—legislative, executive, or judicial (the concept of whose division was discussed.

Practical experience has shown that participation in the work of a procurator as a deputy has elevated the legal level of the Soviets' activities, and the deputyship of procurators does not influence his independence or autonomy from the local organs.

Taking this into account, the restriction provided for procurators was removed from Article 96 of the draft USSR Constitution. Nor are there any grounds for including such a restriction in the Latvian SSR Constitution. However, in violation of Article 96 of the USSR Constitution, Article 85 of the draft republic-level Constitution provides that the chairman and members of the Committee for Constitutional Supervision, procurators, or deputy procurators can be elected as people's deputies of the corresponding Soviets. That is to say, the range of citizens who are deprived of their constitutional right to be elected as people's deputies has been expanded.

The Latvian SSR Supreme Soviet has been granted the right to put a halt to acts being performed by organs of the USSR state administration in case they are not in accordance with the Constitution and laws of our republic (Article 102, Par. 9 of the draft Constitution). Moreover, the right to put a halt to the activity of Union-level state organs is included within the competence of the USSR Committee for Constitutional Supervision (Article 125 of the USSR Constitution).

The procurator of the Latvian SSR informed the Procurator of the USSR that the draft Law on additions and amendments to the Latvian SSR Constitution does not conform to the statutes of the USSR Constitution. Deputy Procurator General Comrade Katusev informed us that the USSR Procuracy fully agreed with this conclusion. In his letter he pointed out that this "is a violation of the fundamental principles of the Soviet federation and attests to a disrespectful attitude toward the laws on the part of the authors of the draft."

He issued the following directives to the Latvian SSR Procurator:

"If the drafts are adopted, the Latvian SSR Procuracy shall be guided by Article 74 of the USSR Constitution, which establishes that, in case of a divergence between the Law of a Union republic and an All-Union Law, the USSR Law shall be in effect."

I am confident that the deputies of the Latvian SSR Supreme Soviet, when they examine and consider at the session of the Supreme Soviet the proposed draft Law, entitled "On Amendments and Additions to the Constitution (Fundamental Law) of the Latvian SSR" and the draft Law of the Latvian SSR entitled "On Elections of the People's Deputies of the Latvian SSR" will manifest political wisdom, juridical competence, and a sense of responsibility for the destiny of the Latvian people, and, taking into consideration the de facto situation in the republic, will not cave in to any ultimatum-type demands.

**Lithuanian CP Spokesman on Consequences of  
1939 Soviet-German Pact**

18001298 Vilnius SOVETSKAYA LITVA in Russian  
8 Jun 89 p 2

[Speech by Lithuanian CP Central Committee Secretary  
Valerionas Baltrunas: "The Soviet-German Pacts of  
1939 and the Fate of the Baltic States"]

[Text] As already reported, a scientific conference was held in Vilnius on the "Problems of Domestic and Foreign Policy of the Baltic States on the Eve and at the Beginning of the Second World War." We invite the readers' attention to the report by Lithuanian CP Central Committee Secretary Valerionas Baltrunas at that conference:

We have every right to call the last four years in our lives a turning point in history. Owing to the efforts of the party, the workers, and the social movements, our society has aroused itself; the political and spiritual life of the nation and the republic have become more diverse, more interesting and richer; and the creative beginning of a scientific and humane socialism has been given birth by perestroika.

As we observe the open and democratic work of the country's Congress of People's Deputies, we are once again convinced that our people are truly being set free from apathy and alienation; that the wind of renewal is tempering the moral health of the republic; and that democracy is inspiring a powerful flow of ideas, emotions, actions and initiatives for working out the mechanisms of renewal. Truth and glasnost, legality and morality are being affirmed. This is purging the social atmosphere, unfettering the consciousness and memory of the nations, and is stimulating the energetic action of the social movements. We are gaining a more profound knowledge and understanding of our past, our present and our future, which today is becoming a practical matter for millions of people.

In the stormy events of our days we again and again turn to our history, in which the most complex processes of public and secret contacts with neighboring states took place. Some of them have long been illuminated by historians, and have become part of the social consciousness of the people; while others are only now finding their way into the light of day and still await the well-focused, detailed analysis of contemporary research. The thoughts which I have expounded do not pretend to be the "truth of the last instance," but perhaps they will serve as the basis for discussions and joint work; in broad outline, they reflect the opinion which is taking shape in the leadership of the Lithuanian CP Central Committee.

One of the important historical problems is the study of the causes and circumstances of the start of the Second World War, especially the "blank spaces" in the history of this period—the unexpected rapprochement of Fascist

Germany and the USSR in 1939, as well as the role of this rapprochement in the subsequent fate of the sovereign Baltic states—Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia.

There are no doubts whatsoever that Fascist Germany had persistently prepared for a large war and at the end of the 1930's was concerned only about the most favorable international conditions for it.

The aggressive plans and actions of the main villain of the war—Fascist Germany—were encouraged by the "Munich" policy of England and France (as well as the betrayal of the Spanish Republic in 1938, and the connivance in the liquidation of Czechoslovakia in March 1939). Additional evidence in that respect was the "non-interference" of the English and French governments when Germany seized the Klaypedskiy Kray in March 1939. This event was the actual beginning of German aggression in the Baltic Littoral, which showed the true intentions of the Nazi leadership in this region.

At the very same time the Soviet Union also activated its policy in the Baltic Littoral, evidence of which is the note of 28 March 1939 to the governments of Estonia and Latvia, handed over by People's Commissar of Foreign Affairs M. Litvinov. In the above-mentioned note, the Soviet Union expressed its determination to defend its own state interests in the given region.

The actions of Soviet diplomacy in 1939 were contradictory and to a certain extent inconsistent. This was brought about by the complexity of the foreign policy situation and the internal situation in the country. But at the same time it became obvious that the means and methods of Stalin's diplomacy were taken up in the international relations of that time. The concluding of the non-aggression pact between the USSR and Germany of 23 August 1939 was not so much a consequence of the real development of the international situation, as much as it was a result of the sharp, and to a certain extent emergency turnabout in the USSR's foreign policy, toward rapprochement with Fascist Germany. The final decision in favor of an agreement with Germany was taken by the USSR in August 1939, when owing to the complex contradictions it was impossible to achieve tripartite agreement among the governments of the USSR, England and France.

As M.S. Gorbachev noted, the calculations of the governments of the Western countries in the course of the Soviet-Anglo-French talks during the summer of 1939 consisted of "luring" the Russians with a promise of an alliance, thereby hindering the acceptance of Berlin's proposal for a non-aggression pact, and depriving us of the possibility to better prepare for the inevitable attack of Hitler's Germany on the USSR. For the Fascists, after crushing Poland and after annexing Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, would then make a dash farther to the East. At the same time the intense armed conflict at Khalkhin-Gol (in July-August of 1939) played a considerable role, having placed the Soviet Union under a real threat of

war on two fronts. Incidentally the fact of signing a non-aggression pact per se is a very widely practiced phenomenon in international diplomacy.

But at the same time we must also stress the clearly negative side of the pact, with which we as representatives of the Baltic peoples can in no way agree. For the USSR difficulties arose connected with the fact that a pact was signed with a Fascist country, against whose policy the Soviet Union and the international community had spoken out for many years, and with which the international communist and worker's movement had fought. While acknowledging the reasons for the Soviet government's acceptance of a proposal to conclude a non-aggression pact and the role of this pact for strengthening the USSR's defensive capability, **at the same time it is necessary to trace the process of realization of the given agreement in practice.** After concluding the pact the Soviet government could no longer maintain the proper distance in relations with the German government and decisively disassociate itself with its aggressive actions in Western Europe. In addition, as history shows, Fascist Germany made better use of the time offered her by the pact to prepare for aggression against other countries, including the Soviet Union itself.

According to diplomatic documents and the subsequent course of events, an additional protocol was appended to the agreement of 23 August. The essence of it consisted of the fact that the USSR and Germany had divided their spheres of interest in Poland and the Baltic Littoral. Finland, Estonia, Latvia and the eastern territories of the Polish state, Western Ukraine and Western Belorussia fell to the USSR's sphere of interest. Lithuania fell into the sphere of interest of Germany. While noting that the originals of the additional secret protocols to the agreement of 23 August have not yet been found (they are widely quoted in foreign literature), we must acknowledge that the subsequent development of events and diplomatic correspondence provide a basis to ask of the fact that the agreement had been reached between the USSR and Germany on delimiting their spheres of interest.

The further foreign-policy rapprochement of Stalinism with Nazi Germany took place after the crushing of Poland and the territorial changes which followed that. On 28 September 1939 a pact on friendship and the border between the USSR and Germany was signed.

From German documents it follows that three protocols were attached to the pact: one confidential and two secret protocols. The confidential protocol concerned resettlement to Germany of the population of German descent, which was living in the Soviet sphere of interest; the first of the two secret protocols clarified the borders of these spheres, which to a significant extent coincided with the ethnic regions; and the second stated that the USSR and Germany would not permit Polish agitation on their territory directed against the other side.

In the first of the aforementioned secret protocols, Lithuania had already gone over to the USSR's sphere of interest. At the same time, on Polish territory, Lyublin Province and part of Warsaw Province were transferred to the sphere of German interests. In addition, a small part of southwest Lithuania went to Germany (which later was acquired by the USSR by an agreement with Germany of 10 January 1941).

Inasmuch as the position of Stalin's leadership was to place the pacts on non-aggression, friendship and the border into the sphere of ideology, anti-Fascist propaganda was struck from the agenda. An impression was formed of an alliance relationship between the USSR and Fascist Germany.

Analyzing all these circumstances as a whole, Gorbachev qualified the pact of 28 September and the declarations of V.M. Molotov connected with it as "a political mistake with grave consequences" for the USSR and other countries and for the communist movement as well, and as "a direct and defiant retreat from Leninism, and a trampling on Lenin's principles." It must also be pointed out, that these political mistakes had far-reaching consequences for the independent Baltic states.

The agreement of the USSR to "delimit spheres of interest," and including formulae on friendship in the agreement of 28 September 1939 in and of itself not only was not justified for mutual relations between a socialist state and Fascist Germany, but also contradicted Lenin's principles for the foreign policy of the Soviet state. Undoubtedly, extending the provisions of the protocol part of the bilateral agreement to third countries would not have had any international-legal significance to the latter. Nevertheless, it was these very provisions of the Soviet-German agreement that had a significant influence on the USSR's policy in the Baltic Littoral, and influenced in a decisive manner the dynamics of the political struggle in Lithuania.

In the new political situation established after the Soviet-German treaties and the defeat of the Polish state, the sovereign Baltic states, under diplomatic pressure on the part of the USSR, were forced to sign mutual assistance treaties with it (Estonia on 28 September, Latvia on 5 October and Lithuania on 10 October). The parties took upon themselves the obligation to render any and all assistance to one another, including military assistance, in case of an attack by any third power; they also agreed not to conclude alliances and not take part in coalitions directed at one of them. It should be stressed that the Soviet Union accepted an obligation on non-interference in the internal affairs of the independent Baltic states. Independent Soviet garrisons were situated on the territory of the Baltic countries, USSR naval bases were established, as well as airdromes for the basing of Soviet aviation.

Under conditions of a raging world war, part of the populace of the Baltic Littoral was counting on the mutual-assistance pacts for protection from Fascist aggression.

In accordance with the agreement of 10 October 1939, the Soviet Union returned to Lithuania Vilenskaya Oblast and its ancient capital, Vilnius. The Lithuanian people had been striving for this for the entire period between the wars. With this step the Soviet government facilitated the process of reuniting the Lithuanian lands, although part of its territory (Klaypedskiy Kray) remained under the occupation of Fascist Germany. However, upon thorough analysis of the mutual-assistance pacts between the Baltic countries and the USSR, it must be pointed out that the stationing of units of the Red Army had a profound change on the political situation in Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia.

The end of 1939 and the first half of 1940 was characterized by further acute intensification of the international military-political situation. Under these conditions the leadership of the Soviet nation took measures to strengthen its defensive positions, and in the Baltic nations in particular. But the implementing of these measures was accompanied by incorrect and at times even crude actions by Stalin's leadership, expressed, for example, in the ultimatum nature of the June 1940 note from the USSR to the Baltic governments.

In the ultimatum to the government of Lithuania of 14 June 1940, for example, the Soviet Union unjustifiably accused it of provocative actions directed against Soviet soldiers and creation of an anti-Soviet military alliance; and it issued an ultimatum to change the government, to take certain of its members to court, and to agree to station an unlimited number of Soviet troops in the most important centers of Lithuania. These demands were not only not at all in accord with international law, neither did they coincide with the spirit of the 1939 agreement with Lithuania.

Even the complex international situation did not justify those forms and methods which were utilized by Stalin's leadership to force the governments of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia to agree, in June 1940, to accept the demands of the Soviet side, delivered in the form of ultimatums, on changes in the governments of these states, and on introduction of additional military units onto their territory.

One must not underestimate the USSR's influence in the region as a factor of the political transformations in the Baltic Littoral, which paved the way for the social processes which followed. The introduction of additional Soviet troops foreordained the fall of the ruling regimes in Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, and it energized the bourgeois opposition and the revolutionary forces led by the communist parties.

From this the conclusion follows that from a scientific point of view, the interpretation advanced in previous years, that the events which began in Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia in mid-June 1940 were purely local socialist revolutions, does not correspond with historical truth. In actual fact, decisive influence on the subsequent course of political events was rendered by the directives foreordained by the Stalin leadership, which were zealously put into effect by extraordinary plenipotentiaries—V. Dekanozov, V. Vyshinskiy and A. Zhdanov. They defined not only the make-up of the national governments, they also planned in an incredibly short time the character of the elections to the parliaments of the three republics, and the mechanism for joining the three states to the Soviet Union as union republics. Consequently, the question of the relationship of this interference and the local democratic-revolutionary movement requires further study.

The parliaments of the Baltic republics (the popular sejm of Lithuania and Latvia and the state дума of Estonia) almost simultaneously (21-24 July 1940) adopted declarations proclaiming Soviet rule, on joining the USSR, on declaring the land to be state property, and on the nationalization of the basic means of production. Between 3-5 August, at the 1940 session of the USSR Supreme Soviet, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia became part of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. This signified a decisive turning point in the fates of the three Baltic nations.

There is no doubt that the violation under Stalin's leadership of the norms of international law and the principles of morality with respect to the peoples and states of the Baltic Littoral in the years 1939-1940 deserve our unambiguous and outright condemnation. Therefore the leadership of the republic believes it necessary that the government of the USSR subject to political analysis the agreements of 1939 and the actions on carrying them out—which we have repeatedly stated, and which was stated at the present Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR as well.

The foreign and domestic political processes which took place in the Baltic republics during the spring and summer of 1940 require additional in-depth study. At the same time, it is necessary to overcome the oversimplified "black and white" approach to these studies. The general democratic movements against the existing regimes, the depth of public awareness in Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia of the real threat from Fascism, the mechanism for elections to the national parliaments, and the possible alternative fates of the three states in 1940, have clearly been insufficiently studied. The oversimplified stereotypes made by others which are now sometimes observed are altogether inadmissible. We must clearly realize that under those conditions Lithuania was faced with two, and not three choices—either with Hitler's Germany, which was overtly proclaiming the theory of the superiority of the Aryan people and the destruction or Germanization of other nations; or, with

Stalin's Soviet Union, where a distorted model of socialism had been established; however, in the eyes of the European community and in the practical affairs of millions of Soviet people, the Leninist and internationalist features of socialism were alive. Historians have a very important role to play in scholarly, well-reasoned analysis of the problems of the years 1939-1940 in the context of all the events in Europe of that time, which determined for many long years the political relations between states on a world scale.

The documents adopted at the 11th Session of the Lithuanian SSR Supreme Soviet gave for the first time a political analysis of the above-mentioned events of a half-century ago—an analysis appropriate to the spirit of the times and the requirements of objective historical truth. The "Declaration and Appeal of the Lithuanian SSR Supreme Soviet to the Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR and the Government of the USSR," states: "Public acknowledgment and condemnation of the secret protocols to the aforementioned treaties are an objective necessity. It is necessary to do this in the name of historical truth, and in the name of the future of the Lithuanian and other peoples of the Baltic Littoral."

Of course, public condemnation of the aforementioned treaties must in no way be looked upon as a return from the present to the past of half a century ago, or as automatic restoration of the juridical norms and international legal acts, by which Lithuania was guided in 1940 and which (as were the legal acts of other European states) were trampled by the Second World War and the course of post-war development.

Stalin's repressions and the illegal mass deportations carried out in Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia between 1940 and 1953 dealt a severe blow to the peoples of the Baltic Littoral and left behind a tragic memory for all succeeding generations. On the fateful night of 14-15 June 1941 alone, nearly 40,000 people were transported from Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. To a certain extent one can assert that these and other actions of Stalin's foreign policy disrupted the natural processes of social transformations, and distorted the idea of building socialism in Lithuania.

At the present time the deportations are acknowledged to be unconstitutional. People who suffered unjustly are being compensated for the losses they incurred. The republic party organization and the public, giving due recognition to the tragic events of June 1941, plan to hold a Day of Mourning and Hope on 14 June, and to pay homage to the memory of all the victims who perished from Hitlerism and Stalinism in the years 1940-1953. We see profound meaning in this for all mankind: while grieving for the innocent victims, we shall bring together all the generations and all social strata, and shall unite all those who hope and believe in the triumph of justice and the renewal of socialism, to create in the name of democracy and humanism the basis for a better future for our children.

Comrades! The political meaning of our conference—in the spirit of Leninist traditions, and founded on the collective experience of historical science and the practical experience of social development—lies in critically and thoroughly analyzing the Soviet-German treaties of 1939 and the fate of the Baltic states. Thereby we shall enrich the strategy of science and will make more concrete the tactics of the forces of perestroika for energizing the intellectual and spiritual potential of society and its history.

### **Solovyev Visits Leningrad State University**

*18001307 Leningrad LENINGRADSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 14 Jun 89 p 1*

[LenTASS report: "Collective Experience in the Service of Perestroika"]

[Text] The dynamic development of revolutionary changes in society, the results of the First Congress of USSR People's Deputies, and the course being taken by economic and political all require a profound conceptualization of the party's role and place at the present-day stage of building socialism.

Communists are posing questions as to the conduct of a wide-ranging discussion of the attitude toward the CPSU Program and Charter, the limits of pluralism within the party, improvement of the procedure for shaping the elective organs, and the direct election of party-organization secretaries.

All these and other problems require collective discussion and the development of an over-all stance on the most urgent directions to be followed within party life.

A conference of the Leningrad State University's party organizations was held yesterday in the Tavricheskiy Palace; it examined the progress being made in restructuring the political work of the Leningrad party organization and the role played by the Communists of the LGU [Leningrad State University] in this process.

The conference was opened by an introductory speech made by V.V. Zakharov, secretary of the University's partkom.

Those assembled here were then addressed by Yu.F. Solovyev, candidate member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and first secretary of the Leningrad Party Obkom. He dwelt in detail on the principal aspects of the activity engaged in by the CPSU obkom after the 28th Accounts-and-Elections Party Conference, the work accomplished in the high-priority lines of the region's socioeconomic development, the new structure of the party apparatus, as well its interrelations with the soviet and economic organs in the localities.



It was noted that nowadays public consciousness on the whole is characterized by an acute dissatisfaction with what has been achieved in the socioeconomic sphere and by an attempt to deeply analyze the complex and, at times, even contradictory phenomena of political life.

In this fundamentally new situation there has been a radical change in the party's role and place in the changes which are taking place. So that it may continue to remain the most influential political force in society, we must boldly proceed further in it to make democratic changes, and to develop an up-to-date theory and practice of socialism. The necessity for the most rapid possible solution of these problems was dictated by assigning to the obkom buro plenum and the CPSU Leningrad Gorkom the task of introducing a proposal to examine and consider the problems of internal party life at the Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee.

Subjected to criticism here were style and operating methods of the party committees, including the CPSU Obkom; it was noted that perestroyka in the party itself was lagging behind the processes of democratization in society.

It was emphasized that, in carrying out the practical tasks of perestroyka in this region, an important role has been allotted to the LGU as Leningrad's leading scientific and educational center. Under the conditions of building a state of law, we need more than ever before outstanding kinds of studies in the area of the social sciences—economic, legal, sociological, and comparative at the level of developing the foundations of social planning, studies which have exerted an enormous influence on Leningrad's development and that of the oblast as a whole.

Also examined here were the problems involved in strengthening the University's material and technical base, as well as solving the social problems of its collective, which comprises many thousands of persons.

Yu.F. Solovyev answered numerous questions from those who had assembled here.

Also taking part in this conference's work was Yu.A. Denisov, secretary of the party obkom.

On the eve of the conference Yu.F. Solovyev had visited Leningrad State University: he dropped in at the museum of its history, the Library imeni M. Gorkiy, and the nuclear-physics laboratory. A thoroughgoing, detailed conversation was held in the University partkom with the members of the LGU partkom buro.

**Aims of Estonian Chernobyl Committee Detailed**  
*18001325 Tallinn SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA in Russian 3 Jun 89 p 3*

[Article by G. Diomidova: "In Order Not To Perish One by One, Or, Why the Estonian Chernobyl Committee Was Formed"]

[Text] ...Let's take each other by the hands, friends, so as not to perish one by one! This poetic line has resounded for a good ten years now, and it expresses probably one

of the most important social tasks for those whose fate—and sometimes life—depends on the degree of humaneness of society rather than the rigid expediency of "plans of bulk," which quite often not only turns into brutality with regard to human beings but also complete absurdity in terms of common sense and competent management.

The "Estonian Chernobyls" have also had to seek one another out and take each other's hands. Although at first many were afraid. Especially of winding up there again. Not because they didn't understand how important, necessary, and essential it was. But because they understood very well how badly everything was organized, because they sensed themselves to be grains of sand between the millstones of a mighty, quite soulless, and very poorly run machine.

And also because, having shielded you and me with their own persons, on returning they felt themselves to be not only superfluous among people but also unnecessary to anyone. But they needed concern and help. And they had the right to count on more attention being paid to them, because they had been sent to clean up the consequences of the accident at the Chernobyl AES, and not always voluntarily either. Moreover, they simply did not know how all of this might turn out for them. And those who sent them, who dispatched them, also had a rather murky idea of their future. This is not to justify officials. It is a tragic statement of fact.

As of today, life itself provides abundant information for contemplation, although it is thoroughly marked with a minus sign. Information for generalization, study, and—ultimately—action. But neither one nor the other, nor yet the third, has taken place. The USSR Ministry of Health, and our own republic organ with it, is still panicked by the words "radiation, exposure." Data concerning illnesses of persons returning from Chernobyl and its environs are processed like ordinary, run-of-the-mill illnesses. The republic is not conducting any research on its own in this sphere; all information is sent to Kiev, to a special institute, where it disappears without a trace or is returned with answers to the effect that the illness of a person who was just recently absolutely healthy has nothing to do with his stay in the radioactive zone. At least, that's the impression people are getting.

The doctors of the republic—as, indeed, those of the whole Soviet Union, at least the competent specialists—take a different attitude toward the problem, one which is more worthy of the calling of a servant of medicine. But in the Ministry of Health, as in any other department, there are papers stamped "Secret." I have seen a handwritten copy of a republic version of one of them. It came to light on 27 July 1986—a time that cannot be called the height of stagnation.

And people are sick. They are dying. Men in the prime of life. Fathers of young children. According to official data recorded in the Estonian SSR Ministry of Social Security



(the only institution, incidentally, which is not refusing to help the "Chernobylians" and is supporting them to the best of its ability, although this is extremely difficult without special medical data!), as of today five of the persons who worked in the radioactive zone have died, five have been classified invalids of Group Two, one has been classified Group Three, and one has been classified Group One. The author of the present lines hopes sincerely that none of her readers will permit himself to shrug his shoulders and say, "Is that all! What's all the fuss about...." But if anyone does, he should know that already more than 4000 of our countrymen have been there. The work is continuing. The Estonian Chernobyl Committee, which is made up of persons who have decided not to perish one by one, is keeping a card file; according to it, another 227 persons are registered who have to undergo constant treatment. And apparently this is by no means all.

Why do many of the "Chernobylians" link their illnesses precisely to their stay in the radioactive zone? A journalist is not a medical expert. I am not competent to confirm or dispute their opinion. I will simply recount in brief the story of Peeter Grimm, who was there, again only by way of information for contemplation.

He was notified by the military commissariat that he was being called up to undergo retraining on Friday evening. Men aged 30 to 45, who had undergone training exercises more than once, were assembled, passed through the usual medical examination, and loaded on a railcar. Where they were going and what for, no one knew. Of the 150 who were transported to the accident zone, 47 wound up in the 30-kilometer zone. They worked without days off, reveille at 6:00, taps at 22:00. Peeter Grimm became a dosimeter operator at the "tomb"—the place where the radioactive rubble was buried. Safety measures—or, more accurately, the rudiments thereof—were violated because of... the planned conduct of the work. For example, a driver hauling contaminated waste was supposed to drive not more than 40 kilometers per hour in order to prevent the dangerous load from shaking out, but it was physically impossible for him to do that and complete the required number of trips. Consequently, they didn't figure his "norm of radioactivity"—that is, it was as if he himself was prolonging the time he spent in the zone. The vehicles and bulldozers were in terrible condition. His only means of protection consisted of "strips" of gauze covering his face. Only rarely were clothing and sleeping accommodations checked for contamination, or changed, and chiefly prior to the arrival of the brass. And two years after the catastrophe, high officials no longer favored the zone with frequent visits. Those lower in rank, according to the rank-and-file servicemen, visited more often, but not on real business and not in places where they were needed; they were simply "collecting" radioactive doses, as quickly as possible, and, of course, merely on paper rather than in reality. Instead of the prescribed diet, the servicemen were fed primarily canned fish and soup; they made tea

with local, contaminated water. Of the rations of mineral drinking water stipulated in the directives, P. Grimm received only... four bottles in the whole three-month period.

They were transported to work on the "tomb" on time, but no one was in a hurry to go and bring them back, although radioactive dust does not care whether you breathe it while working or while awaiting transport. But mainly, no one said how much the men were "picking up," although it was well known that "the rules" called for no more than 0.125 milliroentgens per day. The equipment for taking measurements was very poor. Peeter was working as a chemist and dosimeter operator, so we must assume he knows what he is talking about.

Everyone was coughing badly. Peeter himself spent one and a half weeks in the barracks with an abscess in his throat—also from radioactive dust. He was treated with analgin and aspirin. In the military unit headquarters they had better equipment to measure radioactive doses, and the men from Estonia got together and went there in hopes of finding out how things were with them. They wouldn't let them into headquarters, "you're not in uniform." When the author of these lines asked him an obviously purely feminine question, namely, "Why didn't they let you in? Didn't you explain what you came for?", Peeter just laughed. Army brass and army procedures. The top brass was changed frequently, and the new commanders came in bringing their own barracks rules. One of them, for example, categorically prohibited anyone to lie down on his bunk until 22:00. Even if the men got back by 18:00. Yet the boys were dizzy, terribly weak, and were asleep on their feet. "No one was recorded as having a full dose of radiation. I measured it myself, and I know how to add," says Peeter Grimm. Although he is a mechanic in the Tallinn Soft Drink Plant, he has been on the sick list for almost a year now. He jokes bitterly, "Every cloud has a silver lining; now I have time to be involved with the Committee."

The Estonian Chernobyl Committee, like all volunteer social organizations, had a hard time getting started. People first started talking about the problem on 20 July of last year on the television show "Point of View." In September they raised the issue at the Greens Forum. Then they appealed to the rayon newspapers for help in getting in touch with their countrymen. The first to respond, to its credit, was the Rapla newspaper YUKHISTYOZ. People began to call one another and meet. There was a series of radio broadcasts under the overall title "Letters From Chernobyl." The first Chernobyl forum was held in Rapla in October, with the participation of the city department of the sanitation and epidemiological service. They called a representative of the republic's Ministry of Health, but alas.... Doctor Raudsepp of the oncological clinic showed up. The Greens are providing the Chernobylians with a lot of active and qualified help. The Chernobyl Committee has been functioning since January 1989; it has its own initiative groups in almost all regions. Those who have

not yet found each other can write to Peeter Grimm, Apartment 903, 44 Makhtra Street, Tallinn 200038, or telephone Ayn Payumyae at 532-972 or Toomas Roozilekht at 681-220.

In the four months the Committee has been in existence, it has managed to gain the support of many governmental offices. But a trip to Kharkov to attend events of the Kharkov Association of Participants in the Liquidation of the Consequences of the Accident at the Chernobyl AES showed that it is possible and essential to do much more. The Kharkov Chernobylians formed their association three years ago under the aegis of the Red Cross and are collaborating closely with medical people and with the Kharkov Radiological Institute. Incidentally, the first persons from Estonia needing treatment will be going to the Institute in late June for an examination. In practically three minutes, Peeter Grimm was able to accomplish what the republic's Ministry of Health failed to organize in a year: The Kharkov scientists immediately agreed to take our people in, literally at the first request. The Kharkov Chernobylians are also being supported by the gorispolkom. Since May, the city has provided them with free public transport and, to the extent possible, the city is trying to improve their housing conditions. There are three special apothecaries for them. The Association is focusing all-union attention on the problem of the compulsory sending of citizens to jobs that are dangerous to health under the pretext of military obligations. In the opinion of many competent jurists, this is a direct violation of a number of articles in the USSR Constitution. Another person who was in Kharkov during those days was Yevgeniy Yevtushenko, a candidate for people's deputy. He expressed an idea which was heartily supported by many: that of organizing an All-Union Chernobyl Committee.

But that is something for the future. Today, our own republic Committee has opened an account in the Estonian SSR Zhilsotsbank, No 700459. The money is needed primarily for the material support of the "Chernobylians" themselves and their families, for organizing therapeutic vacations, and, indeed, for trips to Kharkov, which also cost money, although the treatment, of course, will be free of charge. Incidentally, the Committee is counting on the mercy and charity of both individual citizens and enterprises; it requests that labor collectives not just deposit a certain amount in the bank account but also pay kindly attention every day to those of their workers who spent time in the zone of the AES accident. Perhaps some of them are in serious need of help. And after all, who can provide it better and faster than those working alongside?

The Committee is gradually making contact with the families of those who are working today to liquidate the consequences of the accident or will be doing so in the future. So all you wives, mothers, and parents can also write or telephone to the above addresses and numbers,

get advice, and obtain information from people who have already been there. Any experience, especially the kind that was gained at such a price, is worth a lot, and should not be ignored.

The Committee also invites former military units connected with the radiation service to take part.

And, what is probably most important: No one who appeals to the Committee for help needs to feel like a beggar; each one will be met with compassion and understanding. Of course, the resources and funds of these people who are united by a shared concern are far from unlimited, all the work is being done on a volunteer basis during time free of other daily concerns. But the more activists there are, the sooner it will be possible to help everyone who needs it.

#### **Chernobyl Evacuees Invited Abroad**

*18001256 Minsk SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA in Russian 18 May 89 p 3*

[Unsigned article: "Phony Invitation' From Abroad"]

[Text] A man who called our editorial office did not identify himself, saying only that he worked at a motorcycle and bicycle plant. He wondered where and when he can submit his papers to go to work in Canada. He explained that three countries - Australia, New Zealand and Canada - will sign five-year job contracts with those employed by the republic's enterprises and collective farms located in the regions affected by the Chernobyl disaster. He also inquired whether it was true that those taking these jobs will be provided with housing, money and be allowed to lease a plot of land overseas.

Those questions were not a stunner, because the residents of Minsk have been gossiping already about the countries that offered their sponsorship to Belorussia and promised what looked like a life in paradise. That is why A. Lipskiy, a BELTA correspondent, asked competent authorities to comment on these rumors.

Vasiliy Bachilo, deputy chairman of the Belorussian State Committee for Labor and Social Matters, had the following to say:

"We do not have any official documents to prove these rumors. We are in a good position to deal with the problems facing the Republic on our own - to help the victims and to bolster the economy of the Mogilev and Gomel oblasts. I must admit that we witness quite a sizable migration from the affected areas. But the gossip about the movement of people to Canada, Australia and New Zealand is groundless."

The same opinion was expressed at the Ministry of External Affairs of the Belorussian SSR.

"We are aware of the fact that not only the residents of the Republic's capital, but those living elsewhere, have gabbled about the alleged proposals made by some Western countries," said Valeriy Anishchuk, a counselor at the press department. "A flood of telephone calls at the consular department, with the callers asking for clarifications, proves that a new 'wild rumor' has gained much currency." The Ministry does not monitor foreign radio broadcasts, but we assume that they are the source of stories about the possibility of leaving the country. Obviously, a foreign observer made a statement about such an option being quite feasible in principle. That statement was taken as an official one. I can state with full certainty that the rumors are groundless and are not supported by any evidence".

**LiSSR: Many Ionava Wells Still Contaminated**

*18 001190c Vilnius SOVETSKAYA LITVA in Russian  
13 May 89 p 3*

[Discussion with Algirdas Vaychyulis, chief physician of the Republic Disease Control Station, conducted by ELTA correspondent Vida Petrauskayte: "After the Accident"]

[Text] From well to well would be an apt name for the expedition of medical personnel that was organized in Ionavskiy Rayon after the accident at the Azot [Nitrogen] Production Association. Algirdas Vaychyulis, chief physician of the Republic Disease Control Station, discussed this expedition in some detail, and also problems with drinking water with ELTA correspondent Vida Petrauskayte.

The medical personnel went to the villages and farms over which the toxic cloud had passed, he said. They were looking for nitrates. According to data from the Ionavskiy Rayon Disease Control Station's Medical Hygiene Laboratory, increased levels of nitrates were found in 393 of the 718 wells that were checked. The nitrate level was five times greater than the permissible norm in 40 wells, four times greater in 71 wells, and as much as 10 times greater in two of the wells. Test samples of water from the wells were sent to laboratories in Leningrad and Kiev for a more extensive analysis. We did not find any substances unknown to us or any particularly dangerous substances. Tests of drinking water in the environs of the Azot plant will continue, with institutes of the Lithuanian SSR Academy of Sciences, as well as oncologists, becoming involved. After the contaminated wells were mechanically treated on the recommendation of sanitation specialists, water quality improved significantly, but not everywhere. We feel it is imperative that the communal farm services have specialized well cleaning brigades. There are many elderly people in the villages. They are no longer physically able to properly maintain the wells: to systematically pump out the water, clean the bottom, sprinkle fresh sand, and inspect the condition of the surface framework to see

whether surface water is leaking into the well. A specialized brigade, possibly working on a cooperative basis, could carry out all this work. The collective farms could cover expenses for cleaning the wells of indigent families of veterans.

It is estimated that there are now close to 300,000 old shaft wells in the villages of Lithuania. A portion of them are checked each year according to an established schedule. But I must confess that even before the accident, results were disheartening. Let's take Ionavskiy Rayon itself, for example. Last year, of the 327 wells that were checked, the water in 120 of them was contaminated. The level of nitrates, nitrites and ammonia in them exceeded permissible norms. A comparable situation exists throughout the republic. Even in the relatively clean, wooded Varenskiy Rayon, water in the wells has suffered from the improper application of fertilizer on fields. Our neighbors, the Poles, are experiencing many problems in maintaining their wells. Their sanitation specialists have traveled here to share experiences. When a clean well is found in the Polish countryside, a sign is attached to it stating that children may drink water from the well. We also devote special attention to wells in farming centers that await the return of mothers with infants from maternity homes.

An unfavorable ecological situation—soil contamination—is inflicting an increasingly severe sentence on our old wells. Only artesian wells can now guarantee an uncontaminated water supply. Water from a depth of 100 to 150 meters is still pure at present.

The Committee on Environmental Protection and "conservationists" [zelenye] have developed extensive well research programs.

**Data on Post-War Victims Collected**

*18001190b Vilnius SOVETSKAYA LITVA in Russian  
12 May 89 p 1*

["Appeal to the Residents of Lithuania: History Needs the Truth. We Will Help Restore It!"]

[Text] A word of truth is gradually returning to the modern history of Lithuania. Lithuania's act of independence of February 16, 1918 has already been acknowledged, and the twenty-year existence of the Lithuanian Republic is being evaluated in a new light, as are the events of 1940-1941, which were so fateful for this territory. However, the dramatic events of the post-war years remain a complex problem in Lithuanian history.

Until quite recently the history of the post-war years was only depicted in black and white. In Stalinist manner, the dogmatic theory of the "class struggle" divided the republic's population into two antagonistic camps—supporters of Soviet power and its enemies.

Now attempts are being made to provide a more objective assessment of post-war events. Tragically interwoven in these events were socialist transformations and the Stalinist methods used to carry them out, revival of the territory's economy, ravaged by war, and the mass deportation of people, internecine strife and the brutal arbitrary rule of repressive authorities.

The public is particularly troubled by the mass deportation of Lithuanian residents and the bitter fate of those exiled. The Commission to Investigate Crimes of Stalinism has announced a general survey of the population (GIMTASIS KRASTAS, 11 August 1988), is collecting questionnaires on exiles, and is gathering and publishing reminiscences about them. Having broached the subject of the dramatic events of that time, we are obliged to gather data, documents and materials on other victims of tragic fate—those who died during the post-war years on both sides of the barricades.

More complete information has been gathered about the activists, supporters and sympathizers of Soviet authority who were killed by the armed underground. Unfortunately, even this information in many instances is inaccurate and incomplete. In the truthful airing of events of the post-war years, crimes committed by special sections of the Peoples' Commissariat of Internal Affairs involving the murder of Lithuanian residents have come to light.

In studying the events of the post-war years, we are still not able to make full use of all the archival sources from that time, while other documents are one-sided or distort the truth. Superficial articles in the periodical press, written according to boilerplate, provide little information.

In order to uncover the complete historical truth about the post-war period, it would seem to make good sense to expand the boundaries of the public survey by requesting the assistance of the Historical Society and other public organizations. It is extremely important that people who have left their place of birth or moved from the countryside to the city be included in the survey.

A questionnaire...must be completed on every resident of the Lithuanian SSR who perished during the post-war years. It is especially important that the column on circumstances surrounding the death be completed as fully and in as much detail as possible. In answers to the survey's questions, you should indicate their number.

Memoirs about the struggle taking place then, and about the armed confrontations will help in recalling the tragic history of the Lithuanian people in the post-war years. Please attach reminiscences, documents, and photographs of the time, or copies of them, to the completed questionnaires. Authors of reminiscences or the individuals who are forwarding them should provide their full name, year and place of birth, residence during the post-war years, and current address and phone number...

### Travel Regulations Eased

18001190a Vilnius SOVETSKAYA LITVA in Russian  
6 May 89 p 4

[Interview with A. Velichka, head of the Lithuanian SSR Ministry of Internal Affairs Visa and Registration Department: "Visiting Friends Abroad"]

[Text] The changes that are taking place in the humanitarian-legal sphere in our country have extended to procedures for USSR citizens traveling abroad and for foreign citizens entering the country, as well as traveling within the country. SOVETSKAYA LITVA correspondent E. Zayats asked A. Velichka, head of the Lithuanian SSR Ministry of Internal Affairs Visa and Registration Department, to discuss innovations in this sphere.

Work on legislation dealing with this issue is currently being completed, A. Velichka said. Many barriers to the authorization of documents for travel abroad, not only for business trips, but also for visits or permanent residency, have already been removed. This requires an invitation from relatives or friends if the trip in question is a temporary visit on personal business, and from immediate relatives if permanent emigration is the goal. As concerns Israel, an invitation from any relative will suffice.

Many people ask the question, "Are such invitations really necessary? Don't they limit citizens' rights?" But for the time being, these procedures do still exist. Obviously, this will continue to be the case as long as our bank is unable to ensure the necessary monetary exchange.

Procedures for having documents authorized for the person planning travel abroad have been greatly simplified: The questionnaires have been shortened considerably, and character references, certified by party, Komsomol and trade union agencies, are no longer required. By way of example, I might note that when our citizens travel to the US they are obliged to complete a questionnaire issued by the US embassy requiring them to answer 38 questions. Our questionnaire is considerably shorter. What is more, soon citizens taking private trips to CEMA-member countries will not need a foreign passport. Possession of a USSR passport with a special addendum will suffice. These addenda are being prepared for use. This simplified passport procedure will only be applicable for travel to countries with which the USSR has a mutual agreement eliminating visa requirements. In my opinion, the procedure could be examined for other countries as well. Naturally, this is a very complex problem and is not contingent on our country alone.

Many people are alarmed by the problem of foreign travel requests being denied—something that is now quite infrequent, but still occurs. One reason for this is that some people who want to travel abroad possess information that is considered a state secret, while others have been indicted on criminal charges or are serving

sentences. The Visa and Registration Department cannot resolve these issues itself—they lie beyond its jurisdiction. The length of time during which citizens possessing state secrets cannot travel abroad is currently being reviewed with a view to possibly reducing it.

People still complain that they have to wait a long time to obtain a foreign passport, that established timeframes for obtaining authorization are not being adhered to, and that they have to stand in long lines. But placing all of the blame on employees of the Visa and Registration Department is, in our view, unfair.

In light of the ever increasing flow of people traveling abroad in this day and age, we have been handed a great deal more work, yet with no increase in staffing. What is more, we have very primitive technical equipment. All of the developed countries have computerized this work. I want to say something in this regard. It is known that the USSR Ministry of Finances charges citizens a state tax of 30 rubles for processing a foreign passport to the socialist countries, and 200 rubles for one to the capitalist and developing countries. The deduction of a small percentage of these funds would be enough to increase staffing or acquire technical equipment, as well as equipment to properly appoint reception areas for visitors. Local authorities should also help us in this regard, since naturally, it would in large part improve and accelerate the processing of documents and eliminate lines.

Yet despite existing difficulties, we still hope that our citizens will be able to fully satisfy their requirements for visiting other countries in the near future.

Recently we approached Union-republic and republic authorities with proposals for simplifying procedures for entering and leaving the country. In our opinion, if they are codified, we will, to all intents and purposes, be very close to a legal state in this area.

In conclusion, I will permit myself to give some advice to people who are planning foreign travel: Prior to departure, it is essential that you familiarize yourself with the customs rules of the country you are planning to visit or tour. Then you will be able to avoid many of the misunderstandings that arise with some of our citizens returning from a number of the socialist countries.

As is known, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Poland, the German Democratic Republic and certain other countries have imposed limits on the export of specific groups of goods: some are banned for export, while others are subject to state customs duties of varying amounts. Moreover, it must be confessed that some of our tourists or people traveling on personal business, either "forget" about the customs rules when returning or they "play the odds." Then when misunderstandings arise in connection with the fact that they don't have sufficient funds to pay the state customs duties, they turn to our representatives abroad for assistance. I must warn that our employees at these institutions abroad have no right to

interfere in the customs affairs of the host country, and consequently, are in no position to assist citizens who, having failed to acquaint themselves with the rules, make more trouble for themselves in the end.

**Proletarskiy Raykom Discusses VEF Fire Damage**  
*18001316 Riga SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA in Russian*  
22 Jun 89 p 3

[Article by V. Minayev: "Misfortune United Them"]

[Text] Our newspaper has already reported on the disaster which occurred at the VEF [Valsts Electrical Equipment Factory]. According to preliminary and very conservative estimates, direct damage from the fire alone amounted to 5 million rubles. But how many receivers, radio-tape recorders, telephone sets, and other items bearing the VEF trademark will not be received by customers? How much effort and money will be required to rebuilt and, in part, even to build new wings, assembly lines, and workshops? Moreover, this association has traditionally assumed a high level of sponsoring obligations to the inhabitants of its own rayon and the entire city in the sphere of social, cultural, and everyday matters, in the construction of Riga's cleaning facilities, in the production of consumer goods, and to the villagers of the Limbzhskiy Rayon.

As we have seen, it is a misfortune common to all of us, and we must seek a solution to it together. Everybody understands this and shares in it. Precise and effective actions are being undertaken by the staff and three sub-staffs, headed up by General Director I. Brazhis, which were set up literally by the morning after the fire. By Monday the VEF Partkom, together with the secretaries of the party organizations, had already developed a plan for uniting the efforts of all the services and all the public organizations to find a solution to this disaster. The main thing was to determine the fate of those 1500 VEF workers who had suddenly found themselves "without a work place." At the same time the party raykom held a conference with the partkom secretaries of the largest enterprises and discussed possible aid measures with them. An immediate response to the disaster was made by the collectives of the Alfa, Radiotekhnika, and Kommutator organizations, which work in fields closely related to the VEF. The rayispolkom checked out the possibilities of distributing some of VEF's obligations among other enterprises.

And on Tuesday, 20 June, a joint, expanded session was held by the Buro of the Proletarskiy Party Raykom and the rayispolkom, to which the enterprise directors and the partkom secretaries were invited, for the purpose of discussing together how to eliminate the consequences of this natural disaster more rapidly and how to help the VEF.

General Director I. Brazhis informed this session in detail about the fire; he thoroughly analyzed the reasons why, despite the dedicated efforts of the firefighters, the

source of the blaze could not be quickly located. And he acquainted the session with those measures which have already been undertaken to make sure that this enterprise can resume operations at full capacity as soon as possible.

Yes, the fire did a significant amount of damage. The association will be unable to produce at least 15 percent of its consumer goods in the immediate future. By the end of the year these volumes will have amounted to the enormous total of 33 million rubles. Just how can we extricate ourselves from this disaster? There is a comprehensive plan. The principal burden will be borne by the VEF itself, along with the Union-level Ministry of the Communications Equipment Industry. Minister E. Pervyshin visited the enterprise, and the necessary deliveries of items from the products list, as well as financial matters, have been coordinated and agreed upon with him.

This republic's Council of Ministers has already assigned to Gosstroy the task of presenting plans for the necessary construction or reconstruction of wings, built as long ago as the beginning of this century. It has allocated the necessary machinery and mechanisms for dismantling and clearing away the ruins; and it has also allotted auxiliary materials. The VEF has a standardized module, amounting to 10,000 square meters, which could be quickly erected, and production set up and fine-tuned in it. The difficulty is in finding the necessary space in the city. By the morning of 21 June all 1500 of the "burnt-out people" were on the job either at other VEF workshops, at the plant in the city of Stuchka, or at the Radio Plant imeni Popov of the Radiotekhnika Association.

"We understand," I. Brazhis concluded in his speech, "what a responsibility we bear, and we VEF people are determined to eliminate the consequences of the fire as rapidly as possible. We are ready for the difficulties with which we will inevitably have to contend. We also understand that nobody has an extra builders, construction materials, or specialists, that nobody can 'turn aside' in order to erect some housing. And, therefore, we are planning a renovation strategy which counts primarily on our own manpower. But, of course, if someone could help by contributing money to the development fund, we would not refuse."

After evaluating the merits, realism, and balance of the VEF people's plan, as well as their responsibility for the destiny of their own enterprise, F. Kornelius, the party raykom first secretary, proposed to discuss the matter more extensively. Because, after all, a weakening of the VEF's capacity is immediately felt in the rayon, in the city, and in the entire republic.

This was talked about in some detail by G. Izranova, the rayispolkom chairperson. She emphasized that, as a result of this misfortune, the rayon will not receive half a million rubles scheduled to be contributed for its social needs, nor will the trade system receive certain items

which the people have been waiting for. We are not even counting the hard currency which the association had recomputed in order to purchase imported equipment for the processing industry. Nor can we retreat from the assigned tasks with regard to the high-priority development of the rural area to which the VEF has channel significant manpower and funds. Someone must also replace those dozens of workers who used to arrive every day to help the builders of cleaning facilities.

"In general," G. Izranova emphasized, "the production duties, if I may so express myself, outside the association's collective, must be assumed by the rayon's other industrial enterprises. We are prepared to redistribute these assignments in accordance with requisitions."

There were no long speeches at the session. Its participants responded to the misfortune with the following specific proposals in the name of their own collectives: to conduct "Saturdays," to help with funds, to offer work places to the VEF people, and to assume for themselves some of the VEF obligations.

We could conclude on this optimistic note, but, like all the conference participants, I am still troubled by the following thought: how long will we continue to ignore the lessons of the disasters which are hurtling down on our heads. Because, you know, several years ago the firemen warned us that the old workshops at the VEF present a fire hazard. The mistake made by the old-time builders in arranging the wings and in using peat for heat insulation in the roof was intended to be corrected at the time of modernizing this enterprise, but somehow they did not get around to it. A great many discussions were held about the need to have fire engines with long pipes and hoses, but the funds for them were not available. There are only two such installations for the entire city; this is criminally insufficient, all the more so in that Finland no longer produces spare parts for one of them—it has become obsolete. And this is what the firemen had for equipment in their heroic struggle against the fire. And the engines as well as up-to-date tools necessary for getting as close to the fire as possible were not available.

In his conclusion, F. Kornelius reminded the participants that as long ago as August of last year the Latvian CP Central Committee adopted a decree entitled "On Serious Shortcomings in Providing Fire Safety in the Republic." Everybody knows about this, but it turns out that the necessary conclusions have not been drawn. There is hardly anyone who can say with assurance at present that everything is in good order at his enterprise with regard to fire safety and other safety measures. And so we need to have a sense of responsibility, which we know how to manifest at a time of misfortune, but, alas, which we frequently forget during ordinary times, relying on the notorious adage: "Perhaps it will pass by."

**Details On Azeri Emigration From Armenia Given**  
*18310402a*

[Editorial Report] Baku KOMMUNIST in Azeri on 7 May 1989 carries on page 4 a 100-word response to a question on the exact number of Azeris who had left Armenia as the result of ethnic clashes. The response is given by Ziya Yusifadze, director of the department for work with the population which abandoned its permanent residence of the AzSSR Council of Ministers. He says that 135,861 Azeris (29,003 families) emigrated to the AzSSR and "close to" 15,000 had settled temporarily in some rayons in Georgia. At the same time "close to 124,000" Armenians emigrated to Armenia, of which roughly one-third subsequently returned.

**AzSSR MVD Chief Discusses Work During**  
**NKAO Events**  
*18310402b*

[Editorial Report] Baku ADABIYYAT VA INJASANAT in Azeri on 19 May 1989 carries on page 3 a 2,800-word interview with Major General A. Mammadov, AzSSR Minister of Internal Affairs, on MVD activity during the NKAO events. "I have to note that the extreme conditions revealed certain organizational-tactical shortcomings in the work of the internal affairs organs." These included poor discipline and "helplessness." He adds that "360 criminal investigations connected with the event are taking place" and that "more than 300 of the instigators and active participants have been exposed and imprisoned."

**Refugees Complicate Job Picture in AzSSR**  
*18310402c*

[Editorial Report] Baku KOMMUNIST in Azeri on 21 May 1989 carries on pages 1 and 2 a 1,900-word article by F. Farajov headlined "Face To Face With Difficulty" dealing with labor resources in the AzSSR. With regard to the 135,000 Azeri refugees from Armenia, he points out that "work must be improved for the more than 50 per cent who will remain here permanently." Since many of them have only agricultural skills, job retraining is being considered "for a definite part of them."

**Turkmen Roundtable on Socio-Economic Factors**  
**of Nationality Conflicts**  
*18300385 Ashkhabad TURKMENSKAYA ISKRA in*  
*Russian 13 Jan 89 pp 2, 3*

[Report on roundtable discussion led by S. Galechyan, TURKMENSKAYA ISKRA correspondent: "Not to Lose the Reference Points"]

[Text] During the concluding performance of folklore groups in Krasnovodsk, the Kazakh representatives were hissed off the stage and were not allowed to perform. The same thing happened with respect to the Uzbek folklore group from Tashauz. How can one explain what has happened? What is the interethnic situation in the

republic? Is there no cause for interethnic conflicts if we analyze the socio-economic situation? These and other questions were discussed in the course of a "roundtable" meeting on problems of interethnic relations, which was organized by the ideological department of the Turkmen CP Central Committee for party workers of the rayon link, who gathered in Ashkhabad for courses to improve qualifications.

The following took part in the discussion: S. I. Kostenko, inspector of the Turkmen CP Central Committee; O. Musayev, director of the Turkmen branch of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism at the CPSU Central Committee, and doctor of philosophy; Ye. Ovlyakuliyev, chief of the Department of Philosophy and Law of the Turkmen SSR Academy of Sciences, and candidate of philosophy; B. D. Elbaum, a leading scientific associate of the Turkmen SSR Academy of Sciences, and doctor of history; and I. A. Imamkuliyev, senior teacher of the Turkmen State Medical Institute.

[O. Musayev] If we take some evident signs of complications of the interethnic situation—manifestations, unlawful mass actions taking place in other regions of the country, above all in the Baltic and the Transcaucasus—then the situation in the republic does not cause special alarm. All of us are eyewitnesses of this.

However, there are serious problems. I think it is necessary to engage in the prevention of possible manifestations of interethnic aggravations in the future. To intensify attention to questions of interethnic, patriotic education. Our chief misfortune is a lack of culture—of general, political culture, a culture of interethnic relations. We must seriously think about how to solve social problems and problems of the rational utilization of the raw material resources of the republic.

There are problems in the sphere of language. We come to the conclusion: It is necessary to open up mixed schools, where they would study the Russian and Turkmen languages—by choice of the pupils themselves or their parents. Such schools are appearing, but there should be more of them. Moreover, schools for the national minorities are needed. Why are schools operating in Tashauz, where the Uzbek language is taught, but in Ashkhabad there are no such schools. In the capital there are 12,000 persons of Armenian nationality. Why not open up schools or classes for them? And in Mary Oblast, let us say, in the language of the Baluchi, the Germans?

And cultural exchange? Why can the people of Tashauz not independently—without the permission of higher authorities—develop contacts with neighboring Khorezm Oblast of Uzbekistan and Kara-Kalpak ASSR? That is, I again underscore, there are enormous problems in the formation of a high level of interethnic relations. And here but again we are dealing with the results of errors in the fostering of general, political culture.



[Correspondent] What concretely is being done for the development of bilingualism in the republic?

[S. I. Kostenko] Of course, as a minimum we need to know two languages. Let us remember, the representatives of the Leninist guard know 5-6 languages each. Lenin—many more. There are more than enough of those who want to study both Russian and Turkmen. Instruction is now being conducted along the line of the Znaniye Society, the cooperatives can be linked up with this undertaking. And nevertheless, for the time being we cannot satisfy the demand. The requisite base does not exist. Even the existing phrase-books do not stand any criticism. A special integrated program is being developed. In it, in particular, the accelerated study of the Russian and Turkmen languages is also embodied.

[Ye. Ovlyakuliyev] And along the line of the Turkmen SSR Academy of Sciences a comprehensive program of bilingualism is being developed.

[Correspondent] Why are government decrees not implemented in the provinces? For example, the decision was taken, you see, to open up beginning classes for the Baluchi. But even then they have not opened them. . . .

[S. I. Kostenko] You are all acquainted with the resolution of the Turkmen CP Central Committee on interethnic questions and on the course of its implementation, where, in particular, the question was raised about the Baluchi, about the necessity of their instruction in the native language. Already in the first years of the formation of Soviet power, there was this question. Then there were textbooks for elementary schools in the Baluchi language, but in the Latin alphabet (they are now in the archives). It is necessary to translate them into the Cyrillic alphabet. However, there are no specialists for the creation of a modern Baluchi written language. The USSR Ministry of Education is working on this plane. So that the end goal is marked: To open schools for the national minorities. But for the time being, the necessary material basis and the textbooks for this do not exist. The term of its creation is minimal, that is why they have already twice returned to this question in the Turkmen CP Central Committee. They called the first secretary of the Mary Party Obkom on the carpet, including for the fact that, in the development of the relevant program for 1988-1989, questions of the formation of a material base for studies of the Baluchi were not included.

[O. Musayev] I was in Mary Oblast not long ago. Practical measures are being taken. Representatives of the national minorities are now more in leading posts and in the ranks of the CPSU. On democratic principles, elections of farm directors from Baluchi and Germans were held.

[Ye. Ovlyakuliyev] And nevertheless there are many problems. In Mary Oblast there are 25,000 Baluchi. They justly not only raise questions of instruction in their native language. Much still should be done with respect

to the equalization of the level of the socio-economic development of the regions of massive residence of national minorities with the other regions of the republic. In the western regions, with the majority of the population consisting of Kazakhs, they raise the question of the supply of textbooks and the improvement of the qualifications of teachers. In the Turkmen SSR there is no such possibility. National Kazakh traditions are not developing. In Tashauz Oblast, where Uzbeks live in large numbers, they face the question of providing textbooks in the Uzbek language. The Turkmen SSR Ministry of Education receives them on the basis of orders, but not in sufficient number.

At present, a group for the study of the problems of interethnic relations is being created in the OFiP [not further identified] of the Turkmen SSR Academy of Sciences. A concrete subject matter for research is being developed. This will be the priority direction of work of the scholars of the department. In time it is planned to create a special center—an academic council for problems of interethnic relations. It will study questions of the coordination of subjects of scientific research and extend practical assistance in the regions.

[I. A. Imamkuliyeva] Karl Marx noted: The interrelation among nations depends on how the productive forces are developing. This question was on the agenda already from the first years of Soviet power. In the country, with the formation of the USSR, there lived at that time 66 percent of persons of non-Russian nationality who found themselves on a lower level of development—political, cultural, and economic. Since that time, a significant growth of socio-economic development of the regions has taken place. At the same time, the imaginary, catchword-type establishment of the friendship of peoples led to a whole series of negative phenomena in the sphere of interethnic relations. For this reason, in order to bring the development of nations and nationalities in conformity with the norms of socialist development in the country, the scientific forces, the party, soviet, and economic organs can act jointly. To think constantly about the degree of the satisfaction of national and international interests.

In the materials of the 27th Party Congress, it was stated that, beginning with the 1970's, the Turkmen SSR began to lag sharply behind in the rates of socio-economic development compared to the other republics of the country. We are even called dependants. Students frequently raise the question: Why, in the presence of the richest natural resources, are there so many problems in the regional economy? Not by chance, these question were also put at the 13th Plenum of the Turkmen CP Central Committee and at the last session of the USSR Supreme Soviet. Here we must investigate.

[Correspondent] What is the role of the republic in the all-union division of labor?



[Ye. Ovlyakuliyev] We form the budget from grants of the center. But although our oil, cotton, gas, and machine building and agriculture products frequently yield a part of the foreign currency receipts, the interests of the region are not always taken into account. This is the fruit of the imperfection of the economic relations and the stagnation in the country. Now, with perestroyka, we hope the problems will be solved. But the Turkmen model of republic khozrachat must become an organic part of the new all-union economic mechanism.

[B. D. Elbaum] All discrepancies are solved in the course of the political reform being carried through today. And this must be taken into account in cultural and political discussions and conversations, in order for the lack of understanding of the problems of the regional economy not to lead to the aggravation of the interethnic situation. Here a great deal depends on the mass media. I think: The press at times loses the feeling of measure. Of what sins do they not accuse, for example, our Karakum Canal in connection with the problems of the Aral Sea. They have even finished saying that it should be closed. But, you see, this would mean to doom the republic to stagnation. The Aral Sea is fed by the water of the Amudarya, on the banks of which live both Turkmen and Uzbeks. Thus, all of simply will have to expend the common water resources more economically and not shift the guilt for the tragedy of the Aral Sea from one to the other, as this is done by the press—our and the Uzbek press.

The question arises of the correlation of the rights and powers of the center and the republic. And again the press loses the feeling of measure. Indeed, if you read this stream of critical articles today, the impression is created as though the center only brings harm to the republics. There are mistakes, of course. They closed the Gulf of Kara-Bogaz-Gol. Both from the standpoint of the interests of the country as a whole and the republic, the decision was insufficiently considered. But the success of the second stage of the political reform precisely suggests the limitations of the arbitrary decisions of the departments. It is also impossible to forget that in the country a single national economic complex was created on whose development the solution of the problems depends. Accordingly, a strong coordination center is necessary. And it is necessary to be able to explain these aspects in cultural and political discussions with the people.

I am not against criticism of the negative, but the people must also be told about the positive which the center is doing for the regions. And there is a striking example that a strong center is necessary—the tragedy of Armenia, where the entire Union is now helping to overcome the consequences of the earthquake. The Armenian people alone could not cope with this terrible misfortune.

[O. Musayev] Indeed, it would be incorrect to blame the center for all the problems of the region. Basic changes in the economy of the republic are taking place slowly

above all because all the elements of the new economic reform have not begun to function properly in the provinces. The Mary people, for example, have received permission from above to utilize their gas, but for some reason are not hurrying to make use of this possibility. One can cite quite a few such examples. Regular information is necessary in order for there not to be unfounded occasions for discussions about the infringement of the rights of the republics.

[Correspondent] Why is the question of the rational use of manpower resources not being solved? We have a large part of the population not engaged in social labor, especially women, because they simply cannot work anywhere. Is this really normal that the republic—one of the basic producers of cotton—does not have, let us admit, its own cotton-processing industry enterprises, which is precisely where women could work?

[S. I. Kostenko] In the new conditions of management, many possibilities appear for successfully solving the problem. In particular, joint enterprises are being created, and the cooperative movement is expanding. It is necessary to develop promising sectors of industry. You see, this is also a question of the growth of self-consciousness, the culture of the national working class and interethnic relations. But, I shall repeat what has already been said here, an integral national economic complex has taken shape in the country, within the framework of which the division of social labor is proceeding. And there, where we are talking about state interests, everything must be subordinated to the solution of the strategic tasks of the development of the national economy of the country as a whole. It is another matter that the questions of the management of the economy are in need of improvement.

[B. D. Elbaum] It must be taken into consideration that bourgeois propaganda in every conceivable manner exaggerates the sore points of our economy. In particular, we are reminded every time that Central Asia, they say, as before the revolution, remains today only the producer of cotton. Yes, the situation, where practically all of the cotton being produced in the republic is processed outside its boundaries, cannot be called normal. But it is also impossible to forget that the prices for it have increased a great deal and that our kolkhoz farmers are much richer than, let us say, the Russians—the basic producers of grain. Enormous are the incomes of our kolkhoz farmers, especially of those producing fine-fiber cotton. We have to take into account in what conditions this valuable product is sold today to the state. Although, of course, we need to develop a textile industry. This is also the question of finding work for the female population, as has been noted here.

[Correspondent] A part of the lands of Kunya-Urgencheskiy Rayon was long ago transferred to Uzbekistan. What are we receiving in exchange? You see, our lands and water resources are being used. . . .

[S. I. Kostenko] A legitimate question. I was in Tashauz. I talked apropos of this in the party committee. The point is that in Kunya-Urgencheskiy Rayon there are many uncultivated lands, for the working of which we have neither the technology nor the people. So they decided to turn over a part of these lands for 5 years on lease conditions to the Shumanayskiy Rayon of Kara-Kalpakia, where, incidentally, the majority of the population—are Turkmen.

[Correspondent] The raw material resources of the republic permit, if you like, permit every kolkhoz to build its own brick plant. Meanwhile there is a shortage of brick. Why?

[S. I. Kostenko] On ourselves depends the expansion of the production of brick and other construction materials in the republic. For example, in Charshanginskiy Rayon they mine black limestone, which in terms of its qualities is not inferior to granite. There are many who want to purchase this valuable, rare raw material, but in this case it is more advantageous to the republic to process it at home. This promises us large foreign exchange receipts. But for the time being, they impede the existing proportions in the development of the economy, the production and infrastructure sectors. We are doing a poor job of studying the sales market. In Chardzhou, for example, a brick production plant "went bankrupt" only because the brick is red and is not in demand among the local population.

[Correspondent] Have radical measures for the eradication and the prevention of recurrences of inter-tribal conflicts been developed?

[Ye. Ovlyakuliyev] For the time being, one thing is clear: The reasons for the survivals [of the past] and distortions in inter-tribal relations are also concealed in the socio-economic backwardness of the republic, which has been taking shape for years. Scholars are search for answers to these acute questions.

[Correspondent] Has a scientific analysis been made of the aggravations in interethnic relations in some regions of the republic, in particular Yakutia and Bashkiria, and is sociological research on the study of the interethnic situation in our republic?

[S. I. Kostenko] Scholars of the USSR Academy of Sciences have conducted such research in Ashkhabad and in Chardzhou oblasts. We have acquainted the party aktiv with their results. The Muscovites consciously refrained from drawing conclusions of their own. We ourselves have to draw these conclusions. They conducted the survey on the basis of three questionnaires. Analogous research was conducted previously as well, on a narrower subject matter.

[Ye. Ovlyakuliyev] The OFiP of the Turkmen SSR Academy of Sciences is planning to conduct sociological research on the elucidation of the interethnic situation in the republic during the first quarter of 1989, before the CPSU Central Committee Plenum on this question.

[S. Musayev] In conclusion, I would like to say the following. In cultural and political discussions on questions of interethnic relations, we must in no case forget about the main thing: About the strengthening of our Union. There are problems. They will be solved. And our task is to talk more to people about what unites us in the struggle for the restructuring and renewal of society, and not about what divides us. In unity lies our strength.

### **Study Gauges Practical Application Of Economic Instruction**

*18001230 Leningrad LENINGRADSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 23 May 89 p 2*

[Article by V. Krylov, instructor at the Leningrad Higher Party School, and T. Zagruzina and O. Sukhanov, associates of the USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Social and Economic Problems: "Cost Accounting On Command? Findings Of A Sociological Study—How Students Themselves Assess The Restructuring Of Economic Instruction"]

[Text] Before discussing the sociological study's direct findings, we think it not out of place to ask the following question: What is the place of economic instruction in ideological work today?

The question is not accidental. Economic instruction, in our view, is a means of economic education. Nevertheless, in recent years—in both scholarship and the work of primary party organizations—it has ceased to be singled out as an independent area of ideological work. It has wrongly come to be identified with labor education. This is the case even in the party Program, in which economic education is lacking among the areas of ideological-education work.

But, you will agree, just as it is impossible to build a state based on the rule of law without providing legal education for the masses, so is it impossible to shape new economic thinking without economic education.

There is another important circumstance. If we speak today about the need to realize the Leninist concept of ideological work, we must doubtless not forget that the problem of economic education—as a practical task!—was posed by V. I. Lenin immediately following the October Revolution.

It would seem that today, given our radical economic reform, a return to the Leninist ideas of economic education of the masses is highly relevant.

At first glance, the accomplishment of this task is promoted by enterprises' transition per se to full cost-accounting and self-financing. When the results of a collective's performance have a direct impact on an employee's personal income and his ability to improve his living conditions and to solve other social problems, people begin to take an interest in questions that used to be of little interest to them: How are contractual commitments being met? What are unit output costs? Who is to blame for the paying of fines from enterprise profits? One would think that everyone is beginning to realize just how important a knowledge of economics is.

One would think... But now let us turn to the sociological study's concrete findings. The study was conducted by associates of the USSR Academy of Sciences' Institute of Social and Economic Problems at a number of major Leningrad industrial enterprises, among them the Kirovskiy Zavod [Kirov Plant] Association, the Leningrad Lenin Optical Mechanics Association, the Pozitron Association, and the Soyuz Association. The aim of the study was to determine the effectiveness of mass economic instruction and the expediency of combining it with production instruction.

Here are the figures. In the workers' opinion, only one-third of them have a grasp of basic economic principles. Among factors impeding the introduction of cost-accounting, two-thirds of those questioned ranked first "people's lack of conviction that cost-accounting will improve their living conditions." Yet how could they have such a conviction when the same percentage of workers have only a vague perception of the essence of cost-accounting?

All this stems from the fact that the introduction of in-house cost-accounting work methods on workers' own initiative (in brigades, for example) began long before the economic reform. The process proceeded slowly, however, something that was attributed to the lack of cost-accounting arrangements at the enterprise level. But how, then, is one to explain the present situation, in which all industrial enterprises and associations are operating under the new managerial arrangements, but elements of cost-accounting are being used by only about one-third of all brigades, and the most effective contractual methods are being employed by fewer than 10% of all workers?

Of course, shifting enterprises to the new managerial arrangements by directive is a lot easier than introducing in-house cost-accounting and establishing cost-accounting relations among employees. However, only when the transition of enterprises to self-financing and the introduction of intra-production cost-accounting proceed as a single process will the new managerial methods start working at full force.

For very many propagandists, the requirement that the connection between theory and students' vocational activity be strengthened ultimately takes the form of an

effort to reduce all instruction solely to practical advice and recommendations and to emasculate it of theoretical content and its world-outlook function.

Allow us to draw the following historical analogy. When V. I. Lenin proposed the shift to the New Economic Policy, many, even his closest comrades, failing to grasp its essence and need, simply panicked. And not without reason. Four years after the October Socialist Revolution, the introduction of NEP—which, in Lenin's words, marked a "shift toward the restoration of capitalism to a considerable degree"—was viewed by many as a mistake at the very least.

By the same token, many questions of economic reform at the present, essentially revolutionary stage of our society's development—such as the development of commodity-money relations, cooperatives, and individual labor activity, for example—trigger disputes and occasional contradictory assessments. And it is by means easy for either the propagandist or his students to sort out the conflicting views that are often heard in the wide-ranging discussion of socialist economic management experience and the new conceptualization of the practice of the War Communism, NEP, and collectivization periods. Under these circumstances, a knowledge of the theoretical foundations and creative heritage of the Marxist-Leninist classics—and especially of Lenin's works of the post-October period—assumes paramount importance. Meanwhile, more than half of all economic-instruction students virtually never consult them!

Why do propagandists so rarely use active methods of conducting lessons?

Let's be frank: Apparently, they are simply ill-prepared for such methods of conducting lessons. And in general, the problem of the quality of the "propagandist corps" in the economic education system is a rather acute one. A radical way of solving it would be to effect a gradual transition from volunteer propagandists to staff instructors or specialists paid by the hour.

Such a transition would seem both essential and possible. Especially given the present policy of combining economic instruction with vocational instruction. And 63% of all students readily support just such a course of action.

We think the study's findings need no detailed commentary. We must move from the oft-repeated words to the effect that we are now "learning how to manage" to concrete deeds, and as quickly as possible.